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FEDERAL CERTIFICATE REGULATION OF
PRODUCER GAS SALES:
INITIAL RATES AND RELATED PROBLEMS
by
N. Kenneth Scott, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
N ATURAL gas is one of the nation's most important sources of
energy. Statistics for the year 1961 show that natural gas was
consumed in more than thirty-two million residences located in every
state except Maine, Vermont, and Hawaii; in 1930 natural gas was
used in only five million residences.1 During this period, the quantity
of gas consumed residentially increased elevenfold.' This spectacular
growth in demand has resulted from the inherent superiority of na-
tural gas over rival fuels,' its relatively low cost, and the tremendous
growth of the system of pipelines linking natural gas producing areas
with the large population centers." Pipeline expansion was particu-
larly impressive following World War II,' and so was the growth in
demand for natural gas. During the decade between 1940 and 1950,
overall consumption of gas increased 227 per cent, and residential
consumption increased 270 per cent. By 1961, overall consumption
had increased 493 per cent, and residential consumption had in-
creased 732 per cent over 1940 levels.!
Because of the enormous increase in demand for natural gas since
1930 (and particularly since 1940), it was to be expected that the
price of gas would increase, both at the point of production and at
* B.A., LL.B., University of Tulsa; staff attorney, Amerada Petroleum Corporation,
Tulsa, Oklahoma.
' U. S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 727 (1963); U. S.
Dep't of the Interior, 1961 Minerals Yearbook Vol. 2, Fuels 313 (1962).
'U. S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 727 (1963).
a'"The inherent advantages of natural gas are clear and indisputable. It is a clean and
convenient fuel, available instantly on demand, and readily sensitive to precise thermostatic
control. It needs neither handling nor storage by the consumer, and leaves neither smoke
nor ash. It comes ready to burn and its flame, easily ignited and controlled, develops its
maximum heating capacity at once." American Gas Association, Natural Gas, A Study in
Industry Pioneering 5-6 (1964). Substantially the same view was expressed by Mr. Justice
Jackson in his dissenting opinion in the Hope case. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S.
591, 635 (1944).
'This -system has grown from 42,000 miles in 1929 to 52,000 miles in 1932, 77,000
miles in 1945, and 190,000 miles in 1961. U. S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract
of the United States 539 (1961); FTC, Utility Corporations, S. Doc. No. 92, 70th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 84-A, p. 27 (1936).
'More than 65,000 miles of natural gas transmission lines were built in the decade
1945-1955. U. S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 539 (1963).
6 Id. at 727.
7 ibid.
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the point of consumption. Between 1930 and 1940, however, the
average price per Mcf s of gas at the point of production actually
declined from 7.6 cents to an all time low of 4.5 cents.9 Reacting to
the postwar boom in demand, the price of gas at the well rebounded
to 6.5 cents in 1950 and reached 15.1 cents in 1961.1" The average
price per Mcf at the burner tip of all gas consumed increased from
21.4 cents in 1930 to 21.7 cents in 1940, 26.6 cents in 1950, and 51.0
cents in 1961.11 The average burner tip price per Mcf of gas con-
sumed residentially increased from 67.8 cents in 1930 to 71.1 cents
in 1940, decreased to 69.0 cents in 1950, and then increased to 107.0
cents in 196 1 . These comparisons become more meaningful if ac-
count is taken of the decrease in purchasing power of United States
currency that has occurred since 1930. Expressed in terms of 1930
currency value, the average prices (expressed in cents) per Mcf of
natural gas in the years in question were:"
1930 1940 1950 1961
At point of production 7.6 5.4 4.5 8.3
At point of consumption (all) 21.4 25.9 18.5 28.5
At point of consumption (residential) 67.8 84.8 48.0 58.8
Thus, despite the very substantial increase in demand for natural
gas since 1930, its price in terms of constant purchasing power has
changed little since that time. Indeed, the price to residential con-
sumers actually has decreased.
As indicated above, the catalyst which has triggered increased gas
consumption has been the growth of the system of pipelines carry-
ing gas from producing areas to areas of high potential consumption.
Producer"4 and consumer both necessarily are dependent on such
pipelines, for in the absence of a connecting pipeline gas can be
neither sold by the former nor bought by the latter. The large in-
vestment required necessarily limits the number of pipelines con-
structed."5 The dependence of producer and consumer upon pipe-
One thousand cubic feet.




'3 Computed using data concerning purchasing power of the dollar and consumer price
indexes found in U. S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 351,
356 (1963). For a similar comparison, see Garfield, Price Regulation of New Supplies of
Natural Gas, 71 Pub. Util. Fort. 15-16 (1963).
" As used in this Article, the term "producer" means "independent producer," i.e., an
entity that produces gas, but neither owns nor has corporate affiliation with a gas pipeline.
" The costs of large diameter pipelines have been reported to range "considerably up-
ward from $100,000 per mile." Hargrove, Characteristics and Problems of Interstate Natural
Gas Transmission, 1 Economics of the Gas Industry 255, 257 (1962). At the end of 1959,
investment in investor-owned natural gas pipelines was approximately $8.1 billion. American
Gas Association, Historical Statistics of the Gas Industry 399 (1961). At the end of 1962,
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lines, together with the lack of competition among the pipelines (due
to their relatively small number), vested in them at an early date po-
tential power to exploit both producers and consumers." It became
apparent in the late 1930's that control of the few pipelines which
were in existence had passed to an even fewer number of large hold-
ing companies." Because the important cross-country pipelines were
engaged in interstate commerce, the states were held powerless to
regulate sales by such pipelines to local distributors for resale to ulti-
mate consumers."
With this situation before it, Congress enacted the Natural Gas
Act of 1938." This act confers upon the Federal Power Commission
authority to regulate (1) "the transportation of natural gas in in-
terstate commerce"; (2) "the sale in interstate commerce of natural
gas for resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, com-
mercial, industrial, or any other use"; and (3) "natural gas compan-
ies engaged in such transportation or sale."'" Specifically exempted
from such regulation is "the production or gathering of natural
gas.'"" Until 1954 the Commission applied this exemption to sales
there were just 40 interstate pipelines which had (1) over 250 miles of transmission lines
and (2) sales for resale in excess of 50% of total sales. FPC, Statistics of Natural Gas
Companies at VII (1962).
", "The keystone . . . is in control of the pipe lines. Only through pipe lines can
natural-gas producers and consumers deal with each other. With pipe lines in the hands of
strong interests working in quite close harmony, those independent producers who desire to
transport rather than process their output may be deprived of the consumer market. Both
may be at the mercy of those who control the vital link of transportation." FTC, Utility
Corporations, S. Doc. No. 92, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 84-A, pp. 609-610 (1936). The
impact upon producers of the shortage of pipeline capacity in the 1930's has been described
by a former general counsel of the Commission as follows:
Having been caught between large over-supplies of natural gas and totally
inadequate pipeline outlets to ripe markets, many of the producers prior to
passage of the Natural Gas Act in 1938 agreed to sell at ridiculously low
prices gas which would be otherwise flared. These low prices came at the
beginning of an inflationary cycle and not only created trouble for the pro-
ducers who had to agree to inadequate prices but also made attractive for
argument unfair comparisons when new supplies were sold later at several times
the distress rates. Gatchell, Some Basic Factors and Trends in Public Utility
Regulation, 12 Ann. Inst. on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 23, 40 (1961).
"FTC, Utility Corporations, S. Doc. No. 92, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 84-A (1936).
See FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 610 (1944).
"State Corp. Comm'n v. Wichita Gas Co., 290 U.S. 561 (1934); Public Util. Comm'n
v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927); Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co.,
265 U.S. 298 (1924). See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); Oklahoma
v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911). States in which interstate gas was con-
sumed were permitted to regulate the sale of such gas to ultimate consumers. Pennsylvania
Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 252 U.S. 23 (1920); Public Util. Comm'n v. Landon, 249
U.S. 236 (1919).
" 52 Stat. 821 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1958) (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the "act"). For a detailed analysis of the legislative history of the act, see Note,
Legislative History of the Natural Gas Act, 44 Geo. L.J. 695 (1956).
'o 52 Stat. 821 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1958).
"1 Ibid.
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by producers of natural gas."2 However, on June 7, 1954, the United
States Supreme Court ruled in the Phillips case"s that producer sales
in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale were subject to regu-
lation under the act, notwithstanding the "production and gather-
ing" exemption. The Commission was immediately faced with the
task of regulating several thousand gas producers. The nature and
size of the gas producing industry presented the Commission with
unprecedented regulatory problems of great complexity-problems
which, after ten years of effort, remain substantially unsolved."
A significant number of the Commission's post-Phillips problems
have involved producer applications for certificates of public con-
venience and necessity. Under section 7(c) of the act, " a natural-gas
company " may not engage in the sale of natural gas in interstate
commerce for resale "unless there is in force with respect to such
natural-gas company a certificate of public convenience and neces-
sity issued by the Commission authorizing such acts ... ." Certificate
applications must be made to the Commission in writing and must
be verified under oath. The Commission must set such applications
for hearing upon reasonable notice to interested persons. If upon
such hearing the Commission finds that "the applicant is able and
willing properly to do the acts and to perform the service proposed
and to conform to the provisions of the act and the requirements,
rules and regulations of the Commission thereunder, and that the
proposed ... sale .. . , to the extent authorized by the certificate,
is or will be required by the present or future public convenience
and necessity," a certificate "shall be issued to any qualified appli-
"' For a discussion of the history of the exemption to 1954, see Atkinson, Federal Regu-
lation of Natural Gas-The Independent Producers' Status, 13 Sw. L.J. 425, 431-38 (1959).
'sPhillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
"By no means the least of the regulatory problems which the Phillips decision, supra
note 23, thrust upon the Commission was the very practical one of how to cope with the
staggering increase in its work load. In the year before Phillips, the Commission had 283
certificate filings and 706 rate filings; during the first nine months after Phillips, the Com-
mission had 5,673 producer certificate filings and 10,042 producer rate filings. Mason, Prob-
lems in Regulation Under the Natural Gas Act of Interstate Operations of Producers, ABA
Proceedings, Section of Mineral & Natural Resource Law 30, 31 (1961). Six years after
Phillips, the Commission stated that even if its staff were immediately tripled, it would be
82'z years behind in its producer rate work load. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.P.C. 537,
546, 13 0. & G.R. 343, 352, (1960), rehearing denied, 24 F.P.C. 1008 (1960), aff'd sub
nom. Wisconsin v. FPC, 303 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1961), aff'd, 373 U.S. 294 (1963).
25 52 Star. 824 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1958).
26 Section 2 (6) of the act defines a "natural gas company" as "a person engaged in the
transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce, or the sale in interstate commerce of
such gas for resale." 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717a(b) (1958).
27Act § 7(d), 56 Stat. 83 (1942), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(d) (1958). The form and con-
tents of such applications are prescribed in detail by Commission regulations. 18 C.F.R. SS
157.23-157.27 (1961).
28Act § 7(c), 52 Stat. 824 (1938), as amended, 17 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1958).
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cant therefor." 9 If the Commission does not make these findings,
"such application shall be denied.""0 The Commission is authorized,
however, "to attach to the issuance of the certificate and to the ex-
ercise of the rights granted thereunder such reasonable terms and
conditions as the public convenience and necessity may require.""
Pending the determination of an application for a certificate, the
Commission may issue in cases of emergency a temporary certificate
without notice or hearing "to assure maintenance of adequate service
or to serve particular customers.""
Foremost among the problems which have arisen with respect to
certification of producer sales has been the determination of an ap-
propriate initial rate. Prior to 19 5 9 the Commission took the position,
with only one exception," that it should not determine rate ques-
tions in producer certificate proceedings. In 1959, however, the Su-
preme Court held that a producer seeking certification of a gas sale
has the burden of proving that the price he proposes to charge in-
itially is required by public convenience and necessity.' This broad
standard has proved difficult to apply. The Commission has changed
its position several times concerning the meaning of the standard as
applied to producer rates and how it may be met. Other subsidiary
but nevertheless important problems have confronted the Commis-
sion in certificating producer sales.
It is the purpose of this Article to analyze the problems which
have arisen with respect to producer certificate cases, to discuss the
law applicable to such problems, and to suggest appropriate changes
in or additions to existing law."a Problems involving permanent cer-
"
5
Act § 7(e), 56 Stat. 83 (1942), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (1958).
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Act § 7(c), 52 Stat. 824 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1958). Provision
for temporary "authorizations" of producer sales has been made by Commission regulation.
18 C.F.R. § 157.28 (1961). Gas may be sold without a certificate for a maximum period
of sixty days "where imminent danger to life and property can be eliminated by such sale."
18 C.F.R. § 157.29 (1961).
aCities Serv. Gas Co., Signal Oil & Gas Co., 14 F.P.C. 134, 5 0. & G.R. 428 (1955),
rehearing denied, 15 F.P.C. 1020, 5 0. & G.R. 625 (1956), aff'd, 238 F.2d 771 (3d Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 923 (1957).
4 Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959). This case is com-
monly referred to, and will be referred to in the text, as CATCO, which is derived from
the names of the producers involved: Cities Service Production Co., Atlantic Refining Co.,
Tidewater Oil Co., and Continental Oil Co.
as For another recent discussion of this subject, see Johnson, Producer Rate Regulation in
Natural Gas Certification Proceedings: CATCO in Context, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 773 (1962).
For information concerning other aspects of Commission regulation of producers, see Atkin-
son, Federal Regulation of Natural Gas-The Independent Producers' Status, 13 Sw. L.J. 425
(1959); DeCrane, Federal Power Commission: Regulatory Evolution at the Ten-Year Mark,
15 Ann. Inst. on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 271 (1964); Mosburg, Regulation of the
Independent Producer by the Federal Power Commission, 16 Okla. L. Rev. 249 (1963);
[Vol. 18
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tificates o and problems involving temporary certificates will be
treated separately. Because of its pre-eminent importance, the bulk
of this Article will be concerned with the initial rate issue. As has
been indicated above, the Commission has vacillated in this impor-
tant area and the law has evolved, for the most part, on an ad hoc
basis. For this reason, the first part of this Article will trace in con-
siderable detail the evolution of the law with respect to initial rates.
II. PERMANENT CERTIFICATES
A. Initial Rates
Normally, title to natural gas is transferred from producer to
pipeline as produced, pursuant to a long-term gas sales contract that
sets forth, inter alia, the price which will be paid for the gas." The
Commission has provided by regulation3 that such contracts shall be
filed by gas producers as their rate schedules.39 Soon after the Phillips
case'°-as initial prices under gas sales contracts between producers
and pipelines increased in response to the ever growing demand for
gas-the Commission's staff and various interveners began to contest
producer certificate applications on the issue of initial rates. The
contention was made that gas producers, upon filing an application
for a certificate, have the burden of showing that public convenience
and necessity requires the proposed sale at the price provided in the
sales contract. In the absence of such a showing, it was argued, the
application must be denied or the certificate must be issued with a
Smith, The Operator Who Has Discovered A Gas Pool-What Next?, Rocky Mt. Min.
Law Inst. 79 (1962); Stone, Federal Power Commission Developments of Significance to
Independent Producers of Natural Gas, 13 Ann. Inst. on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 1
(1962).
a The words "permanent certificate" are not found in the act, but are used by the
Commission and will be used in this Article to describe a certificate with no specific limit on
its term that is issued by the Commission after a hearing and upon the basis of the findings
required by § 7(e) of the act, 56 Stat. 83 (1942), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (1958).
" For further information concerning such contracts, see Leeston, Crichton & Jacobs,
The Dynamic Natural Gas Industry 309 (1963); Gregg, Negotiating and Drafting Gas
Purchase Contracts on Behalf of the Seller, 13 Ann. Inst. on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation
87 (1962). On rare occasions, all gas in a given field is sold to a pipeline while still in place
in the reservoir, or gas is sold directly from producer to consumer, the pipeline performing
a transportation service without taking title to the gas. On this subject, see Doggett, Mar-
keting by Producer of Natural Gas Through Means--Conventional and Unconventional, 1
Economics of the Gas Industry 193, 210 (1962).
3818 C.F.R. §§ 154.92-154.93 (1961).
"
5 Section 4(c) of the act, 52 Stat. 822 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717c(c) (1958), pro-
vides that every natural gas company shall file with the Commission "schedules showing all
rates and charges for any . . . sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, and the
classifications, practices, and regulations affecting such rates and charges, together with all
contracts which in any manner affect or relate to such rates, charges, classifications, and
services."
' Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
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rate condition attached pursuant to the Commission's authority under
section 7 (e) of the act."
I. Evolution of Existing Law
a. Post-Phillips-Pre-CATCO
(1) Signal One of the earliest contested producer certificate cases
was the Signal case,4" in which the Commission issued a producer
certificate upon the condition that the initial contract price be re-
duced from 12 cents to 10 cents per Mcf. The Commission based its
action upon uncontroverted evidence introduced by interveners in
the case that the highest price then being paid for gas in the area of
the sale was 10 cents per Mcf, that the average price in the area was
9.9 cents per Mcf, and that the proposed sale at 12 cents would force
area prices to that level. Under these circumstances, the Commission
deemed the imposition of a price condition to be appropriate for the
purpose of " 'holding the line' and preserving the status quo."' a
Institution of an investigation into the lawfulness of the rates in
question under section 5 (a) of the act" was regarded by the Com-
mission as inadequate to cope with the situation, because of the com-
plexity of such proceedings and because of the "long delay" involved
in reaching a final decision, during which "there is no way of undoing
the damage done to the public."4 The Commission made it clear that
in imposing a rate condition it did not purport to determine a just
and reasonable rate within the meaning of section 4 of the act.4' The
Commission held that in a proceeding upon a certificate application
the "applicant-seller has the burden of proving all elements of its
application so that we may conclude that the service proposed is or
will be required by the present or future public convenience and
necessity." 7 The level of rates proposed, the Commission concluded,
was "a vital element of such proof," which was not sustained by a
" 56 Stat. 83 (1942), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (1958).
42Cities Serv. Gas Co., Signal Oil & Gas Co., 14 F.P.C. 134, 5 0. & G.R. 428 (1955),
rehearing denied, 15 F.P.C. 1020, 5 0. & G.R. 625 (1956), aff'd, 238 F.2d 771 (3d Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 923 (1957).
43 14 F.P.C. at 149, 5 0. & G.R. at 441.
4 52 Stat. 823 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a) (1958). This section of the act provides
in substance that the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate applicable to
any sale of natural gas upon finding, after a hearing held upon its own motion or upon
complaint, that the existing rate is "unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or pre-
ferential."
45 14 F.P.C. at 147, 5 0. & G.R. at 439.
46 52 Stat. 822 (1938), as amended, IS U.S.C. § 717c (1958). This section of the act
requires that "all rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any natural-gas com-
pany for or in connection with the . . . sale of natural gas subject to the jurisdiction of
the Commission shall be just and reasonable .. " Section 4(a) of the act also declares that
'any such rate or charge that is not just and reasonable is . . . unlawful."
47 14 F.P.C. at 145-46, 5 0. & G.R. at 438.
[Vol. 18
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showing that the price is the product of an "arm's length" transac-
tion.4'
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the Com-
mission's order.4 The court specifically upheld the Commission's au-
thority to attach price conditions to producer certificates and found
substantial evidence supporting the Commission's exercise of that
power in this case.
The Signal case is significant because it is the only instance prior
to the CATCO decision5 ' in which the Commission imposed a rate
condition upon a producer certificate and because it represents an
approach strikingly similar in some respects to that taken by the
Supreme Court four years later in CATCO. After the Signal case,
the Commission continued to enunciate the principles there an-
nounced, but a shift in approach was apparent.
(2) Tamborello More representative of the Commission's ap-
proach in the Phillips-CATCO interim was the Tamborello decision,"1
issued the same day as the Signal decision. In Tamborello, the Com-
mission, although declaring that it possessed the power to do so, re-
fused to attach rate conditions to producer certificates. After dis-
cussing its prior policies regarding the attachment of rate conditions
to pipeline certificates, the Commission said:
However, because the economic and other conditions presented in cer-
tificate applications filed by independent producers are substantially
different from those presented in certificate applications filed by inter-
state pipe line companies, the Commission has not deemed it prudent to
expend the time required to resolve rate issues at this stage, nor has it
found it practical to inquire into the reasonableness of producer rates
in all producer certificate proceedings."
The Commission stated that the interests of distribution companies
and consumers would be protected by the Commission's authority
"to inquire later into the reasonableness of the rates proposed to be
charged by the producers."'" Noting that the proposed initial rate
would result in a "negligible" (one per cent) increase in the pur-
chaser's cost of service, the Commission concluded that "in the cir-
cumstances and considering the time which would be required to
resolve any rate issues in this proceeding at this stage, we do not
4
'Id. at 145-47, 5 0. & G.R. at 438-39.
"'Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC, 238 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
923 (1917).
"Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959), discussed in text
accompanying note 34 supra and notes 99-139 infra.
" Anthony J. Tamborello, 14 F.P.C. 123, 5 0. & G.R. 458 (1935).
5 Id. at 126, 5 0. & G.R. at 461.
13 Ibid.
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believe that further review of the level of the rates proposed by the
producers in this proceeding is warranted.""' The Commission's ap-
proach in the Tamborello case set the pattern for its disposition of
producer certificate applications during the remainder of the post-
Phillips-pre-CATCO period.
(3) Natural Gas Pipeline In the Natural Gas Pipeline case," the
Commission refused to attach rate conditions to producer certificates
authorizing sales in north Texas despite strenuous arguments that
such conditions were necessary to avoid a serious disruption of pre-
vailing prices in south-central Oklahoma. The Commission noted
that in the Signal case:"
[W]e made it clear that the particular circumstances presented in each
case are of decisive importance in determining whether a condition like
that imposed in the Signal case should be attached to the issuance of a
certificate to a producer. These circumstances include the extent to
which a convincing showing has been made that as a result of the price
imposed, the prices for other sales in the area in question will be in-
creased, keeping in mind such relevant factors as the kind and quan-
tity of gas sold, the degree of competition present in the area, and the
extent to which the producer contract in question resembles the other
gas sales contracts in the area.5"
Based on the evidence before it, the Commission concluded that a
disruption of south-central Oklahoma prices due to the sale in ques-
tion was at most a remote possibility. It is noteworthy that because
of the lack of competing buyers in that area the Commission was
unwilling to regard the price paid by the only large purchaser of gas
in two north Texas counties as the "prevailing price" in those counties.
In its order denying applications for rehearing," the Commission
stated that "the element of price to the ultimate consumer is but
one factor to be considered in determining upon the convenience
and necessity involved in a given case."" In this case, the Commission
decided, "other elements overbalance such increases as may ensue
from the certification of the producers' sales . . . at the prices au-
thorized." ' Further, in response to the contention that these pro-
"Ibid.
"Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 16 F.P.C. 80 (1956), amended, 17 F.P.C.
67 (1957), aff'd sub nom. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 257 F.2d 634 (D.C. Cir.
1958), petition for cert. dismissed, 358 U.S. 948 (1959).
a"Cities Serv. Gas Co., Signal Oil & Gas Co., 14 F.P.C. 134, 5 0. & G.R. 428 (1955),
rehearing denied, 15 F.P.C. 1020, 5 0. & G.R. 625 (1956), aff'd, 238 F.2d 771 (3d Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 923 (1957).
a7 16 F.P.C. at 91-92.
" 17 F.P.C. 85 (1957).
sId. at 88. (Emphasis added.)
'0 Ibid.
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ducer prices had not been shown to be just and reasonable, the Com-
mission concluded, quoting its Signal decision,"1 that " 'a proceeding
of this nature cannot and is not intended to take the place of a pro-
ceeding under Section 4 or 5 of the Act.' "..
The Commission's refusal to impose rate conditions upon the pro-
ducer certificates in this case was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia.63 The court held that the Commission
was vested with discretion as to whether or not to attach rate condi-
ions to producer certificates and that the exercise of this discretion,
unless abused, should not be disturbed by the courts. In finding that
the Commission did not abuse its discretion, the court noted that (1)
the volume of gas reserves involved was great, and (2) other
gas in the area, for which 12 cents per Mcf was being paid, was casing-
head gas, which was not as valuable as the gas well gas involved in
this case, for which a 13.9 cents per Mcf price was provided by con-
tract. The court concluded that a comparison of the 13.9 cent price
"with the prices being paid for gas well gas by other gas purchasers
in relevant areas shows that [the 13.9 cent] price is in line."6" This
was the first judicial reference to a price "line" in a producer certifi-
cate proceeding, a concept which, as we shall see, assumed great sig-
nificance after the CATCO case."' It will be remembered that the
"line" concept previously was utilized by the Commission in the
Signal case.
The court rejected the argument that if a proposed price is above
the price then being paid by others in the specific area, the Commis-
sion must either impose a price condition or determine the justness
and reasonableness of the price as ordinarily would be done in a pro-
ceeding under section 4 or 5 of the act. Concerning the latter alterna-
tive, the court said: "Section 4 (a) states the substantive objective of
the Act, that rates be reasonable; it does not specify the procedure
by which this objective is to be attained. That procedure is prescribed
by [sections] 4 (d), 4 (e) and 5 (a). The Commission cannot be re-
quired to convert every certificate proceeding into a rate pro-
ceeding."66
A vigorous dissent was written by Judge Bazelon, who argued
65 Cities Serv. Gas Co., Signal Oil & Gas Co., 14 F.P.C. 134, 5 0. & G.R. 428, rehearing
denied, 15 F.P.C. 1020, 5 0. & G.R. 625 (1956), aff'd, 238 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 923 (1957).
62 17 F.P.C. at 88. As to §§ 4 and 5 of the act, see notes 44 and 46 supra, respectively.
63Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 257 F.2d 634 (D.C. Cir. 1958), petition for cert.
dismissed, 358 U.S. 948 (1959).
"Id. at 638. (Emphasis added.)
"
5Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Sery. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959), discussed in text
accompanying note 34 supra and notes 99-139 infra.
66 257 F.2d at 640.
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that a proposed producer sale could not be certificated under the act
if the initial price is in "substantial disparity with field price," unless
the Commission imposed a rate condition or determined that the
initial price was just and reasonable."7 Judge Bazelon observed that
section 4 procedures were not applicable to initial rates, that
section 5 (a) proceedings were notoriously long and complicated,
and that no provision was made for even temporary suspen-
sion of rates or for refund of amounts received which ultimately
might be found unlawful. For this reason, he concluded, the public
interest in just and reasonable rates was "essentially unprotected"
unless the Commission had the power and duty to protect that inter-
est in a certificate proceeding."8
(4) Hope In the Hope case, " the Commission again applied its
policy that rate issues could, but in the interest of expedience should
not, be dealt with in producer certificate cases. In that case it was
argued by the Commission's staff that a producer applicant must
show in a formal hearing that public convenience and necessity re-
quires the sale at the proposed price rather than at some unspecified
lower price. In the absence of such proof, it was contended, the pro-
ducer fails to support his burden of proof and must be denied a
certificate. The Commission rejected this position, saying:
We are of the view that if the applicant proves there is a market for
the gas at the proposed price and that the project is economically feas-
ible at the proposed price (both market and economic feasibility being
factors which we consider in determining public convenience and
necessity) that it has sustained its burden of going forward with the
evidence, and in the absence of evidence showing that the proposed
price or rate adversely affect [sic] the public convenience and neces-
sity, the applicant has made out a prima facie case, and a certificate
should issue to it." (Emphasis added.)
This was the Commission's first statement of the elements of a prima
facie case supporting a producer certificate application.
The Commission declared that the position advanced by the Com-
mission's staff, if adopted, "would seriously impede the administration
of the Act."7 ' Noting that it consistently had held abridged hearings
in independent producer certificate cases since regulation of indepen-
dent producers first was undertaken in 1954, the Commission stated
that a change in procedure requiring a formal hearing on each pro-
1
7 1d. at 642, 651-53.
68 id. at 649.
"
9 Hope Natural Gas Co., 19 F.P.C. 405 (1958).
70 Id. at 407.
71 Id. at 408.
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ducer application would bring the granting of certificates to pro-
ducers to a virtual halt. The same result would occur in pipeline cases,
it was said, due to the dependence of pipeline applications upon the
certification of producer sales.
(5) Seaboard In the Seaboard case,72 the Commission not only
refused to attach a rate condition to a producer certificate, but also
condemned the use of such conditions in rather broad terms:
Time and experience have attested to the soundness of our position in
the Tamborello case and have forcibly demonstrated at least in the
great majority of independent producer cases coming before us, where
the price for the proposed sale has been arrived at on an arm's-length
basis, that the imposition of a rate condition under Section 7(e) reduc-
ing the price proposed by the applicant for its sale of gas is neither a
proper nor practicable means for protecting the consumer against prices
which may not have been shown to be just and reasonable; and that the
primary instrument for the protection of the consumer against excessive
rates is and must continue to be the means afforded by the rate pro-
visions of the Act.
7
The Commission noted the difficulty which would be involved
in determining a substitute price if the initial price as negotiated were
deemed to be excessive, and insisted that there must be "some
rational basis for the new price"; it refused to apply a " 'grab bag'
approach" under which a price several cents lower than that proposed
would be selected arbitrarily as the proper price level. 4 Field price
evidence presented by the Commission's staff was regarded as having
"little probative value" due to the "possible noncomparability" of
the terms and conditions of the sales being considered. Some of the
"factors which enter into the finally negotiated price" which the
Commission thought might not be comparable from sale to sale in-
cluded: (1) the period covered by the contract, (2) the volume of
gas dedicated under it, (3) the kind of gas sold, (4) its heating value,
(5) certain cost factors (such as the depth of sands from which
production is obtained), (6) accessibility of the gas to the pur-
chaser's pipelines, (7) the fact that the gas may be produced in con-
junction with oil and must be sold to prevent its being flared, and
(8) the number of pipelines competing for the gas."' The introduc-
tion of field price data in certificate proceedings was said by the
Commission to make "difficult the timely administration of the
Act." ' Further, it concluded, rate reductions based upon such data
"Seaboard Oil Co., 19 F.P.C. 416, 8 0. & G.R. 999 (1958).
3 Id. at 421, 8 0. & G.R. at 1005.7 Id. at 423, 8 0. & G.R. at 1008.
71Id. at 423, 8 0. & G.R. at 1007.
16Id. at 423, 8 0. & G.R. at 1008.
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without proof of the surrounding circumstances would be of doubt-
ful validity.
Despite these statements, the Commission warned that high initial
prices appearing in certain contracts were "a matter of grave con-
cern" to it and that the possibility remained of attaching rate con-
ditions to producer certificates if required by the facts." Commis-
sioner Connole dissented at great length, arguing that the Com-
mission should utilize its conditioning power to reduce initial prices
to the "prevailing price for a typical new sale" in the area."
(6) Transco The Commission's approach to the rate issue in
producer certificate cases during this period was developed further
in the Transco case." Although the Commission conceded price to
be an "element" of the public convenience and necessity "complex,"
it held that "in circumstances such as those which exist in this case,
the importance of price in relation to the other elements involved
may be materially lessened.""0 It concluded that the initial price had
not been shown in this case to be "unreasonable" or productive of
an "adverse effect justifying rate conditions." 1 Further, the rationale
of two then-recent judicial decisions " was thought by the Commis-
sion to cast doubt on its "power to alter or vary the terms of con-
tracts between producers and purchasers," contrary to the earlier
decision of the Third Circuit in the Signal case. 3 The Commission
suggested that the practical difficulties which it had encountered in
finding "a rational and workable basis for imposing rate conditions"
might be the result of "an absence of legal authority in the prem-
ises."'" In conclusion, the Commission stated that if it were to "act
as a kind of peace-time OPA for the natural-gas producing indus-
try," undertaking to prevent all price increases and to "force back
the level for all initial producer sales on the basis of a price-ceiling
type of regulation," such an approach, even if valid, would "be
7id. at 424, 8 0. & G.R. at 1009.
7' Id. at 427, 433, 8 0. & G.R. at 1013, 1020. Commissioner Connole's views concerning
regulation of producer prices are set forth in his article, Threshold Prices: A Practical Pro-
posal for Producer Pricing, 63 Pub. Util. Fort. 23 (1959).
" Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 20 F.P.C. 264 (1958), aff'd sub nom. United
Gas Improvement Co. v. FPC, 269 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1959), vacated per curiam and re-
manded with instructions to remand to Commission, 361 U.S. 195 (1959).
8o 20 F.P.C. at 270-71.
'lid. at 271.
2 The decisions in question were United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp.,
350 U.S. 332 (1956), and Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 258 F.2d 906 (10th Cir. 1958).
In these cases it was held that the Commission has iso initial rate-making power, that initial
rates are established by contract by natural gas companies, and that initial rates so estab-
lished may be changed only through § 4 or § 5 procedures.
'320 F.P.C. at 272; Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC, 238 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1956), dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 42-50 supra.
84 20 F.P.C. at 272-73.
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antithetical to the interests of the public and the consumer" in the
long run."
(7) Trunkline In the Trunkline case,"0 the last major certificate
decision during the period between Phillips" and CATCO," although
the certificates were issued without rate conditions, a distinct change
in the Commission's approach was evident. The sales contracts in
question provided for initial prices of 22 cents per Mcf in south
Louisiana and 20 cents per Mcf in Texas Railroad District No. 3.
The Commission summarily approved the south Louisiana sales on
the basis of its prior certification of similar sales in Louisiana and in
the absence of evidence that the price would affect the public inter-
est adversely. However, the Texas sales presented a problem. With
one exception, the highest prices previously certificated by the Com-
mission in Texas were 17.5 and 18 cents per Mcf. The exception was
a sale of gas produced from offshore Texas but delivered in Louisiana,
at which point title passed to the purchaser.
The Commission stated that price was "an important element of
public convenience and necessity," and expressed the opinion that it
should give more weight to that element "so as to discourage further
price increases until the need therefor can be clearly shown."'" The
Commission again indicated its concern over the implications of the
two decisions which had troubled it in Transco" with respect to its
power to impose rate conditions upon producer certificates, but con-
cluded upon the basis of the Signal decision' that it possessed that
power.
The Commission then addressed itself to the "question of proof"
in a producer certificate case. It concluded that, as a general rule, "it
is not feasible or even possible in the confines of producer certificate
proceedings to obtain evidence of costs."" Instead, the Commission
said, it had relied on "comparative field price evidence in considering
the initial prices of independent producers," despite the "limitations
5 1d. at 273.
"Trunkline Gas Co., 21 F.P.C. 704, 10 0. & G.R. 343 (1959), aff'd on another ground
sub nom. Battle Creek Gas Co. v. FPC, 281 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
"' Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 627 (1954). See text accompanying
note 23 supra.
"Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959), discussed in text
accompanying note 34 supra and notes 99-139 infra.
"'21 F.P.C. at 716-17, 10 0. & G.R. at 357-58.
"°Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 20 F.P.C. 264 (1958), aff'd sub nom. United
Gas Improvement Co. v. FPC, 269 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1959), vacated per curiam and re-
manded with instructions to remand to Commission, 361 U.S. 195 (1959), discussed in text
accompanying notes 79-85 supra.
'" Cities Serv. Gas Co., Signal Oil & Gas Co., 14 F.P.C. 134, 5 0. & G.R. 428 (1955),
rehearing denied, 15 F.P.C. 1020, 5 0. & G.R. 625 (1956), aff'd, 238 F.2d 771 (3d Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 923 (1957).
"221 F.P.C. at 717, 10 0. & G.R. at 358.
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inherent in such evidence" due to the "many factors" affecting the
comparability of various sales." In addition to the factors affecting
comparability previously set out in the Seaboard case, " the Com-
mission mentioned the following: (1) the historical development of
a particular field or producing area, (2) the distance from available
markets, (3) the volume of gas being delivered, (4) the delivery
pressure, (5) the provisions for future price changes, and (6) the
impact of local conservation laws." Despite these inherent limitations,
the Commission stated that comparative field price evidence was the
only feasible standard available to it in initial price cases.
The evidence in the case showed that the Texas sales might estab-
lish a new high for jurisdictional sales in the Texas Gulf Coast area
and that the proposed initial price would cause the "triggering" of
first party "favored nations" clauses" in the purchaser's existing con-
tracts. Because of this evidence, the Commission concluded that sub-
stantial proof was necessary for it to find that the proposed 20-cent
price was required by the public convenience and necessity. The
Commission found such proof in evidence (1) that direct sales,"'
intrastate sales, and other nonjurisdictional sales were being made at
prices near or above the price in question; (2) that due to intrastate
competition, significant reserves were not available in the area at
lower prices; (3) that uncertificated interstate sales in another Texas
Railroad District were being concluded at prices nearly as high as
those under study; and (4) that the contracts contained certain
unique features (large volumes of reserves were covered, and the
initial 20-cent price was to remain firm for ten years). The Com-
mission warned that it would "closely scrutinize" any proposed sale
in this area providing for price increases above 20 cents per Mcf
within a period of five years and that, unless a "clear showing" was
made that such prices were required by public convenience and
necessity, certificates would be denied or rate conditions would be
imposed."
03 Ibid.
"Seaboard Oil Co., 19 F.P.C. 416, 8 0. & G.R. 999 (1958), discussed in text accom-
panying notes 72-78 supra.
0521 F.P.C. at 717, 10 0. & G.R. at 358.
"See Ross, The Area Rate Proceedings: An Unsettled Experiment in Public Control of
Natural Gas Prices, 18 Sw. L.J. 163, 171 n. 24, 179 (1964).
"A "direct sale" is a sale from producer to consumer with no intervening change of
title. Although such a sale is not a "sale in interstate commerce for resale" and, hence, is
not subject to direct regulation under the Natural Gas Act, it has been held subject to
indirect regulation through the Commission's authority over the pipeline's transportation
service. See FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1 (1961).
"'21 F.P.C. at 719, 10 0. & G.R. at 360.
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b. CATCO
Proceedings in the CATCO case" began in September, 1956, when
Continental Oil Company, Atlantic Refining Company, Cities Serv-
ice Production Company, and Tidewater Oil Company (referred to
as a group as CATCO) filed applications for certificates to sell gas
to Tennessee Gas Transmission Company from leases covering about
95,000 acres located in the Gulf of Mexico, some 12 to 25 miles off
the coast of Louisiana. The initial price provided for this gas by
contract was 21.4 cents plus reimbursement of state production
taxes00 where applicable. Provision was made for fixed price escala-
tions of 2 cents per Mcf five years after initial delivery and thereafter
each four years during the term of the contract. The reserves covered
by these contracts were extremely large, then estimated to be nearly
1.7 trillion cubic feet. In order to take this gas, the purchaser pro-
posed to build 107 miles of pipeline at an estimated cost in excess of
16.3 million dollars.
After a two-day hearing, the presiding examiner, following exist-
ing precedent, refused to impose a rate condition as urged by eastern
interveners, and issued certificates to the CATCO producers condi-
tioned only upon the issuance of a certificate to the purchaser author-
izing construction of the facilities necessary to take the gas."0' During
the hearing, the interveners had presented evidence (1) that the
CATCO companies were selling gas to the same purchaser from other
offshore Louisiana areas at a price of 17 cents per Mcf, (2) that the
purchaser was paying only slightly more than 10 cents per Mcf (in-
cluding the state tax) for gas in southwestern Louisiana, (3) that
the purchaser was not paying a price as high as 21.4 cents to any
other producer under any contract, and (4) that the fixed price
escalations provided in these contracts were the "steepest" in any of
the purchaser's existing contracts.
The examiner, however, did not give the rate question extensive
attention. He noted that "initial or other prices" paid by other inter-
state pipelines in onshore area under long-term contracts equalled
or exceeded 20 cents per Mcf for smaller reserves and smaller poten-
tials than those covered by the CATCO contracts."' Steep price
"'Continental Oil Co., 17 F.P.C. 563 (1957), modified, 17 F.P.C. 732 (1957), second
order modified, 17 F.P.C. 880 (1957), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Public Serv. Comm'n
v. FPC, 257 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1958), aff'd sub nom. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959). See text accompanying notes 271-278 infra for a discussion
of the proceedings on remand.
'0o At the time the contracts were executed, the Louisiana tax on gas production was 1
cent per Mcf.
1°1Continental Oil Co., 17 F.P.C. 563 (1957).0 21 Id. at 571.
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escalations, he added, "are not unknown in interstate pipeline con-
tracts.""1 ' In any event, the examiner concluded, the record did not
contain sufficient evidence to provide a basis for price comparisons;
and if such studies were undertaken, the validity of all rates entering
into the comparison would be open to question-an inquiry beyond
the scope of a certificate proceeding.
Exceptions to this decision were filed by the interveners and by the
CATCO companies. The interveners objected to the examiner's fail-
ure to impose price conditions, and the CATCO companies objected
to the single condition which the examiner had imposed: viz., that
the purchaser's facilities be certificated. The Commission ruled that
the evidence of record was insufficient to support "a finding that the
public convenience and necessity requires the sale of these volumes of
gas at the particular rate level here proposed. 1.. The rate issue was
said by the Commission to be particularly important in this case be-
cause (1) the size of the reserve was large, (2) the sale was from
newly developed offshore fields from which large proportions of
future gas supplies would be taken, and (3) the proposed price was
the highest at which the sale of gas to the purchaser had been pro-
posed. Citing its action in the Signal case,105 the Commission con-
cluded that on the basis of these factors the sale would not be certi-
ficated permanently "unless the rate level has been shown to be in
the public interest. 10. Accordingly, the Commission remanded the
proceedings to the presiding examiner "to determine at what rates the
public convenience and necessity requires these sales to be made"
under permanent certificates.107 However, faced with "compelling
reasons" requiring that the availability of these reserves not be post-
poned, the Commission issued temporary certificates to the CATCO
companies authorizing the sales and to the purchaser authorizing con-
struction of the requisite 107 miles of line. The Commission added
that its action did not necessarily imply that the initial prices in ques-
tion "are not in the public interest." 00
The CATCO companies requested a rehearing of the matter,
alleging (1) that their acceptance of temporary certificates was
foreclosed by the economic risks they would have to face, (2) that
they could not present sufficient evidence at the hearing contemp-
101 Ibid.
14Id. at 575. (Emphasis added.)
10. Cities Serv. Gas Co., Signal Oil & Gas Co., 14 F.P.C. 134, 50. & G.R. 428 (1955),
rehearing denied, 15 F.P.C. 1020, 5 0. & G.R. 625 (1956), aff'd, 238 F.2d 771 (3d Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 923 (1957).
106 17 F.P.C. at 575.
1071 d. at 576.
10a Ibid.
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lated by the Commission's earlier order "within any reasonable period
in the future," and (3) that they could not afford to commence con-
struction until the initial rate question was resolved. In response, the
Commission modified its previous order by issuing permanent cer-
tificates conditioned upon the amendment of the sales contract in a
manner which would (1) reduce the initial price to 17 cents per Mcf
plus tax reimbursement and (2) allow the CATCO companies to file
a rate increase up to 21.4 cents plus tax reimbursement one day after
deliveries were commenced."' This increase, when filed, would be
suspended for only one day instead of the five months permitted by
section 4 (e) of the act "' and would be collected thereafter by the
CATCO companies subject to an obligation to refund any portions
later determined to be unjust and unreasonable.
The Commission repeated its position that the evidence was not
sufficient to justify the proposed initial price. The price specified in
the condition was said to be equal to the highest price then being
paid by the purchaser for any gas produced in "the Southwest area.. 11
The procedure which the Commission had devised was said by it to
provide a means of protecting the interests of the consuming public
while allowing the pipeline and producers to proceed with their con-
struction programs. The Commission made it clear that it was not
determining that the price provided by the condition was proper
under the standards of the act.
The modified order also proved unsatisfactory to the CATCO
companies. An application for rehearing was filed by the purchaser
in which it stated that it was "advised that the CATCO companies
were unwilling to accept the permanent certificates of public con-
venience and necessity granted by the ... order because they objected
to the pricing and other conditions specified in the order, and that
they would terminate the contracts" on this basis."' In oral argument
on the application for rehearing, the CATCO companies apparently
made it clear that they objected to the price conditions contained in
the order in question and would seek to dispose of their gas outside
the interstate market.
Faced with the possible loss of this gas to the intrastate market,
the Commission reversed its course and issued permanent certificates
without a rate condition."' By the same order, an investigation under
"'Continental Oil Co., 17 F.P.C. 732, 7 0. & G.R. 515 (1957).
"') 52 Stat. 822 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (Supp. IV, 1962).
"'. 17 F.P.C. at 734, 7 0. & G.R. at 517.
"'. Continental Oil Co., 17 F.P.C. 880, 881, 7 0. & G.R. 925, 926-27 (1957).
"' Continental Oil Co., 17 F.P.C. 880, 7 0. & G.R. 925 (1957). The CATCO com-
panies accepted these certificates and began gas deliveries in the summer of 19 58.
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section 5 (a) of the act"" was instituted concerning the lawfulness of
all the rates of one of the CATCO companies. Similar proceedings
already were pending regarding the rates of other CATCO com-
panies. In changing its position, the Commission said it was influenced
by the great need of the public served by the purchaser for increased
supplies of natural gas. The Commission concluded that "important
as is the issue of price, . . .as far as the public is concerned, the
precise charge that is made initially is less important than the assur-
ance of this great supply of gas."'' Further rehearing was denied,
and the stage was set for judicial review.
Petitions to review the Commission's action were filed in the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit by the eastern interveners. That
court vacated the Commission's order and remanded the case to the
Commission for further proceedings."' The rationale of the court's
decision was as follows:
Congress has not given the Commission power to inquire into the issue
of public convenience and necessity where, as here, the applicant cir-
cumscribes the scope of that inquiry by attaching a condition to its
application requiring the Commission to forego the consideration of
an element which may be necessary in the formulation of its judgment.
Otherwise stated, the Commission has not been endowed by Congress
with jurisdiction to conduct a limited inquiry."' (Emphasis in or-
iginal.)
Upon petition of the CATCO companies, certiorari was granted by
the Supreme Court."' On June 22, 1959, the Supreme Court issued its
opinion affirming the judgment of the Third Circuit on different
grounds and remanding the applications to the Commission for further
proceedings."' The Court ruled that the lower court was in error in
deciding that the Commission had been deprived of jurisdiction by
the acts of the CATCO companies. The Court noted that the pro-
posed sales had not begun, that the sales contracts were conditioned
upon the issuance of certificates, and that failure of either party to se-
cure certificates rendered the contracts subject to termination. The
Court further observed that the mere filing of an application for a
certificate did not constitute the "dedication" of gas to the interstate
market and that the CATCO producers were at liberty to refuse con-
14 52 Stat. 824 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a) (1958). See note 44 supra and accom-
panying text.
" 17 F.P.C. 881, 7 0. & G.R. at 927. (Emphasis added.)
"'Continental Oil Co., 18 F.P.C. 169 (1957).
.. Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 257 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1958).
"' Id. at 723.
"358 U.S. 926 (1959).
Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959).
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ditional certificates proposed by the Commission's second order. The
Court summarized its position on this matter as follows:
While the refusal might have been couched in more diplomatic lan-
guage, it had no effect on the Commission's power to act on the rehear-
ing requested. Even though the Commission did march up the hill only
to march down again upon reaching the summit we cannot say this
about-face deprived it of jurisdiction. We find nothing illegal in the
petitioners' rejection of the alternative price proposed by the Commis-
sion and their standing firm on their own."
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court on the narrow ground
that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of public
convenience and necessity, a prerequisite to the issuance of the
permanent certificates. However, the importance of the decision as
a landmark in producer regulation resulted from its extensive dicta
concerning the rate issue in producer certificate proceedings. This
portion of the decision is founded on the Court's assertion that the
purpose of the Natural Gas Act 2 ' was to "underwrite" just and
reasonable rates to the consumers of natural gas and to afford con-
sumers "a complete, permanent and effective bond of protection"
from excessive rates." 3 Having laid this predicate, the Court observed
that gas purchasers had no protection from excessive charges collected
during the pendency of section 5 proceedings, which appeared "nigh
interminable," and that the Commission was not given the power to
suspend initial rates under section 7. The Court concluded that a sale
should not be certificated permanently unless the rate level had been
shown to be in the public interest and that, if the proposed price was
inconsistent with the public interest, the Commission in its discretion
could attach such conditions as it believed necessary.
Arrayed on this basic frame of reasoning was an assortment of
dicta to which great significance has been attributed. Conceding
that the act did not require a determination of just and reason-
able rates in a section 7 proceeding as it did under either section 4 or
section 5, the Court said it was not holding that "a 'just and reason-
able' rate hearing" was required prior to the issuance of a producer
certificate. The Court stated it was holding that, in view of the
"inordinate delay" involved in section 5 proceedings, the Com-
mission must give "a most careful scrutiny and responsible reaction
to the initial price proposals of producers."1 " Recognizing that rates
were not the only factor bearing on the public convenience and neces-
121 Id. at 388.
122 52 Stat. 821 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1958).
123 360 U.S. at 388-90.
12Id. at 391.
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sity and that the Commission must evaluate all factors bearing on
the public interest, the Court took the position that price becomes
"a consideration of prime importance" if "prices have leaped from
one plateau to the higher levels of another, as is indicated here."
12
5
On this subject the Court said:
Where the application on its face or on presentation of evidence signals
the existence of a situation that probably would not be in the public in-
terest, a permanent certificate should not be issued.
There is, of course, available in such a situation, a method by which
the applicant and the Commission can arrive at a rate that is in keep-
ing with the public convenience and necessity. The Congress, in [sec-
tion] 7(e), has authorized the Commission to condition certificates in
such manner as the public convenience and necessity may require. Where
the proposed price is not in keeping with the public interest because it is
out of line or because its approval might result in a triggering of general
rice rises or an increase in the applicant's existing rates by reason of
"favored nation" clauses or otherwise, the Commission in the exercise
of its discretion might attach such conditions as it believes necessary.""0
(Emphasis added.)
The Court brushed aside the contention that the attachment
of rate conditions to producer certificates would encroach on the
power-recognized by the Court in previous cases 7 -of natural gas
companies to establish initial rates. The attachment of rate condi-
tions was said not to be the determination of rates by the Commis-
sion or the overturning of rates agreed upon by the parties; rather,
the Court concluded, such procedures "act to hold the line awaiting
adjudication of a just and reasonable rate.' '..
In holding that the evidence was insufficient to support the Com-
mission's certification of the sales, the Court said that the witnesses
in support of the applications "developed little more information than
was included in the printed contracts" and that "no effort was made
to give the 'reason why' " the initial price was higher than any pre-
viously paid by the purchaser and was some seventy per cent higher
than the weighted average cost of gas to the purchaser.' The Court
expressed surprise that evidence, if available, was not introduced con-
cerning relative costs of production. More damaging, in the Court's
view, was evidence that the proposed price greatly exceeded all other
prices paid by the purchaser for gas from south Louisiana.
121 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
" United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S. 103 (1958);
United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956). It will be re-
called that this point was a matter of concern to the Commission in the Transco and
Trunkline cases, discussed in text accompanying notes 79-98 supra.
'28360 U.S. at 392.
1
2
1 Id. at 392-93.
[Vol. 18
1964] FPC REGULATION OF PRODUCER GAS SALES 591
The Court also noted that the construction of a pipeline to
the producers' wells was "unsupported by evidence of practice or
custom," and that the movement of producer-owned distillates
by the pipeline at no cost (which was a part of the sales arrange-
ment) was without supporting data.' The evidence as to whether
the proposed initial price would cause "favored nation" price in-
creases was regarded by the Court as unconvincing. The "claim"
that no increase in the purchaser's rates would result from this
price similarly was dismissed. No evidence was found by the
Court that supported the Commission's "conclusory finding" of a
public need for this gas or that the producers would seek to dispose
of this gas elsewhere than in interstate commerce. The Court asserted
that the sale of the great quantities of gas involved in this case
"would hardly be profitable except interstate," because "some 90%"
of all commercial gas moved into the interstate market."'
Justices Harlan and Frankfurter concurred"' in the decision on the
ground that the record did not support the findings upon which the
Commission based its conclusion that the public convenience and
necessity required the issuance to petitioners of unconditional per-
manent certificates. Specifically, they noted the lack of evidence sup-
porting two "crucial findings": (1) the public need for increased gas
supplies, especially to the extent that this finding implied an im-
mediate need which could not be satisfied from the purchaser's exist-
ing reserves, and (2) the danger of loss of the CATCO gas to the
interstate market unless unconditioned certificates were issued. In
view of this lack of evidence, the concurring Justices were of the
opinion that consideration of the other questions sought to be pre-
sented by the parties was unnecessary.
The CATCO decision authoritatively settled the question of
whether initial rates were properly an issue in certificate proceedings.
In resolving this issue, however, the Court introduced some formid-
able new problems incident to the application of its decision. Thus,
in describing instances in which permanent certificates should be
denied unless conditioned as to price, the Court referred to the ex-
istence of "a situation that probably would not be in the public inter-
130 Id. at 393.
13' Id. at 394. This assertion by the Court, for which no authority was cited, is at odds
with published figures. During the year 1958, the last full calender year before the CATCO
decision, interstate shipments of natural gas totaled about 6.342 trillion cubic feet. 40 FPC
Ann. Rep. 62 (1960). During the same year, total marketed production of natural gas
amounted to 11.030 trillion cubic feet. U. S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the
United States 732 (1960). Thus in 1958, interstate shipments of natural gas were only
slightly in excess of 57% of total natural gas marketed. In 1961, the latest year for which
figures were available at the time of this writing, this figure was about 60%.
"' 360 U.S. at 394.
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est..'.'. Later in its opinion, the Court described with somewhat greater
specificity facts which would "signal" such a situation; viz, "[w]here
the proposed price is . . . out of line or . . . its approval might
result in . . . general price rises or an increase in . . . existing
rates by reason of 'favored nation' clauses or otherwise."1"4 In such
situations, the Court stated that price conditions might be imposed
by the Commission to "hold the line" pending determination of the
justness and reasonableness of the price. In reintroducing the price
"line" concept into producer certificate cases, however, the Court
failed to define the term. As will be seen, the problem of giving
specific content to this term in individual cases has proved to be a
most fertile field of controversy.
The Court not only failed to be very specific about the situations
in which the imposition of rate conditions would be appropriate, but
also it was equally vague concerning the kind of condition it had in
mind. The condition which the Commission previously had imposed
and thereafter had withdrawn in the CATCO proceedings was one
which reduced the initial price for only one day and which then
allowed the producers to file an increase to the original contract price;
this increase was subject to one day's suspension, and collection there-
after was subject to an obligation to refund those amounts later de-
termined to exceed the just and reasonable rate. The Court seemed
to have in mind this type of condition in concluding that rate con-
ditions do not encroach upon the initial rate-making powers of na-
tural gas companies, and that by using such conditions the Commis-
sion does not determine initial rates or overturn those agreed upon
by the parties, but merely acts to protect the consuming public pend-
ing determination of the justness and reasonableness of the prices set
by the parties. This is indicated even more strongly by the Court's
statement that a gas producer subject to the Commission's jurisdic-
tion is free "unless otherwise bound by contract," to file rate increases
with the Commission."'a In this connection, it should be noted that
the Court did not mention the Commission's action in attaching rate
conditions in the Signal case1 ' and did not cite the court decision
affirming the Commission's action.3 ' In Signal, it will be remembered,
l31d. at 391.
134 Ibid.
135 Id. at 389.
" Cities Serv. Gas Co., Signal Oil & Gas Co., 14 F.P.C. 134, 5 0. & G.R. 428 (1955),
rehearing denied, 15 F.P.C. 1020, $ 0. & G.R. 625 (1956), aff'd, 238 F.2d 771 (3d Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 923 (1957), discussed in text accompanying notes 42-50
supra.
"'Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC, 238 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1956), discussed in text accom-
panying notes 49-50 supra.
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the Commission attached a firm condition reducing the initial price
agreed upon by the parties with no specific provision for a subsequent
increase.
CATCO also indicates rather clearly that a certificate may be
issued without a rate condition even if a proposed price "is out of
line or ... its approval might result in a triggering of general price
rises or an increase in the applicant's existing rates" if such price is
supported by a "reason why. 1. 8 However, the Court provided no
guidance concerning the kind of evidence which would show a
"reason why," other than an indication that evidence of "relative
costs of production" from area to area might have some weight for
this purpose.'"
c. Post-CATCO-Pre-Policy Statement
(1) Commission Action During the year which followed the
Supreme Court's CATCO decision, the Commission interpreted
and applied that decision in many producer certificate proceed-
ings. In determining whether a proposed price was "out of line"
within the meaning of CATCO, the Commission as a general
rule compared it with the highest price at which previously cer-
tificated sales were being made in the area. In making this com-
parison, differences between the terms and conditions of the proposed
sale and of the previously certificated sales were considered and
evaluated. If, after taking into account these differences, the price at
which the proposed sale was to be made exceeded the highest price at
which previously certificated sales were being made in the area, the
proposed price was found by the Commission to be "out of line."
Upon making such a finding, the Commission usually issued certi-
ficates conditioned upon the reduction of the initial price to the level
found to be the "line" in the area. The Commission, however, did
not impose price conditions in all cases in which the proposed initial
price exceeded the highest certificated price in the area. In some cases,
the Commission found a "reason why" the contract price should not
be reduced even though it was above the "line." In other cases, the
Commission attached conditions reducing the initial price to a level
above the "line" but below the contract price. In general, the Com-
mission relied on evidence showing that the gas in question was
especially valuable to the buyer or costly to the seller, or both, in
allowing initial prices above the highest price previously certificated
in the area.
During this period, however, the Commission failed to formulate
18360 U.S. at 391-93.
139ld, at 393.
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criteria for delineating relevant areas of comparison in determining
whether proposed prices were ."out of line." In some instances the
Commission restricted its comparison of sales to a relatively small
area; in other cases sales over a vast area were considered. In general,
it seemed that the Commission was willing to extend the areal limits
of its comparison as far, but only as far, as was necessary to include
sales which it regarded as being comparable with the sale proposed.
One of the Commission's first certificate decisions during this
period was the South Georgia case.4° in which the Commission certi-
ficated without rate conditions sales from southwestern Mississippi,
east-central Louisiana, and southern Louisiana. The Commission found
that these prices were not "out of line on a comparable basis" with
prices at which other certificated sales to the same purchaser had been
made in "the same general areas.''. It was observed that the pur-
chaser had made other contracts prior to the original certification of
the sale involved in CATCO 4' at the same price at which the south
Louisiana sales involved in this proceeding were to be made. There-
fore, unlike CATCO, the proposed price would not have set a new
high in the area and would not have been the highest price paid by
the purchaser.
Evidence had been presented concerning the Mississippi and east-
central Louisiana sales showing that the proposed prices were above
the highest price previously paid in those areas. With respect to the
east-central Louisiana sales, however, this showing required that price
comparisons be restricted to that part of Louisiana north of the
thirty-first parallel. Without commenting on this limitation of the
areas of comparison, the Commission concluded that any differentials
between the prices in question and the prices previously paid in the
area were supported by "circumstances of the kind considered perti-
nent by the Court in the CATCO case."' 43 The Commission then
listed the following factors which made these sales especially valuable
to the purchaser:.. (1) the gas was to be produced from recycled
gas fields permitting unusual flexibility in takes, similar to the flexi-
bility achieved in a gas storage field; (2) minimum and maximum
take provisions in the contract were unusually favorable to the pur-
chaser; (3) the gas was to be delivered to the purchaser at a central
point in the field (whereas the highest priced gas previously sold in
4
'South Georgia Natural Gas Co., 22 F.P.C. 211 (1959).
'
41 id. at 219.
""2Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959), discussed in text
accompanying notes 34 and 99-139 supra.
14322 F.P.C. at 219.
44Id. at 220-21.
[Vol. 18
1964] FPC REGULATION OF PRODUCER GAS SALES 595
Mississippi was delivered at the wellhead) ; (4) the gas reserves cov-
ered by these contracts were very large;' 4 (5) these reserves were
more accessible to the purchaser's markets than other reserves pre-
viously sold in an intrastate market at a higher price; (6) a large
part of this gas was being bought at current prices for delivery six
or seven years later; and (7) unusually high delivery pressure was
required of the producers.
These benefits to the purchaser were held to outweigh the small
overall increase in the cost of its purchased gas that would result from
buying the gas in question at the contract prices. The Commission
found that these prices would not trigger general price rises or an
increase in the purchaser's rates and that a need for the gas existed on
the part of the purchaser and its customers. In this connection, the
absence of consumer opposition to the proposed prices was noted.
The Commission rejected an argument that the prices in question
stood disapproved by virtue of the CATCO decision.14 No basis was
found for assuming that the prices involved in this case were depen-
dent on those involved in CATCO. Further, the Commission stated
that the Supreme Court did not hold in CATCO that the rate there
in question or any other rate could never be substantiated, but
merely that the price there proposed had not been.
The Commission's South Georgia decision was fairly representative
of its approach to the initial rate issue in producer certificate cases
during the post-CATCO-pre-Policy Statement period, although in
some later cases the application of this approach resulted in the im-
position of rate conditions. In several cases '47 during this period, the
Commission unconditionally certificated sales from south Louisiana
at the same price as those certificated in the South Georgia case. The
Commission rejected arguments that rate conditions should be im-
posed because the tax reimbursement in those cases was higher than
under other previously certificated area sales. In so doing, the Com-
mission relied on the value to the purchaser of factors such as the
145 These reserves were said to aggregate in excess of 830 billion cubic feet. Id. at 221.
'4°Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959), discussed in text
accompanying notes 34 and 99-139 supra.
""California Co., 22 F.P.C. 252 (1959), vacated and remanded sub nom. United Gas
Improvement Co. v. FPC, 283 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 881 (1961);
Sun Oil Co., 22 F.P.C. 351 (1959), set aside and remanded sub nom. United Gas Improve-
ment Co. v. FPC, 290 F.2d 133 (sth Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 823 (1961); Sunray
Mid-Continent Oil Co., 22 F.P.C. 361 (1959), vacated and remanded sub nom. United Gas
Improvement Co. v. FPC, 287 F.2d 159 (10th Cir. 1961); Superior Oil Co., 22 F.P.C. 369
(1959), vacated and remanded sub nom. United Gas Improvement Co. v. FPC, 290 F.2d
147 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 965 (1961); Texas Gas Transmission Corp.,
22 F.P.C. 378 (1959), reversed and remanded sub nom. Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 287
F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 880, 882 (1961); Transcontinental Gas
Pipeline Corp., 22 F.P.C. 836 (1959), rehearing granted, January 15, 1960 (unreported).
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great size of the gas reserves or their proximity to the purchaser's
pipeline. Other factors given weight by the Commission were the
great need of the purchaser for the gas, the small impact of the price
upon the purchaser's overall cost of gas, the absence of any triggering
of general price rises as a result of the contract prices, and the neces-
sity of offering the contract price to obtain the gas in competition
with other purchasers.
In one of these cases,148 however, the Commission gave considera-
tion to producer costs. In that case, the Commission issued certifi-
cates to producers authorizing sales from south Louisiana at the
proposed initial price of 21.5 cents per Mcf, plus tax reimbursement
in the amount of 2.05 cents per Mcf. The prices were found to be
"the same or lower than numerous other certificated sales in this
area., 149 The Commission rejected the position that the effect of the
CATCO decision1 ' was to require that every producer application
for a certificate to sell gas at an initial price above the "pre-CATCO"
price level be denied or conditioned upon the reduction of the initial
price to that level. Further, the Commission denied the contention
that the "pre-CATCO" price level was 18 cents per Mcf. Although
agreeing that the majority of the sales in the area of the CATCO
sale had been made at prices of 18 cents or below, the Commission
observed that many "pre-CATCO" sales at prices equal to the highest
involved in this case had been authorized by the Commission. Sales
had been made in south Louisiana as early as 1953 at 20 cents per
Mcf, and sales at that price had been certificated by the Commission
in 1954 and 1955. Assuming a twenty per cent increase in the costs
of the gas production business between 1954 and 1959, the Com-
mission concluded that a 20 cent price in 1954 was comparable to
a 24 cent price in 1959. The Commission also gave weight to the fact
that most of the gas involved in this case was to be produced off-
shore or in the inaccessible bayous where drilling operations were
much more expensive than on dry land and to the fact that this gas
was obtained from deep horizons. It concluded that the proposed
price was not "out of line" with either pre-CATCO or current prices
in south Louisiana. Nevertheless, the Commission did issue this warn-
ing: "We shall consider any new application based upon a price in
excess of any price we have heretofore certificated to be 'out of line'
and shall require conclusive proof from the applicant that the public
148 Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 22 F.P.C. 378 (1959).
149 Id. at 387.
"'Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959), discussed in text
accompanying notes 34 and 99-139 supra.
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convenience and necessity requires certification at that price. 1. 1 The
Commission did not suggest what kind of proof it would regard as
"conclusive."
Rate conditions were attached to permanent certificates for the
first time during the post-CATCO-pre-Policy Statement period
in the Transwestern case.1"' The proposed sales were to be made from
what the Commission called the "West Texas-Permian Basin Area"
and the "Panhandle-Hugoton Area." The initial prices provided by
some of the contracts were found to be above the highest prices at
which previous comparable sales had been made in these areas under
Commission certification. It was indicated that if the proposed prices
were allowed, consumer gas costs would be increased by eight million
dollars. The Commission concluded that the producers had not made
a substantial showing that these prices were required by the public
convenience and necesssity. In reaching this conclusion, the Com-
mission stated that the following factors had been taken into account:
(1) the increasing demand for gas in the purchaser's proposed mar-
kets, (2) the present trend of the markets in the purchaser's gas
supply areas and the existing certificated prices in those areas, (3)
the quantities of reserves committed under the producers' contracts
and the quality and delivery conditions of the gas, (4) the depth of
the producing areas and such evidence of costs as was presented at the
hearing.
In imposing price conditions in this case, the Commission recog-
nized that a difference in value existed between gas which must be
treated by the purchaser before it is taken into its system and gas
which is ready to be taken without further treatment (i.e., pipeline
quality gas). It was noted that gas to be sold at 12 cents per Mcf
required treatment by the purchaser at a cost of between 4 cents
and 8 cents per Mcf. The 12-cent price proposed for this untreated gas,
therefore, was held to be above the area "line" of 16 cents per Mcf
for "pipeline quality" gas. The Commission took administrative notice
of the price at which other sales of gas with the same impurities had
been made from the same field and conditioned the certificates cover-
ing the sale of the gas in question upon the reduction of the initial
price from 12 cents to 11 cents per Mcf.
With respect to the other sales, the Commission ordered that con-
tract prices be reduced to the highest prices for which gas was being
sold in the area under comparable circumstances pursuant to Com-
.. 22 F.P.C. at 388.
.. Transwestern Pipeline Co., 22 F.P.C. 391 (1959), modified, rehearing granted, and
proceeding reopened, 22 F.P.C. 542 (1959), amended, 22 F.P.C. 574 (1959), on rehearing,
28 F.P.C. 109 (1962).
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mission certificates. The Commission did not regard lower prices in
the area as being the "line" to which the proposed prices should be
reduced. In this connection, the Commission said: "Since lower prices
being paid for gas in the Panhandle-Hugoton area apparently are
not conducive to drilling the deep wells required to develop the large
reserves being discovered and to bringing this gas to market in large
quantities, we look to the recent prices in this area in determining
the price condition to be imposed on the certificates in these
dockets."' 53
The rate conditions imposed in this case specifically required the
producers to file contract amendments with the Commission reducing
initial prices to the levels specified by the Commission. Upon com-
mencement of the sales at these reduced prices, the producers were
to be free to file price increases up to the original contract level. The
producers, however, were required to agree that they would not move
to put the increased prices into effect until a section 4 (e) 54 proceed-
ing had been held and the justness and reasonableness of such in-
creased prices had been determined.
Subsequent to its original order in this case, the Commission deleted
that part of the rate condition dealing with increases and reopened
the record for presentation by the producers of further evidence,
"including evidence of costs," in support of their contract prices."'
The Commission stated that in order for the producers to sustain
their contract prices, "the evidence must be as convincing as it
would be in a rate proceeding under Section 4 (e), although it may
be of somewhat different character. 156 By another order, 5' the Com-
mission provided that the price levels established by its original order
would not be reduced as a result of the reopened proceedings. These
price levels were not changed by the final order in the reopened case.'58
In the Huber case,"' the value of a producer's compressing and
gathering gas was considered by the Commission in issuing certifi-
cates without price conditions. The producer proposed to sell gathered
gas at a pressure of 45 pounds for 16 cents per Mcf or to sell gathered
gas at a presssure of 250 pounds for 1 8 cents per Mcf. It was decided
that the alternative proposals were roughly equivalent from the
standpoint of cost to the ultimate consumer. Based upon evidence of
record, the Commission found that the cost of gas gathering experi-
13 22 F.P.C. at 400.
154 52 Stat. 822 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (Supp. IV, 1962).
15522 F.P.C. 542, 544 (1959).
o 22 F.P.C. at 544.
22 F.P.C. 574 (1959).
.s 28 F.PC. 109 (1962).
9 J. M. Huber Corp., 22 F.P.C. 338 (19S9).
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enced by the purchaser in the same field from which the proposed sale
was to be made was 2.71 cents per Mcf. Therefore, a 16-cent price
for gathered gas was equated with a 13.29 cent price for gas de-
livered at the wellhead and, hence, was within the "line" of 16-cent,
16.5-cent, and 17-cent prices existing under certificated wellhead sales
in the area. The Commission also ruled in this case that a showing of
"need" for the gas on the part of the purchaser was not essential to
support the application of the producer.
In another decision, l80 the depth of the producing formations was
an important factor in the Commission's certification of sales from
the Knox field in southern Oklahoma at a price "considerably higher"
than that paid by the purchaser for its other gas supplies and
well above the highest previously certificated price in the immediate
vicinity of these sales. The Commission noted that the evidence
showed that the gas would be produced from formations 15,000 to
16,000 feet deep, and it stated that although the price was higher than
others paid by the purchaser, the cost of drilling and developing at
those depths was also considerably higher. In view of this situation,
the Commission concluded: "To encourage and enable producers
to explore for and develop gas from these deeper formations, they
must have the price necessary to support production from such
formations..... The Commission's "primary criterion" for authorizing
this sale at the contract price was said to be higher cost resulting from
greater depth of the producing formation. A warning was issued that
"any price sought to be justified solely by comparison to the initial
price permitted herein must be supported by the same criterion......
The weight given to higher cost resulting from greater depths as
a justification or "reason why" in support of a price which ap-
parently otherwise would have been found to be "out of line" is strik-
ing in view of the absence of cost evidence in the record. The Com-
mission apparently relied upon its own knowledge of the obvious
principle that deeper drilling necessarily results in higher drilling
costs. It made no effort to assess the amount of the cost increase which
would result from deeper drilling or to relate this cost increase to the
size of the reserves found at these depths in order to arrive at a cost
increase in cents per Mcf resulting from the greater depth of the
producing horizons. Apparently it was the Commission's view that,
all other factors being equal, a higher price was justified for gas pro-
duced from deep horizons than for gas produced from shallow hori-
""
0 Phillips Petroleum Co., 22 F.P.C. 528 (1959).
"I Id. at 529.
182 Ibid.
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zons. The method employed in determining how much higher the
price for deeper gas should be was left unclear.
The Commission's approval of the proposed contract price in this
case also was based on another factor. The price in question would be
paid in any event for fifty per cent of the Knox field gas by an
intrastate purchaser; and if acceptable certificates were not issued to
the producers and the interstate purchaser within a fixed time, all of
the gas would go to the intrastate purchaser at that price. The intra-
state purchase would trigger "favored nations" clauses in other con-
tracts of both the intrastate and interstate purchasers in the area and
thus would establish a new plateau for producer prices regardless of
what action the Commission might take on the applications before
it. Although the Commission previously had given passing notice to
intrastate sales in issuing producer certificates, this decision was the
first instance in which any real weight was given to the existence of
unregulated competitive markets as a price justification.
In another case during this period, 6' the Commission imposed a
price condition below the contract price but above the highest
previous price which it found in the area. The Commission allowed
this increment over the "line" on the basis of its conclusion that
the cost of developing the field from which the proposed sales were
to be made would probably be higher than those incurred in de-
veloping the older fields (sales from which were used as a basis of
comparison). This conclusion was apparently based on the Commis-
sion's awareness of generally increasing costs experienced by gas
producers in recent years. The Commission was again quite vague
in its rationale and did not say how it arrived at a proper price
increment to compensate the producers for these increased costs.
As an additional reason for its allowance of an above-the-line
price, the Commission pointed to the "exceptional advantages" to
the purchaser of acquiring this particular gas supply." The general
area from which the proposed sales were to be made had been the
principal source of supply for the segment of the purchaser's system
into which the gas was to be delivered. Because recent discoveries
had been few, the purchaser had experiencd a steady decline in
reserves available to it in this area. The acquisition of the gas reserves
involved in this case would permit continued economic utilization of
the purchaser's facilities in the area. The Commission also regarded
this gas as particularly valuable to the purchaser because it was located
'..Phillips Petroleum Co., 22 F.P.C. 694 (1959), clarified, 22 F.P.C. 1021 (1959).
'"Id. at 696.
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only a short distance from the purchaser's main line transmission
facilities.
In a subsequent order clarifying its decision in this case,"' the Com-
mission considered the proper delineation of the area within which
prices should be compared. The proposed prices in this case had been
compared only with prices in Texas Railroad District No. 6. In
petitions for modification of the original order, the producers had
argued that Railroad District No. 6 did not constitute a proper area
of comparison because of its smallness and peculiar shape. The pro-
ducers contended (1) that no showing had been made of any relation-
ship between gas prices and the boundaries of this Railroad District,
(2) that larger areas had been used by the Commission in making
price comparisons in other cases, (3) that gas was being sold to the
same purchaser elsewhere on its system under Commission certificates
at prices above the proposed contract price, and (4) that the Commis-
sion had certificated sales at prices above the proposed contract price
within a distance from the field involved in this case equal to the
distance to the farthest point of Railroad District No. 6.
These arguments were rejected by the Commission. It conceded
that it had approved sales at prices above the proposed contract price
"two hundred miles or so distant" from the field involved in this
proceeding.' The Commission stated, however, that these sales were
from areas in which price differentials had prevailed historically and
that if comparable prices were to be allowed for this sale, they must
be justified by evidence of record, which the Commission found
lacking. Pricing areas utilized in other cases were regarded as having
"no bearing on what is the best pricing area for purposes of deciding






The rate condition imposed in this case required the producers
to file within a prescribed period "rate schedules or supplements
thereto" providing for the initial rate specified by the Commission.6 '
In its clarifying order, the Commission stated that it intended to
require amendment of the initial price provisions of the sales con-
tracts, but that it did not intend to require any change in the price
escalation and redetermination provisions of the contract.6
In one case during this period.7' effect was given to a test prescribed
'5 22 F.P.C. 1021 (1959).
166Id. at 1022.
167 Ibid.
166 22 F.P.C. at 698.
169 22 F.P.C. at 1022.
'
7
1 Western Natural Gas Co., 23 F.P.C. 332, 11 0. & G.R. 1074 (1960).
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in CATCO. 1 other than the "out of line" test. There, although evi-
dence was presented that other sales in the area had been made at the
proposed initial price, none of the sales relied upon had been made
to the purchaser to whom the gas in question was to be sold. These
facts, concluded the Commission, gave rise to an inference that the
proposed price was higher than other certificated sales in the area to
the purchaser in question and, if approved, might result in an in-
crease in the purchaser's existing rates by reason of "favored nation"
clauses. Evidence to rebut this inference was held by the Commis-
sion to be "an essential part of the applicant's case. 1. 2 Such evidence
being absent in this case, the Commission said it could neither issue
certificates at the price proposed nor rationally impose a price con-
dition. Accordingly, the applications were denied. This action was
taken even though the proposed initial price was apparently not "out
of line" as that test then was being applied.
In the Aneth field case, 7 ' the Commission was confronted with
another new problem. The sales proposed were the first interstate gas
sales from the State of Utah, and considerable ingenuity was required
to construct an appropriate price "line" against which to measure
the proposed prices. The solution arrived at by the Commission was to
look beyond the boundaries of Utah more than seventy-five miles to
sales from the San Juan field in New Mexico. Going outside the
record, the Commission determined from evidence presented in a
rate case involving the purchaser that its weighted average gas cost
at the wellhead in the San Juan field during 1955 was 11.69 cents per
Mcf. To this figure the Commission added a 1-cent price escalation
which took place under the purchaser's San Juan contracts on January
1, 1959, and a 5-cent adjustment representing the cost of pro-
cessing and gathering the Aneth gas, which was to be performed by
the producers."' The Commission required that the proposed 20-cent
initial price be reduced to the 17.7-cent figure so determined.'
In denying rehearing,'7 ' the Commission, having derived a price
"line" to an exactness of one-tenth of one cent, declared that it could
not determine a proper initial price in a certificate case "with the same
degree of refinement" as it could in a rate case. The Commission
171 Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959), discussed in text
accompanying notes 34 and 99-139 supra.
17123 F.P.C. at 332, 11 0. & G.R. at 1076.
"'El Paso Natural Gas Co., 23 F.P.C. 369, 11 0. & G.R. 889 (1960), aff'd sub nom.
Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 290 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1961).
" The derivation of this cost figure is not apparent from the decision.
... The conditions imposed required the producers to file "rate schedules or supplements
thereto" reflecting the reduced figure. 23 F.P.C. at 380, 11 0. & G.R. at 902.
17623 F.P.C. 610 (1960).
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rejected the argument that cost evidence was necessary to support the
price condition it had determined, saying that although cost evidence
suitable for determining just and reasonable rates could be relevant
in some certificate cases, such evidence was not necessarily indis-
pensible in every case.
Diversion of gas from the interstate to the intrastate market, which
had been suggested in the CATCO case,1"' and which was a real pos-
sibility in the Knox field case,' s became a reality in the Glick field
case. 7 ' The producers originally contracted to sell the gas to an inter-
state pipeline company at an initial price of 20 cents per Mcf. The
hearing examiner ordered that certificates be issued conditioned upon
reduction of the initial price to "the highest prevailing previously au-
thorized price level" in Kansas and northern Oklahoma, which he
found to be 16 cents per Mcf. The Commission, however, found the
proper price level to be 17 cents per Mcf, based upon sales at that price
from northern Oklahoma which the examiner had dismissed as "im-
material" because they represented only a small part of the total gas
sold in the area of comparison and because they were approved in
shortened, noncontested proceedings. But the Commission also order-
ed the elimination of an upward price adjustment for gas having a
heating value above 1000 Btu's per cubic foot, even though the sales
used as a basis for comparison contained the same provision.
In disagreeing with the hearing examiner, the Commission stated
that CATCO"s did not require it to "freeze" prices at existing levels,
but did "preclude the issuance of certificates at prices higher than
those established in recent proceedings unless the applicants have
clearly shown that such higher prices are required by the public con-
venience and necessity.' '81 Producer evidence showing strong com-
petition for this gas, with bids as high as 21.5 cents, was deemed
insufficient for this purpose. Because these prices were not related to
the producers' revenue requirements and had been negotiated in what
the Commission called a "seller's market," they were held to have
"little value as an index of the economic conditions of the gas indus-
try or the needs of a particular producer."''
Also rejected as insufficient to justify the proposed price was evi-
'.Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959), discussed in text
accompanying notes 34 and 99-139 supra.
178 Phillips Petroleum Co., 22 F.P.C. 528 (1959), discussed in text accompanying and
following notes 160-162 supra.
7 Gulf Oil Corp., 23 F.P.C. 664 (1960), rescinded, 23 F.P.C. 926 (1960).
"'°Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959), discussed in text
accompanying notes 34 and 99-139 supra.
181 23 F.P.C. at 666.
I88 Ibid.
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dence of general industry trends showing increasing costs and de-
creasing profits; this evidence was regarded as too general to sup-
port a particular price. Little weight was given to producer testimony
that a 20-cent price was required as an incentive to further develop-
ment of the Glick field, in view of the rapid development of a field
in northern Oklahoma which had taken place at a 17-cent price.
The producers involved in this case rejected' 3 the rate-condi-
tioned certificates." The gas was taken off the interstate market
and subsequently was sold in intrastate commerce for use as boiler
fuel under 20-year contracts providing for an initial price of 18.5
cents and for escalations up to 20.5 cents.'"
Periodic price increases were the subject of Commission scrutiny
in the Peoples case.' In support of their proposed 20-cent initial
price, the producers relied upon the Commission's certification of
sales at that price in the Trunkline case,"' even though the proposed
contracts provided for a 2-cent price increase every four years while
those in Trunkline had called for a firm price for ten years. The
producers attempted to support these escalations by showing that
before delivery the gas would be gathered, dehydrated, and com-
pressed by the producers, whereas in Trunkline these functions were
to be performed by the purchaser. However, the Commission refused
to accord any weight to this difference in services performed because
the value of the products derived from processing was expected to
exceed the cost of processing. The certificates were issued upon the
condition that the contracts be amended to provide for no price
escalations for ten years.
In the Peoples case, the Commission again relied on political bound-
ary lines to define appropriate areas of price comparison. The sales in
question were to be made from Texas Railroad Districts 2, 3, and 4.
Upon filing of petitions for rehearing by the producers from the
order first issued in the case, the Commission belatedly discovered that
the sales involved in the Trunkline case had been limited to District
3. Accordingly, it amended its original order'8 to provide that the
'"23 F.P.C. 926 (1960).
as The condition attached to these certificates specifically required amendment of the
gas sales contracts. 23 F.P.C. at 668.
... Foster Associates Report, June 30, 1960, p. 1.
188 Peoples Gulf Coast Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 24 F.P.C. 1, 12 0. & G.R. 785 (1960),
amended, 24 F.P.C. 106 (1960), set aside sub nom. Hassie Hunt Trust, 26 F.P.C. 689
(1961), order setting original order aside aff'd sub nom. Hunt Oil Co. v. FPC, 334 F.2d
474 (5th Cir. 1964).
'.Trunkline Gas Co., 21 F.P.C. 704, 10 0. & G.R. 343 (1959), aff'd on another
ground sub nom. Battle Creek Gas Co. v. FPC, 281 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1960), discussed in
text accompanying notes 86-98 supra.
1824 F.P.C. 106 (1960).
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price for gas to be sold from Districts 2 and 4 be reduced to 18 cents,
the highest price previously found to be required by public con-
venience and necessity in those districts."' Specific cost evidence pre-
sented by the producers which indicated a minimum cost of 3 5 cents
per Mcf for this gas was given no weight. The Commission said that
even if these figures were correct, it could not hold that such expen-
sive gas was required at that time by the public convenience and
necessity.
Subsequently the Commission set aside its order in this case ' as a
result of judicial reversal of its denial of intervention to the New
York Public Service Commission.' The applications were reheard,
and a final decision was not issued until 1963.1's
The last significant certificate decision by the Commission during
the post-CATCO-pre-Policy Statement period involved proposed
sales from central Oklahoma and northern Texas." 3 The proposed
price for the Texas gas did not exceed prices paid under other cer-
tificated sales in the same counties, and the Commission had no
trouble certificating these sales without attaching rate conditions.
With respect to the Oklahoma gas, for which a 16-cent price was
proposed, the hearing examiner had found that the prevailing price in
the area which he deemed relevant for purposes of comparison was 11
cents per Mcf, and he had ordered the certificates conditioned to reflect
this price. The Commission agreed that a 16-cent price was "out of
line," but stated that "the problem of initial price cannot be solved
by attempting to perpetuate a price level that has become obsolete."...4
In disregarding 11-cent prices as "obsolete," the Commission observed
that Oklahoma was an area in which gas prices were depressed and
that most of the 11-cent gas was produced in conjunction with oil
from shallow wells. In arriving at 15 cents as the permissible initial
price in this case, the Commission gave weight to the strong intra-
state competition for gas in this area at a price of 16.8 cents per
Mcf; to the relatively great depth of the gas involved in this case;
and to interstate certificated prices of 17 cents in northwestern Okla-
homa, 16.8 cents in the Knox field, Oklahoma,"' and 15 to 15.5 cents
..' See Texas-Illinois Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 22 F.P.C. 979 (1959).
'"Hassle Hunt Trust, 26 F.P.C. 689 (1961), aff'd sub nom. Hunt Oil Co. v. FPC, 334
F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1964).
'9' Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 295 F.2d 140 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
948 (1961).
"' Hassie Hunt Trust, 30 F.P.C. 1438 (1963), rehearing denied, No. 412A, FPC,
January 24, 1964, discussed at text accompanying notes 339-347 infra.
1 Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 24 F.P.C. 222 (1960), amended, 24 F.P.C. 305
(1960).
94Id. at 227.
"' See Phillips Petroleum Co., 22 F.P.C. 528 (1959), discussed in text accompanying
and following notes 160-162 supra.
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per Mcf in southern Oklahoma." 6 The Commission ruled that in a
case, such as the instant case, in which comparative price evidence was
available, cost evidence was not required.
(2) Judicial Reaction During the post-CATCO-pre-Policy
Statement period, the Commission had little additional judicial guid-
ance. Shortly before the Commission issued its first orders interpreting
and applying CATCO, "' the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
affirmed the Commission's pre-CATCO decision in the Transco case...
issuing unconditioned certificates covering sales from south Louisiana
and offshore areas at prices ranging from 22.4 to 23.3 cents per
Mcf." In substance, the court held, with CATCO before it, that the
Commission had not abused its discretion in failing to attach rate
conditions to the producer certificates. The court likened the Com-
mission's task of balancing the weight to be given various factors in
a certificate case to that of a court of equity in deciding whether an
injunction should issue in a particular case. Dissenting,' Judge Hastie
did not challenge the view that the Commission's action might have
been permissible under the "strictures" of CATCO, but was of the
opinion that the Commission should be given an opportunity to
reconsider the cases "in the light of" CATCO before the court
reached that point.
Thereafter, in a terse per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Third Circuit, and
remanded the case to that court with directions to remand it to the
Commission "for reconsideration and redetermination in the light"
of CATCO."' The Supreme Court's action in this case has been
referred to on occasion as a reversal of the Commission's order... and,
therefore, as disapproval of all that the Commission had said and
done." Although the correctness of the Commission's Transco de-
"' See Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 22 F.P.C. 1059 (1959).
"" Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959), discussed in text
accompanying notes 34 and 99-139 supra.
198 Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 20 F.P.C. 264 (1958), aff'd sub nom. United
Gas Improvement Co. v. FPC, 269 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1959), vacated per curiam and re-
manded with instructions to remand to Commission, 361 U.S. 195 (1959), discussed in text
accompanying notes 79-85 supra.
'United Gas Improvement Co. v. FPC, 269 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1959), vacated and re-
manded sub nom. Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 361 U.S. 195 (1959).
2M 269 F.2d at 869-70.
". Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 361 U.S. 195 (1959).
"°2E.g., Callery Properties, Inc. v. FPC, 335 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1964); United Gas
Improvement Co. v. FPC, 287 F.2d 159 (10th Cir. 1961); Johnson, Producer Rate Regu-
lation in Natural Gas Certification Proceedings: CATCO in Context, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 773,
797 (1962).
"' "There is reason for belief, because of the action of the Supreme Court in the Transco
case that the CATCO 'teaching' has not been fully understood and that it has not been
applied at the Court may have intended." Humble Oil & Ref. Co., Docket No. G-1 5227,
examiner's decision pp. 5-6, Jan. 29, 1960.
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cision may be subject to question in view of several subsequent judicial
decisions discussed hereafter, it does not appear that the summary
order of the Supreme Court can be construed as either approval or
disapproval of the Commission's order issuing unconditioned cer-
tificates.' °" Since the Commission's order was not vacated, the cer-
tificates issued by that order were not vitiated by the Supreme Court's
action."5
The Commission's interpretation and application of CATCO.°.
during the period in question was the subject of a number of judicial
decisions. The only Commission order which was affirmed was its
issuance of rate-conditioned certificates to the Aneth field pro-
ducers.0 7 The court found the Commission's decision to be supported
by the record, saying: "The power and duty of the Commission to
give 'most careful scrutiny and reasonable [sic] reaction to initial
price proposals of producers' may be discharged by it without the
elaborate and detailed proofs required in a section 4 or section 5
proceeding.""'8
The court also upheld the authority of the Commission to impose the
kind of rate conditions utilized in this case, viz., that new rate sched-
ules must be filed providing for a reduced price in lieu of the price
prescribed by the producer contracts."9 The producers had argued
that this action constituted unauthorized rate-making by the Com-
mission and that CATCO"1 ' authorized only the kind of rate con-
204 See, e.g., two cases in which certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court, the deci-
sions of the lower courts were vacated, and the cases were "remanded for reconsideration
in the light of" cases decided by the Supreme Court subsequent to the decisions of the lower
courts; the lower courts reaffirmed their original decisions on remand, and the Supreme
Court subsequently denied certiorari on one and affirmed the other. United States v. Joines,
246 F.2d 278 (3d Cir. 1957), cert. granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded, 357 U.S.
573 (1958), on remand, original judgment reaffirmed, 258 F.2d 471 (3d Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958); Barenblatt v. United States, 240 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1957),
cert. granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded, 354 U.S. 929 (1957), on remand,
original judgment reaffirmed, 252 F.2d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1958), aff'd, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
"a In the remanded proceedings, the Commission treated the originally issued certificates
as "still outstanding." Texaco-Seaboard, Inc., 27 F.P.C. 15 (1962). In the same proceedings
it stated that a judicial remand after denial of rehearing by the Commission "puts the case
in the same posture as if we had initially granted rehearing, subject to any special instructions
in the mandate." Texaco-Seaboard, Inc., 27 F.P.C. 482, 483 (1962). Even if the Supreme
Court merely had reversed the Third Circuit without specifically prescribing further action
by that court, it does not appear that the certificates would have been affected thereby.
See FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358 (1955).
'Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959), discussed in text
accompanying notes 34 and 99-139 supra.
207 El Paso Natural Gas Co., 23 F.P.C. 369, 11 0. & G.R. 889 (1960), aff'd sub nom.
Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 290 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1961). The Commission's decision is discussed
in the text accompanying notes 173-176 supra.
20s 290 F.2d at 157.
109 Id. at 156.2 2 0Altantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959), discussed in text
accompanying notes 34 and 99-139 supra.
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dition sought to be imposed in that case, which allowed the pro-
ducers to collect the full contract price subject to an obligation to
refund.21' The court, in rejecting this argument, cited the Signal
case.12 and observed that the Commission was authorized to deny a
certificate for a sale if it deemed the proposed price to be excessive.
From the existence of this authority the court reasoned that power to
impose a firm price condition-a remedy less harsh than outright de-
nial-also must exist in the Commission: "[W]e conclude that the
power of the Commission to condition a certificate is co-extensive
with its power to reject or deny a certificate, even though this might
make it impossible for a producer ever to get its initial price....
However, the court softened its holding on this point by stating that
it found no authority that a producer could not file a rate increase up
to the contract price immediately after complying with the rate
condition.
The Commission suffered reversal at the hands of the courts in
four other cases1 involving orders issuing unconditioned certificates
covering sales from south Louisiana at prices ranging up to 23.8 cents
per Mcf."5 ' In each of these cases, the court found insufficient evidence
in the record to support the Commission's finding that the sales in
question were required by public convenience and necessity at the
initial prices provided by the contracts; therefore, the court vacated
or reversed the orders issuing unconditioned certificates and remanded
the cases to the Commission for further proceedings."'
The first and most significant of these decisions was issued by the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit."7 The court held that the
21 See paragraph in text accompanying notes 109-110 supra.
212 Cities Serv. Gas Co., Signal Oil & Gas Co., 14 F.P.C. 134, 5 0. & G.R. 428 (1955),
aff'd, 238 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 923 (1957), discussed in text
accompanying notes 42-50 supra.
2asTexaco, Inc. v. FPC, 290 F.2d 149, 156 (5th Cir. 1961).
214 United Gas Improvement Co. v. FPC, 290 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 823 (1961); United Gas Improvement Co. v. FPC, 287 F.2d 159 (10th Cir.
1961); Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 287 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 880, 882 (1961); United Gas Improvement Co. v. FPC, 283 F.2d 817 (9th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 879, 881 (1961).
*2Discussed in text accompanying notes 147-151 supra.
2"A certificate apparently is of no further effect upon the reversal or vacation of the
order which issued it. See Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 364, 375 (1939); Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. v. St. Joe Paper Co., 216 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
963 (1955); SEC v. Joiner Leasing Corp., 53 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Tex. 1944). But cf. Capital
Transit Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 213 F.2d 176, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 816 (1954). The Commission has taken the view that a certificate is rendered
void by judicial reversal or vacation of the order which issued it. Placid Oil Co., 30 F.P.C.
283, 293 (1963), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Callery Properties, Inc. v. FPC, 335
F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1964).
"'United Gas Improvement Co. v. FPC, 283 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 879, 881 (1961).
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Commission had abused its discretion in issuing unconditioned perma-
nent certificates upon the basis of existing prices which were "under
review" and in failing to take account of "tax reimbursement fea-
tures" in making price comparisons. Accordingly, the court vacated
the Commission's order and remanded the matter to the Commission
for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
The court was disturbed by the fact that out of forty-seven
producer rate schedules "upon which the Commission may have
relied"' s in arriving at a price line, thirty-five were under review by
the courts or the Commission and, hence, subject to the "hazard"
that the certificate might eventually be denied or that rate condi-
tions might be attached."' The court said that reliance upon producer
prices under such a "cloud" would constitute an abuse of discretion
by the Commission because the foundation of the "line" based on
the prices at which the sales were originally certificated might even-
tually be undermined. The court also feared that the use of "ques-
tioned" rates in formulating a "line" might have the "anomalous"
effect of creating a standard by which such questioned rates them-
selves would be later judged.
The court went a step further and held that not only prices under
court or Commission review, but also "like prices" in the same area
should be treated as "suspect" if the number of certificated prices in
the area under court or Commission review is substantial, "except
upon evidence and findings to the effect that they are not subject
to the same infirmities which are under test in the pending pro-
ceedings." ' The court also stated that if denial of the right to
intervene in certificate proceedings is being tested in the courts, the
prices certificated in those proceedings should not be utilized in
measuring the area price "line." However, it was held that mere
denial of participation in a prior proceeding to a would-be intervener
does not preclude use of the price certificated in that proceeding in
fixing a price line, if the denial of participation was not challenged
judicially. If not judicially challenged, the court observed, the Com-
218 Id. at 824. The Commission's order did not reveal what producer price schedules
actually were relied on by the Commission in finding a 21.5-cent "line". The 47 alluded
to in the court's order were appended to the Commission's brief before the court and the
list was said to be "not exhaustive."
"'Thirty-one schedules were before the Commission again on remand from the Third
Circuit in the Transco case, discussed in text accompanying note 79-85 supra. The other
four rate schedules were affected by a pending petition to review the Commission's denial
of intervention to the New York Public Service Commission in the Trunkline case, dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 86-98 supra. This "hazard" was subsequently dissipated
when the petition for review was dismissed. Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 284 F.2d 200
(D.C. Cir. 1960).
"ZUnited Gas Improvement Co. v. FPC, 283 F.2d 817, 824-25 (9th Cir. 1960).
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mission's order excluding participation by others must be taken as
correct.
The court also concluded that the Commission erred in looking
only to base prices, exclusive tax reimbursement, in determining
whether the prices in question were "out of line." Although it recog-
nized that taxes paid by a producer were an out-of-pocket cost and
that reimbursement for these taxes did not amount in itself to a
gain by the producer, nevertheless, the court noted that tax reim-
bursement was an item of bargaining between sellers and buyers of
gas and concluded that a producer who bargained for a full tax reim-
bursement had obtained a better price than one who bargained for only
a partial tax reimbursement. For this reason, the court held that the
Commission should take comparative tax reimbursement provisions
into account as well as comparative prices in determining whether a
proposed initial price is "out of line.
2 2
'
CATCO212 was read by the court as permitting the issuance of
unconditioned certificates only if the Commission found upon sub-
stantial evidence (1) that the price was not "out of line" or that if
"out of line," the prices were required by public convenience and
necessity (i.e., a "reason why") and (2) that the approval of the
price would not trigger general price rises or cause an increase in the
existing rates of the purchaser. The " 'hold the line' technique" was
described as a "stopgap device" designed to serve the public inter-
est in obtaining both reasonable rates and expeditious dedication of
needed new gas reserves. This device was seen by the court as a means
of affording "standby protection to the public pending normal rate
adjudicatory proceedings while enabling the Commission to act upon
certificate applications with reasonable dispatch.
2 23
In vacating the Commission's order and remanding the case for
further proceedings, the court commented at length upon the proper
determination of the price "line" and upon the evidence which should
be presented in a certificate proceeding. On the proper construction
of the "line," the court said:
[T]he "line" referred to in Catco may properly be referenced to rele-
vant existing producer prices under which substantial amounts of nat-
ural gas move in interstate commerce .... Where there are no relevant
existing producer prices with which a price proposal may be compared,
Catco indicates the best criterion of a proper price line may be the
221 If tax reimbursement is considered a part of the purchase price, the highest price
involved in this case (23.8 cents) was .25 cent higher than the highest price previously
certificated by the Commission in south Louisiana.225Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959), discussed in text
accompanying notes 34 and 99-139 supra.
2a 2 8 3 F.2d at 823.
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applicant's224 prices elsewhere, qualified where necessary by substantial
evidence explaining price differentials.
Existing producer prices are relevant for comparative purposes only if
they pertain to gas production in the same or an analogous area and if
other principal features of the contracts are fairly comparable. Thus
the contracts should be comparable from the standpoint of gas reserves
and future potentials. The significance of any disparities existing as to
these conditions should be explained by Commission findings based
upon substantial evidence. Substantial variation in the quality of gas
sold should be similarly treated. . . . Disparate provision relative to fa-
cilities to be provided and other services to be rendered should be given
effect as well in determining the propriety of the analogy to rates under
other existing contracts.225 (Emphasis added.)
The court held that the Commission correctly considered prices paid
by all pipelines in the area instead of only those paid by the particular
pipeline to which the proposed sales were to be made.
The court said that factors such as relative production costs which
are not reflected in specific terms of the contracts need not be
examined in determining relevancy for comparative purposes, but
conceded that if no comparable prices were available, such considera-
tions as relative production costs, need, competition, and other factors
would become significant. Specifically rejected by the court was a
contention that the price "line" of necessity must be identical to the
pre-CATCO "line." The court agreed with the view expressed by
the Commission in the Texas Gas case22 that factors such as increased
production costs, comparative accessibility of field locations, and
comparative depth of sands tend to make pre-CATCO prices irrele-
vant for comparative purposes in other cases. It further held that in
determining the "line," the Commission could properly look to cer-
tificated sales even though the price had not been "scrutinized" by
the Commission. Otherwise, it was observed, the "line" would not
reflect current conditions in the industry, and a rollback to prices
having no current relevancy might be required.
The court ruled that a "comprehensive showing," appropriate in
a rate case, was not required in a certificate case. The court also com-
mented on the evidence which should be adduced in a certificate case:
[W]here the Commission relies upon existing certificated rates in es-
tablishing a line, evidence ought to be submitted concerning those
rates. The contracts ought to be identified, and each should be subject
to test as to arms-length bargaining, identity or similarity of gas pro-
224 This word apparently refers to the purchaser.
22 2 8 3 F.2d at 823.
226 Discussed in text accompanying notes 148-1 5,1 supra.
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duction area, nature of gas reserves, auality of gas, facilities to be pro-
vided and services to be performed."'
The decision of the Ninth Circuit set the pattern for the other
three decisions rejecting the Commission's initial application of
CATCO..8 in south Louisiana. Thus, the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit 2 9 refused to give weight to the fact that the prices involved in
the case before it were in keeping with numerous other certificated
sales in the area, saying:
We are ...reluctant to endorse so dubious a standard of reference,
since presumably the high price certifications which followed in the
wake of the Commission's Catco certification are as much subject to
explanation as the Catco price itself. Where the inquiry is whether a
particular proposed price is inflated, it serves no purpose to refer to
other prices which may be equally inflated.'" (Emphasis added.)
The court went further and found in CATCO "an interpretation of
the 'public interest' which, in the context of a rising natural gas
market, demands a real administrative effort to hold back prices." '
The Tenth Circuit.2 was particularly influenced by the Supreme
Court's action in the Transco case233 (which it called a "summary
reversal") because the sales involved in the case before it were to be
made from the same field as were the sales in Transco. The court
concluded that it would be "presumptuous" on its part to hold that
the price involved in the case before it was "in line" and consistent
with public convenience and necessity. This court also treated prices
involved in applications pending on review before the courts or the
Commission as "suspect" and said that this situation would prevail
until final disposition was made of the applications involved in
CATCO and Transco. Weight was given to the failure of the Com-
mission in its Statement of General Policy No. 61-1" to list initial
price levels for south Louisiana. This omission was said to be an
"implied admission by the Commission" that it had not determined
the "line" in the area. 3' The court also noted that in its Policy State-
227 283 F.2d at 826.
22' Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959), discussed in text
accompanying notes 34 and 99-139 supra.
229 Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 287 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
880, 882 (1961).
30287 F.2d at 149.
23
1 Id. at 1s0.
232 United Gas Improvement Co. v. FPC, 287 F.2d 159 (10th Cir. 1961).
23 3Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 361 U.S. 195 (1961), discussed in text accompanying
notes 201-205 supra.
"424 F.P.C. 818, 12 0. & G.R. 1227 (1960), appeal dismissed sub noma. Wisconsin v.
FPC, 292 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1961), discussed in text accompanying notes 245-259 infra.
232 United Gas Improvement Co. v. FPC, 287 F.2d 159, 162-63 (10th Cir. 1961).
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ment amendment prescribing initial prices for south Louisiana, the
Commission specifically said that it was not prejudging cases being
reconsidered by it on remand.
The Fifth Circuit... also quoted with approval that portion of the
Ninth Circuit's opinion condemning the use of challenged prices in
finding an acceptable price level. Unlike the other three courts, how-
ever, this court seemed to equate the standard applicable in certificate
cases with the "just and reasonable" standard applicable in rate cases
under sections 4 and 5 of the act.2 ' The court was troubled by the
fact that new "initial filing prices" were allowed to be "fixed" at
levels well above those at which the Commission was suspending rate
increases under old contracts, upon the basis of evidence of arm's
length bargaining and field price evidence which had been held in-
sufficient to show the justness and reasonableness of price increases.
In a well-written dissenting opinion,"' Judge Brown condemned
the approach of the majority and of the other three courts which
had found the Commission's application of the "out of line" test
wanting. He saw in CATCO'39 "no purpose.., to make the section
7 public convenience standard one merely of a simple arithmetical
inquiry: is this price higher?"'40 He reasoned that prices "may be
higher and yet quite 'in line' " and concluded that what is "out of
line" is a matter for the judgment of the Commission.' 4 Noting that
CATCO does not spell out what the "line" is or how the Commis-
sion is to determine it, he said: "The term 'out of line'-nowhere
found in the Natural Gas Act-is a handy colloquialism which, if it
means anything at all, must convey the connotation of the more
familiar term 'abuse of discretion'-i.e., is the proposed increase so
great as to indicate arbitrary action without reasonable support in
the practicalities of the regulated gas industry?"''
Judge Brown also addressed himself to the proposition that chal-
lenged orders of the Commission should not be relied upon in deter-
mining the "line":
Nothing under [section] 19(b) of the Act makes FPC action a nullity
while it is being challenged in court. The record of this Court in deny-
ing application of stay in rate orders shows that we regard Commission
" United Gas Improvement Co. v. FPC, 290 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 823 (1961).
2752 Stat. 822 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c-717d (1958).
23290 F.2d at 138.
2
'
9Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959), discussed in text
accompanying notes 34 and 99-139 supra.




decisions as of continuing vitality unless some strong circumstance
compels holding them in abeyance .... Just what is there about this
which withholds the imprimatur of the law until the judge has spoken?
Does the whole machine stop when an appeal is taken?2"
He concluded that in disturbing the Commission's judgment in this
case the court had only succeeded in adding to the Commission's
already staggering workload and that: "I am confident of only one
thing: this case will be back several years and thousands of pages
later. No one will know more than is known now." ' 4
d. Policy Statement
September 28, 1960, marked the beginning of a new era in the
Commission's approach to the rate issue in producer certificate cases.
On that day the Commission rendered its long-awaited decision in
the Phillips rate case." ' In that case it held that "the traditional
original cost, prudent investment rate base method of regulating
utilities is not a sensible or even a workable method of fixing the
rates of independent producers of natural gas"2 ' and announced its
intent "to establish fair prices for the gas itself" upon the basis of
the "reasonable financial requirements of the industry.
47
On the same day that it decided Phillips, the Commission issued
Statement of General Policy No. 61- 1241 in which it prescribed "rate
standards for independent producers of natural gas" that were set
forth in a schedule of "maximum acceptable rates" for twenty-three
gas producing areas. Two rates were announced for each area, one
being applicable to "initial prices in new contracts" and the other
to "escalated prices in existing contracts. ' 'HO These rates were said
243 ld. at 140-41.
244 id. at 147. In 1964, the case was again before the Fifth Circuit, which, in an
opinion by Judge Brown, again reversed the Commission and remanded the case for failure
to receive cost and financial evidence presented by the producers. Callery Properties, Inc.
v. FPC, 335 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1964), discussed in text accompanying notes 331-337
infra.
245Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.P.C. 537, 13 0. & G.R. 343 (1960), aff'd sub nom.
Wisconsin v. FPC 303 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1961), aff'd, 373 U.S. 294 (1963).
246 24 F.P.C. at 542, 13 0. & G.R. at 347.24
7Id. at 547, 13 0. & G.R. at 353-54. On the subject of the Commission's abandonment
of the cost of service approach in evaluating producer rates, see Orn, Area Pricing of
Natural Gas by the Federal Power Commission, Oil and Gas Operations: Legal Considera-
tions in the Tidelands and on Land 371 (Slovenko ed. 1963); Orn, FPC Excursion into
New Regulatory Fields; 14 Ann. Inst. on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 71 (1963); Ross,
The Area Rate Proceedings: An Unsettled Experiment in Public Control of Natural Gas
Prices, 18 Sw. L.J. 163 (1964); Comment, The Legality of FPC Regulation of Independent
Gas Producers by Area Price Fixing, 50 Geo. L.J. 250 (1961).
24824 F.P.C. 818, 12 0. & G.R. 1227 (1960), appeal dismissed sub nom. Wisconsin v.
FPC, 292 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
248No "standard" for initial prices in Mississippi and south Louisiana was announced.
The reason given by the Commission for this omission was that the determination of the
proper initial price in those areas was the subject of the remanded CATCO and Transco
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to be based on the Commission's experience in regulating producers
for six years and upon its consideration of all of the "relevant facts"
available to it. 5' The areas were said to be "convenient and well
known" and subject to revision upon the basis of experience and
changing factors.251 The rates prescribed were stated to be "for the
purpose of guidance and initial action by the Commission,"'.. to
"serve as a guide . .. in determining whether proposed initial rates
should be certificated without a price condition and whether proposed
changes should be accepted or suspended.
2 5
The Commission stated unequivocally that its announcement of
area rate levels was not a determination of just and reasonable rates
and would not foreclose any person from justifying a particular rate
in any area. However, the Commission also made it plain that absent
"compelling evidence" requiring a different course of action, initial
sales at rates above those announced by the Policy Statement would
be certificated only upon the condition that initial rates be reduced
and rate increases filed under existing contracts to levels above the
standards set forth would be suspended. In this connection, the Com-
mission said:
Where a proposed price exceeds the indicated rate level and is there-
fore conditioned or suspended we will, in determining whether the
higher price is justified, not necessarily consider only the financial re-
quirements of the individual producer proposing the price but will
consider all of the above elements relevant to the industry generally in
this area concerned. Similar evidence will also be required from pur-
chasers or their customers who object to any of the price levels or any
specific price.2" (Emphasis added.)
The rate standards were said to be applicable to "pipeline quality
gas as that term is generally understood in each area. . 55 In all areas
cases. Subsequently, however, initial rate "standards" for these areas were set forth in the
First Amendment to the Policy Statement. 24 F.P.C. 903, 12 0. & G.R. 1231 (1960),
amended, 26 F.P.C. 661, 15 0. & G.R. 413 (1961). See note 258 infra.
250 The "relevant facts" which the Commission listed as having been considered were
"cost information from all decided and pending cases, existing and historical prices structures,
volumes of production, trends in production, price trends in the various areas over a
number of years, trends in exploration and development, trends in demands, and the avail-
able markets for the gas." 24 F.P.C. at 819, 12 0. & G.R. at 1228.
251 Ibid.
25224 F.P.C. at 819, 12 0. & G.R. at 1229.
25324 F.P.C. at 818, 12 0. & G.R. at 1227.
25424 F.P.C. at 820, 12 0. & G.R. at 1229.
2 24 F.P.C. at 819, 12 0. & G.R. at 1228. Subsequently, in a separate proceeding the
Commission gave notice of proposed standards for "pipeline quality gas," and invited
comments. 26 Fed. Reg. 4614 (1961). This matter still was pending at the time of this
writing. A related proceeding has been instituted concerning the "ultimate propriety" of
Btu price adjustments-i.e., price adjustments based on the heating properties of gas.
Sunray DX Oil Co., 29 F.P.C. 1079 (1963).
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except Louisiana they were inclusive of tax reimbursement but did not
reflect contractual provisions such as price adjustments for heating
value or point of delivery. Revision of the standards to reflect such
adjustments was promised if such adjustments were determined to
have "general applicability" in specific areas.
All parties interested in changing any of the announced area prices
or geographical pricing areas were invited to join in a proceeding
for that purpose. Shortly thereafter, the Commission initiated the
Permian Basin Area Rate Proceeding "for the purpose of developing
facts relevant and appropriate to the determination of a just and
reasonable area producer rate, or rates." ' Specifically excluded from
the scope of this proceeding was revision of the Commission's pre-
viously announced area boundaries." '
Since its issuance, the Policy Statement has been amended nine
times.28 More significant, however, is the change that has occurred
during this period in the Commission's application of the Policy
Statement and in its general approach to the rate issue in producer
certificate proceedings. The Policy Statement rates, originally pre-
2"Area Rate Proceeding, 24 F.P.C. 1121, 1122 (1960). This proceeding covers Texas
Railroad Commission Districts 7(c) and 8 and the New Mexico Permian Basin. Subsequent
area proceedings have been instituted covering south Louisiana, 25 F.P.C. 942 (1961), the
Hugoton-Anadarko Basin (Kansas and Oklahoma), 30 F.P.C. 1354 (1963), and the Texas
Gulf Coast (Railroad Districts 2, 3, and 4), 30 F.P.C. 1354 (1963). The examiner's decision
in the Permian Basin case was issued on September 17, 1964, three years and nine months
after the proceeding was initiated. Commission and judicial review remain.
... Subsequently, in a separate proceeding, the Commission gave notice of proposed new
areas and area boundaries and invited comments on these proposals. 27 Fed. Reg. 5714
(1962). This matter has been held in abeyance by the Commission pending further de-
velopment in the area rate proceedings. 28 Fed. Reg. 12945 (1963).
258 The amendments have been as follows:
1. Prescribed initial rates for south Louisiana and Mississippi. 24 F.P.C. 903, 12 0. &
G.R. 1231 (1960).
2. Raised limit prescribed for increased rates in Texas Railroad Districts 2, 3, 4, and 6
with respect to rate schedules from which certain pricing clauses were eliminated. 24 F.P.C.
1107, 14 0. & G.R. 209 (1960), amended, 29 F.P.C. 589, 17 0. & G.R. 889 (1963).
3. Increased initial and increased rates prescribed for Texas Railroad Districts 5, 7b, and
9. 25 F.P.C. 595, 14 0. & G.R. 211 (1961).
4. Reduced initial rate prescribed for south Louisiana. 26 F.P.C. 661, 15 0. & G.R.
413 (1961).
5. Reduced initial rate prescribed for Texas Railroad District 4. 28 F.P.C. 441, 16
0. & G.R. 962 (1962).
6. Reduced initial rate prescribed for Texas Railroad District 3. 29 F.P.C. 590, 17
0. & G.R. 894 (1963).
7. Raised limit prescribed for increased rate in all areas except (a) those covered by
the Second Amendment, (b) those in south Louisiana, (c) those in the Permian Basin, and
(d) those in Texas Railroad Districts 5 and 9, with respect to rate schedules from which
certain pricing clauses were eliminated. 30 F.P.C. 1370, 19 0. & G.R. 475 (1963).
8. Reduced initial rate prescribed for Texas Railroad District 2. 28 Fed. Reg. 13547
(1963), 19 0. & G.R. 478 (1963).
9. Limited applicability of Second and Seventh Amendments to situation in which
contract constituting rate schedule has at least 5 years of its term remaining. 29 Fed. Reg.
11154 (1964).
1964] FPC REGULATION OF PRODUCER GAS SALES 617
scribed as "guidance" levels which would prevail in the absence of
"compelling evidence" in support of other rates, have been treated
on occasion as establishing the "line" and have become virtually
impenetrable "ceilings." The scope of permissible "compelling evi-
dence" which may be adduced in a certificate proceeding in support
of an initial price above the applicable area level has been narrowed
from evidence relating to the spectrum of factors upon which the
Commission said it relied in formulating Policy Statement prices to
evidence only of historical price levels existing at the time the con-
tracts in question were executed. This change in approach could be
due, in part at least, to the complete change which has occurred in
the membership of the Commission since the Policy Statement was
promulgated." '
e. Post-Policy Statement
(1) Opinion 339 In its only major certificate decision00 after
the issuance of the Policy Statement, the "old" Commission... attached
rate conditions to the certificates issued at the levels prescribed in the
Policy Statement. The record in the case had been closed prior to the
issuance of the Policy Statement, and the producers had presented
extensive evidence in support of the proposed 22-cent price; this
evidence included costs of production, existing and previous price
conditions, volume and conditions of production, extent of reserves,
location of fields, conditions of delivery, quality of the gas, and
relative need for the gas. Despite this presentation, the Commission
applied the Policy Statement price in a most perfunctory manner:
"Obviously, under the provisions of the Commission's Policy State-
ment, as amended, the producers are entitled to no more than 21.5
cents per Mcf ... exclusive of tax." '  The producers and the pipeline
disagreed as to whether the proper amount of tax reimbursement was
1.8 cents or 2.3 cents per Mcf. Without explaining its reasons, the
"At the time the Policy Statement was issued, the Commission consisted of Chairman
Jerome K. Kuykendall, Commissioner Frederick Stueck, and Commissioner Arthur Kline.
There were two vacancies. At the time of this writing, the Commission is made up of:
Chairman Joseph C. Swidler, who took office on June 28, 1961; Commissioner L. J.
O'Connor, who took office on August 14, 1961; Commissioner Charles R. Ross, who took
office on September 29, 1961; and Commissioner David S. Black, who took office on August
30, 1963. Commissioner Black replaced Commissioner Howard Morgan, who had '.taken
office on June 28, 1961. The existing vacancy was caused by the death on August 4, 1964,
of Commissioner Harold C. Woodward, who had taken office on March 30, 1962.
"°Trunkline Gas Co., 24 F.P.C. 1020 (1960).
.s The distinction between the "old" Commission and the "new" Commission was origi-
nated by the "new" Commissioners. See, e.g., Address by Chairman Swidler, American Gas
Ass'n, October 9, 1962; Address by Commissioner O'Connor, Independent'Natiiral Gas Ass'n,
August 27, 1962.
262 24 F.P.C. a, 103 8. The condition imposed in'this case simply provided'that .the initial
price "shall be 23.25 cents per Mcf, including tax." Id. at 1040.
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Commission concluded that 1.75 cents per Mcf was the permissible
tax reimbursement.
(2) Opinion 3 50 After a lapse of over a year in major certificate
213decisions, the "new" Commission handed down its first decision, in
which certificates were issued to producers in the Oklahoma Pan-
handle and Oklahoma "Other" areas on the condition2" that initial
rates be reduced to applicable Policy Statement levels. It refused to
depart from these levels (which it called "ceilings"), stating that the
Policy Statement should not be construed to suggest that changes in
area prices (or boundaries) would be made in individual proceedings.
Any such change on an ad hoc basis, the Commission warned, would
require at least "a very compelling showing.''2 5
The evidence in this case was held to fall short of the requisite
"showing." Indeed, the Commission concluded on the basis of evi-
dence of certificated prices in the Oklahoma "Other" area that a
reasonable relationship existed between the "line" and the initial rate
prescribed by the Policy Statement for that area. Evidence of similarity
between the proposed sales from the Oklahoma "Other" area and
higher priced sales certificated from the Oklahoma Panhandle area
failed to persuade the Commission that the higher price should be al-
lowed in both areas. The Commission revealed that a review of area
boundaries was underway.6 and provided that any increases in ap-
plicable area price levels resulting from such review would inure pros-
pectively to the benefit of producers accepting certificates issued in
this case.
The Commission dismissed as unworthy of consideration evidence
of factors that affect the desirability of a particular gas supply such
as size of reserves and high initial availability of gas. Policy State-
ment prices were held to contemplate the sale of substantial reserves
"'Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 27 F.P.C. 35, 15 0. & G.R. 877 (1962). In an
earlier case, the Commission (consisting of two "old" and two "new" Commissioners) had
issued an order (1) rescinding unconditioned permanent certificates previously issued by the
"old" Commission, and (2) granting new permanent certificates without deciding the initial
rate issue. Coastal Transmission Corp., 26 F.P.C. 318 (1961). The producers applied for re-
hearing urging that a permanent certificate could not be issued consistent with CATCO
without determining the initial rate required by public convenience and necessity; the Com-
mission rescinded its order and issued temporary certificates to the applicants. Coastal Trans-
mission Corp., 26 F.P.C. 677 (1961).
264 In this case the condition imposed required the filing of new rate schedules. 27 F.P.C.
at 50-51, 15 0. & G.R. at 898-99.
265 Id. at 42, 15 0. & G.R. at 887.
2"6Subsequently, the Commission gave formal notice of proposed revisions in area
boundaries. 27 Fed. Reg. 5714 (1962). Such proposed revisions were said to be based on,
inter alia, geological considerations (nature, size, and location of production areas) and
purchasing patterns in the areas of the major sources of supply. This matter has been held
in abeyance by the Commission pending further development in the area rate proceedings.
28 Fed. Reg. 12945 (1963).
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as well as gas of "pipeline quality." Further, the Commission said:
"Apart from some specific service or forbearance in connection with
a sale of gas, or some circumstance with respect to the conditions of
its sale which affects its character as pipeline quality gas, the value of
the gas to the pipeline purchaser is not a consideration in the certifi-
cation of initial prices under our area pricing policy..2..
One producer, however, was allowed a rate 2.5 cents above the
Policy Statement level for services performed beyond the wellhead.
These services consisted of gathering, dehydrating, and compressing
the gas; they were found not to be generally performed by producers
in this area and, therefore, not to be requisite to make the gas "pipe-
line quality" as that term was understood in the area. No weight was
given to evidence of the cost saving to the pipeline resulting from
the performance of these services by the producer. It was ruled that
the producer's allowance should be based on the producer's cost of
rendering the services. The Commission found insufficient evidence
to determine such costs precisely and, therefore, allowed "an amount
which in our judgment is reasonable.""2 '
In this case the Commission's staff had challenged the propriety of
contract provisions (1) allowing the producers additional compen-
sation for gas with heating properties over a specified norm and (2)
requiring the purchaser to take specified quantities of gas or to pay
for it even if not taken. The Commission found that the heating
value adjustment would not adversely affect the purchaser's juris-
dictional service and allowed the adjustment to be operative pend-
ing the outcome of the rule-making proceeding concerning pipe-
line quality gas." 9 An upper limit was imposed on the adjustment with
respect to the producer that had been allowed a 2.5-cent service
increment, and that producer was required to compute the adjust-
ment on the rate charged, net of such increment. The "take-or-pay"
provisions were allowed pending the outcome of another rule-making
proceeding which the Commission had initiated concerning their
propriety."'
(3) Opinion 3 51 The "new" Commission's approach to the rate
issue in certificate cases was further developed in the remanded
CATCO case,27' in which certificates were issued upon the condition
2727 F.P.C. at 45-46, 15 0. & G.R. at 891. (Emphasis added.)
28 27 F.P.C. at 45, 15 0. & G.R. at 891. The Commission expressed satisfaction that
the amount allowed could be "readily justified" if additional evidence were taken. Ibid.
260 See note 255 supra.
270 26 Fed. Reg. 4615 (1961). The Commission provided that regardless of the outcome
of this proceeding the purchaser's obligation would not be reduced below a specified level.
271 Continental Oil Co., 27 F.P.C. 96, 15 0. & G.R. 841 (1962), clarified and rehearing
denied, 27 F.P.C. 592 (1962).
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that the initial rate be reduced from 21.4 cents to 18.5 cents.72 and
that refunds be made of all amounts collected since first deliveries in
excess of the amount which would have been collected at 18.5 cents.
Because the contracts in question were executed in 1956, prior to the
promulgation of the Policy Statement, the Commission applied a
method which it said "would not be appropriate where area price
levels announced by us are applicable or where area rate proceedings
have been held with resulting elimination of the price problem."27
This method consisted of determining "in lineness" as of the time the
contracts in question were executed and comparing the "line" so
determined with evidence of the applicants' cost of service attributa-
ble to the gas in question during the first full calendar year of opera-
tion. Although it agreed with the examiner's conclusion that the
"line" should be determined as of a past period, the Commission did
not agree with his technique of adjusting a 1953-1955 "line" on the
basis of subsequent cost increases because the field prices to which
the examiner applied his cost adjustment factor were not shown to
be equivalent to cost.
In ruling that "in lineness" should be determined as of the date of
the contract, the Commission indicated its concern that the CATCO
producers not be "enriched" by procedural delays. The "line" for
1956 was based on prices which had been allowed that year
and before, "which were not affected by initial prices which the
courts have called into question."27 ' Reliance was placed on onshore
sales although it was admitted that such sales were not completely
comparable with offshore sales by the CATCO producers. The Com-
mission analyzed the sales which it relied on by the number in each of
the various price ranges and found a weighted average price of 18.59
cents for interstate gas delivered in 1958 under 1956 contracts. Al-
though the Commission conceded that initial prices above 20 cents
had been provided by 20 out of 290 contracts in the period between
the beginning of 1950 and the end of 1956, it ruled that a price "is
not in line as of a given time if it is the highest price or in the highest
group of prices theretofore paid."27'
It appeared for a time that the CATCO case would journey through
the courts a second time, as five parties petitioned for judicial review
.
2 The condition provided that the initial price "shall be" 18.5 cents. 27 F.P.C. at 111.
Pending determination of whether offshore zone 3 was within the territorial limits of
Louisiana, an additional 1.5 cents per Mcf was allowed to be collected as tax reimburse-
ment for gas produced from that area, subject to an obligation to refund such amounts
-if the area is determined to be beyond the limits of Louisiana. Ibid.
17327 F.P.C. at 100, 15 0. & G.R. at 845.
.274 Ibid.
27527 F.P.C. at 102, 15 0. & G.R. at 848.
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of the Commission's order in the remanded proceedings. However, on
December 21, 1962, the Commission conditionally approved a settle-
ment of the case,"7 6 and early in 1963 the petitions for review were
dismissed and the case was closed when the producers complied with
the Commission's conditions to approval of the settlement. Under
the terms of the settlement, the CATCO companies were permitted
to collect varying prices, ranging from 18.5 cents ' to 19.5 cents in
different areas, and were required to make refunds to the purchaser
totaling almost 5.7 million dollars, plus interest.! 8
(4) Ohio In another post-Policy Statement decision, ' the Com-
mission approved sales from north Louisiana under contracts executed
prior to the Policy Statement on the condition that the initial rates be
reduced from 18.5 cents to 17.0 cents and 16.5 cents. The approach
to the rate issue in this case was similar to that adopted in the
remanded CATCO case. 8 ' Prices under contracts made contem-
poraneously with those in issue were analyzed, and based on this analy-
sis, a "line" was derived. For reasons not expressed, the Commission
broke the period during which the contracts were executed into two
parts, and found a 16.5-cent "line" for the earlier part and a 17.0-cent
"line" for the later part. s' The Commission refused to give controlling
effect to one permanently certificated sale at 18.5 cents and gave no
consideration to a 21.5-cent sale which provided for a six-year delay in
initial deliveries. An "economic study" presented by one producer
showing costs of $5.80 per Mcf for one unit and costs of 7 cents per
Mcf for another was deemed to be inconclusive, and evidence of
increasing risks in the area was said to be too general to be translated
into cost figures for the sales. The delivery pressure requirements
under the contracts in question were slightly higher than those under
contracts used as a basis of comparison, but this fact was held not
to support an upward price adjustment.
The Commission's order in this case was affirmed on appeal.8' The
27. Continental Oil Co., 28 F.P.C. 1090 (1962).
277 The CATCO companies reserved the right to file for a 1.5-cent increase with respect
to the sale for which 18.5 cents was allowed, in the event that the area of the sales were
determined to be within the taxing jurisdiction of Louisiana.
278 On the same day the CATCO settlement was conditionally approved, a settlement of
the purchaser's pending rate case also was approved, requiring that refunds received from
the CATCO companies be passed along to the purchaser's customers. Tennessee Gas Trans-
mission Co., 28 F.P.C. 1100 (1962).
278Ohio Oil Co., 27 F.P.C. 551 (1962), aff'd sub nom. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FPC, 316
F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
sO Continental Oil Co., 27 F.P.C. 96, 15 0. & G.R. 841 (1962), clarified and rebearing
denied, 27 F.P.C. $92 (1962), discussed in text accompanying notes 271-278 supra.
s 17.0 cents was the initial price prescribed for the area by the Policy Statement, but
no weight was given to this fact.
28Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FPC, 316 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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court stated that the record in this case indicated that the Commis-
sion had begun to comply with the Supreme Court's instructions in
CATCO."3 The court indicated that the Commission should be
allowed some latitude in fixing prices on an area basis and, in this
connection, said:
Since there is no mechanism for refund of overcharges under Section 7,
if the Commission is to err in setting an initial rate, it should err on the
low side because the company, under Section 4, can immediately in-
crease the rate, subject to disallowance by the Commission after a full
rate proceeding, the public being protected with reference to refunds
in the interim. 84 (Emphasis added.)
After reviewing the evidence of other prices considered by the Com-
mission, the court concluded that the Commission had not abused
its discretion in attaching rate conditions in this case. The 18.5-cent
sale to which the Commission refused to give controlling effect was
said by the court to be "suspect" because it was subject to a section
5 rate investigation. No evidence was found to support a contention
that the appellant's production costs were higher than those of other
producers making sales in the area at 16.5 cents. Further, the court
concluded that the Commission was not required to subsidize high
cost producers with consumers' money.
(5) Opinions 353 and 358 In two cases involving sales from
Oklahoma and Wyoming, respectively,"' the Commission retreated
temporarily from its position that the "line" is to be determined as
of the date of the contracts in issue and that the Policy Statement
is not applicable to contracts which antedate it. In both of these cases
the contracts in issue were executed prior to the Policy Statement,
and in both cases the initial rates and areas prescribed by the Policy
Statement were applied mechanically by the Commission. The Okla-
homa sales were made from a producing area which straddled the
boundary of two of the Commission's Policy Statement pricing areas.
Accordingly, the price allowed the various producers depended upon
the part of the producing area from which their gas was produced.
In each of these cases the Commission referred to the initial area
price prescribed in the Policy Statement as a "ceiling." In the
Wyoming case, the Commission went further: "This ceiling repre-
sents an administrative judgment of the initial price line which the
courts have admonished this Commission to hold in certificate pro-
2
"3ld. at 678. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959), dis-
cusssed in text accompanying notes 34 and 99-139 supra.
284 316 F.2d at 679.
"" Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 27 F.P.C. 449 (1962); El Paso Natural Gas
Co., 27 F.P.C. 1134 (1962).
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ceedings under Section 7... ."" In each case the appropriateness of
enforcing the area "ceiling" was found to be confirmed by previously
certificated sales in the area."'
With respect to the Oklahoma sales, the Commission approved an
arrangement whereby producers were prepaid for a sizeable quantity
of gas. Agreement by the producers to defer deliveries in the early
years of the contract to meet a peculiar supply requirement of the
purchaser was said by the Commission to be a "service or forbear-
ance" by the producers justifying the small additional cost of the
prepayment. Further, with respect to these sales, an upward price
adjustment for gas having a heating value in excess of a prescribed
figure was permitted pending the conclusion of proceedings con-
cerning "pipeline quality gas, '"2 8 but the producers were required to
file rate schedules providing for a similar downward adjustment.
(6) Opinion 359 In one case" " the Commission was confronted
with proposed sales from northeastern Utah, for which no initial rate
had been prescribed in the Policy Statement. The Commission re-
quired that the proposed initial rates be reduced to the level prescribed
by the Policy Statement for adjoining Wyoming. Again the contracts
had been executed prior to the Policy Statement. Previously certifi-
cated sales at higher prices from the Aneth field.8 . in southeastern
Utah were not given weight in establishing the "line" applicable to
the sales in question because they were made from "wholly unrelated"
marketing and geological producing areas. Other Utah sales were
treated similarly because they did not involve "sufficient quantities
of gas, or enough contracts, to constitute an established and stable
market for gas.""'
The producers argued that an additional allowance should be
permitted for gathering, dehydration, and compression services per-
formed by them beyond the wellhead. The producers relied on a
previous case involving sales from Oklahoma... in which an allow-
ance was permitted. The argument was rejected and the Oklahoma case
was distinguished because the gas in the instant case was casinghead
286 27 F.P.C. at 1136. (Emphasis added.)
.87 The Commission did not limit its consideration to sales under contracts executed con-
temporaneously with those in issue.
288 Seee note 255 supra.
2
.Standard Oil Co., 27 F.P.C. 1153 (1962), on rehearing, 28 F.P.C. 292 (1962), aff'd
sub nom. California Oil Co. v. FPC, 315 F.2d 652 (10th Cir. 1963).
"
80
El Paso Natural Gas Co., 23 F.P.C. 369, 11 0. & G.R. 889 (1960), aff'd sub non.
Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 290 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1961), discussed in text accompanying notes
173-176 supra.
21 27 F.P.C. at 1157.
..a Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 27 F.P.C. 35, 15 0. & G.R. 877 (1962), dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 263-270 supra; see especially text in paragraph preceding
note 268 supra.
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gas which required processing to be of pipeline quality and because
gathering, dehydration, and compression were necessary incidents of
such processing for which the producers were entitled to no addi-
tional allowance. By contrast, gas-well gas which was of pipeline
quality at the wellhead was involved both in the Oklahoma sales (for
which an increment was allowed for processing which ordinarily would
have been performed by the pipeline) and in the sales from which
the Policy Statement price for Wyoming was derived. The Com-
mission conceded that the producers might be entitled to an addi-
tional price allowance based on the cost of the services in question
allocable to the shut-in was-well gas involved in the sale. However,
such an allowance was denied because of the absence of record evi-
dence which the Commission regarded as necessary to determine the
appropriateness or the amount of such an allowance. It was said
that in any event such an additional allowance would not be proper
unless it was shown that the gas-well gas was of pipeline quality at
the wellhead and that the additional services performed by the pro-
ducers would save the pipeline purchaser the cost of performing the
same services.
In its order on rehearing, "3 the Commission held that evidence of
higher drilling costs and greater difficulty of exploration and develop-
ment in Utah than in Wyoming did not justify an incentive bonus
for the sales in question. It noted that no radical difference existed
between the two areas with respect to these factors and that there
was no evidence that the price allowed would not provide a sufficient
incentive to supply the pipeline's needs.
The Commission's action in this case was upheld on appeal. 94
Reliance on Wyoming sales and refusal to allow an increment over
the Wyoming price as an incentive to development were held to be
supported by evidence that the Wyoming sales used as the basis of
the price condition were made from a region similar to the area of
the sales in question with respect to geology, geography, and the
conditions of exploration, production, and marketing. Refusal to
allow a bonus for services performed beyond the wellhead was held
to be justified by evidence that the gas in question was casinghead
gas and not of pipeline quality until processed. The latter point,
however, was not analyzed very carefully by the court. The fact
that both casinghead gas and gas-well gas were involved was ignored.
Further, the court observed that it was appropriate for the Com-
mission to treat the producers in this case differently from those in
293 28 F.P.C. 292 (1962).
" California Oil Co. v. FPC, 315 F.2d 652 (10th Cir. 1963).
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the Oklahoma case (in which a service bonus was allowed) because
the spirit of the Policy Statement would be violated by applying
principles for the sale of gas in Oklahoma to the sale of gas in Utah.
Presumably, in so observing, the court was merely stating that differ-
ent facts necessarily yield different results and was not sanctioning
application of the Policy Statement in other than an even-handed
manner.
The court expressed "serious doubts" that the evidence presented
by the producers concerning the high cost of exploration and drilling
operations in this area and the cost of services performed by pro-
ducers beyond the wellhead was "relevant at all in determining the
'in line' price."2 ' In this connection it said: "We do not think that
the Commission was required in this case to consider the exploration
and drilling costs or the cost of delivery services in arriving at the
'in line' price in a certification proceeding. The consideration of these
matters may properly be left to a section 4 proceeding.""'
The court concluded by observing that after complying with the
initial rate condition, the producer was free to file a rate increase up
to the initial price set by its contract or could "properly present its
case for a higher sale price in the pending area price hearing in
Docket No. R-218.'9.
(7) Skelly The foundation of the Commission's current policy
with respect to the rate issue in producer certificate cases was laid in
the Skelly case... involving sales from Texas Railroad District No. 4.
Because the contracts had been executed prior to the Policy State-
ment, the Commission held that the Policy Statement was not ap-
plicable to these sales. Indeed, the certificates were conditioned to a
price 3 cents below that prescribed for the area in the Policy State-
ment. It was stated that in no event could the Policy Statement effect
"automatic approval of proposed rates."'2' As it had done in the
211 Id. at 659. The Policy Statement was said by the court to reflect "in line" prices. Id.
at 655.
:96 Id. at 660.
97 Ibid. This statement by the court is confusing because (1) the proceedings in Docket
No. R-218 are not area price hearings but are concerned only with proposed revisions of area
boundaries (see note 266 supra) and (2) no area price hearings were (or are) pending con-
cerning Wyoming or Utah.
.. Skelly Oil Co., 28 F.P.C. 401, 16 0. & G.R. 865 (1962), modified, 28 F.P.C. 1065
(1962), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 329 F.2d 242 (D.C.
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 963 (1964).
29928 F.P.C. at 407, 16 0. & G.R. at 871. The Commission specifically limited the
application of this proposition to the "area ceilings" set forth in the Policy Statement and
stated that the effect to be given area prices developed upon a record in an area proceeding
was a different question. Deliveries of gas in this case had been initiated after the Policy
date of contracting, rather than the date of initial deliveries, as significant in testing initial
rates. 28 F.P.C. at 1066.
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remanded CATCO case,"' the Commission measured the prices in
question not against the Policy Statement price for the area, but
against the price "line" as of the time the contracts were executed.
Based upon an exhibit in tabular form showing sales permanently
and temporarily certificated under contracts made in 1958, 1959,
and 1960, the Commission concluded that the price "line" prior to
the date of the Policy Statement was 15 cents. This price was deter-
mined by eliminating from consideration higher prices which were
(1) subject to litigation (i.e., "suspect") ; (2) "like suspect" prices; 0
(3) received by a gathering company;... or (4) charged under sales
to a new, uncertificated pipeline not yet in operation."'
The Commission gave little weight to prices under temporary cer-
tificates because such certificates "are issued informally, ex parte and
necessarily without time for full investigation.""0 " It did not enunciate
a formula by which the "line" was to be determined based on volumes
sold or number of contracts executed; instead the Commission stated
that in its judgment 15 cents represented a reasonable limit on prices
arrived at in contracts dated during 1958, 1959, and 1960, and not
subject to litigation.
A most significant aspect of this case was the ruling on evidentiary
matters. The Commission refusesd to give any weight to economic
and financial evidence presented to show the replacement cost of gas
and held that "cost of service and financial requirements evidence
normally is not relevant in producer certificate cases. . , "" The
Commission said that it was not foreclosing justification of a price
above the Policy Statement level by evidence of compelling circum-
stances; however, it held that a "convincing showing" that evidence
of such "compelling circumstances" was essential to a just disposition
of the rate issue would be required in the future in order for the type
of evidence to be admissible that "would customarily be presented in
establishing a just and reasonable rate. 3 .
"° Continental Oil Co., 27 F.P.C. 96, 15 0. & G.R. 841 (1962), clarified and rehearing
denied, 27 F.P.C. 592 (1962), discussed in text accompanying notes 271-278 supra.
... Included within the "like suspect" prices were prices "like" the prices under review
in the case before it. The Commission stated that it had not been shown that such prices
were not subject to "the same infirmities as those which are under test in the Skelly pro-
ceeding [the case under discussion] pending before us." 28 F.P.C. at 409, 16 0. & G.R.
at 874. (Emphasis added.)
"'A large permanently certificated sale by a gathering company at 17 cents was held
"not comparable" to those under review because that company purchased all the gas it sold.
28 F.P.C. at 408 n. 14, 16 0. & G.R. at 873 n. 14.
aoa The Commission reasoned that such sales "may have resulted in higher prices than
would have resulted from contracts with an established pipeline." 28 F.P.C. at 410 n. 20, 16
0. & G.R. at 874-75 n. 20.
304 28 F.P.C. at 409, 16 0. & G.R. at 874.
30 28 F.P.C. at 411, 16 0. & G.R. at 876.
06 28 F.P.C. at 411, 16 0. & G.R. 876-77.
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Four of the contracts consolidated with this proceeding had been
executed after the date of the Policy Statement. These applications
were severed from the proceeding and were reconsolidated with other
pending applications involving post-Policy Statement contracts."0 ' The
Commission took this action because the record before it did not deal
with "the effect, if any, which should be given to the prior establish-
ment of the 18-cent area ceiling upon the determination of the appro-
priate price at which we should issue permanent certificates for these
contracts." ' Because this question had not been before it previously,
the Commission stated that it was not prepared in advance of hearings
to say that its own "ceiling prices" were entitled to no weight in de-
termining initial prices under contracts executed after such "ceiling
prices" were in effect. The Commission made it clear, however,
that it was not suggesting that the announcement of its "ceiling
prices" had the effect of raising the "in-line" price to that level.
On the same day it issued the Skelly opinion, the Commission pro-
mulgated the Fifth Amendment to its Policy Statement,"' reducing
the "appropriate level of initial ceilings" in Texas Railroad District
No. 4 from 18 cents to 16 cents effective as of the date of the
amendment. The Commission stated that its "guiding purpose" in
taking this action was to arrive at a revised price which would enable
it "to hold the line on new sales in this area at a level consistent with
the public interest and, at the same time, to enable producers to obtain
authorizations which provide them a reasonable basis for proceeding
with their operations and furnishing needed supplies of gas..... Dis-
senting, Commissioners Ross and Morgan argued that the revised area
level should be the 15-cent price "line" applied in Skelly. They
equated Policy Statement prices with "in line" prices and found
nothing to indicate that the "line" had moved upward since the
contracts involved in Skelly had been executed.
The Commission's decision on the rate issue in the Skelly case was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia."' The
court held that the evidence before the Commission adequately sup-
ported the condition imposed. The limitations placed by the Com-
mission upon the evidence to be considered in resolving the initial
307 This case has been decided. Amerada Petroleum Corp., No. 422, FPC, March 23,
1964, rehearing denied, No. 422A, FPC, May 27, 1964, discussed in text accompanying notes
348-355 infra.
308 28 F.P.C. at 412, 16 0. & G.R. at 878.
309 28 F.P.C. 441, 16 0. & G.R. 962 (1962). See note 258 supra for the other amend-
ments to the Policy Statement.
310 28 F.P.C. at 442, 16 0. & G.R. at 962.
... Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 329 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 963 (1964).
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rate question were upheld. Consideration by the Commission of evi-
dence concerning cost and financial requirements was ruled unes-
sential. The court carefully pointed out, however, that it was not
holding that the Commission could never consider such evidence in
a certificate case. The court also approved the determination of the
"line" as of the date of contract execution rather than the date of
initial deliveries.
(8) Opinion 383 The Commission's certificate decisions since
Skelly have been, for the most part, reprises of Skelly's basic theme,
although new overtones have been added. The "suspect price" doc-
trine, for example, has been developed further. Thus, in finding a
16-cent pre-Policy Statement "line" in Texas Railroad District No.
3, the Commission "discounted" not only prices under permanent
certificates subsequently set aside, but also those under certificates
which "would have been set aside" but for procedural defects in
obtaining review of such prices.31 The Commission observed, how-
ever, that although the "suspect price" doctrine required that prices
in litigation or which had been set aside in litigation not be taken at
face value as reflecting firm prices in the area, it was not intended as
"a rigid exclusionary rule." It stated that if this "doctrine" were so
applied:
[C]omparatively low prices at fair and readily defensible levels might
be made subject to litigation at the will of some intervening party and
our authority to determine proper initial prices under the Natural Gas
Act thus limited for reasons that are unrelated to the public interest.
Furthermore, we think that merely because prices are in litigation or
have been set aside after litigation and further proceedings ordered
thereon, we should not entirely overlook the economic tendencies which
they represent."' 3
Nevertheless, the Commission concluded that substantial weight
could not be given "suspect" prices until the parties relying upon
them showed their actual effect upon the "line," a showing found
not to have been made in this case.
In the same case, the Commission specifically stated that the rate
condition imposed would not preclude the producer's filing an in-
crease to the full contract price and collecting such price (subject to
an obligation to refund) after the expiration of the statutory suspen-
sion period. In this connection the Commission said:
"'
2Texaco Seaboard, Inc., 29 F.P.C. 593, 597, 17 0. & G.R. 874, 880 (1963), rehearing
denied, 30 F.P.C. 613 (1963). On the same day it issued its decision in this case, the
Commission issued the Sixth Amendment to the Policy Statement, reducing the initial rate
level prescribed for Texas Railroad District No. 3 from 18 cents to 17 cents. 28 F.P.C.
590, 17 0. & G.R. 894 (1963).
213 29 F.P.C. at 598-99, 17 0. & G.R. at 881.
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We recognize, of course, that unnecessarily large refund obligations can
have detrimental effects upon all elements of the gas industry, and
therefore do not intend to cut back the price below that at which signi-
ficant sales of gas were permanently certificated in the area at the time
of the ... contract. We think it clear, however, that the possibility
that the applicable just and reasonable area rate may turn out to be
higher than the in-line rate we here establish, is at least balanced in
the public interest scales by the ever present risk that the in-line rate in
District No. 3 may be too high in relation to the just and reasonable
rate for the gas we shall eventually determine.314
In denying rehearing in this case,315 the Commission discussed the
relationship between Policy Statement prices and "in-line" prices.
It emphasized that Policy Statement prices are "guidelines" for future
action and have no retroactive effect, and found no inconsistency be-
tween its determination of a 16-cent price "line" as of a date in 1960
and its promulgation of a 17-cent price "guideline" for 1963 and
future years. The Commission summarized the significance of Policy
Statement prices as follows:
Such guideline prices are at levels at which the Commission will grant
permanent certificates in non-contested cases and authorize temporary
service in emergencies. By fixing these rates we do not foreclose the pos-
sibility that the parties in a contested proceeding may persuade us that
the level at which we should certificate a particular new sale should be
at either a higher or lower price. Our determination will be based upon
the record in each proceeding in accordance with the principles enun-
ciated in CATCO and Skelly and herein.31" (Emphasis added.)
In the same order, the Commission indicated that the date of con-
tract might not always be determinative in evaluating initial prices.
If a producer seeking authority under a 1960 sales contract were to
cancel the contract and to enter into a new contract in 1963, "the
price," the Commission said, "would be subject to consideration in an
appropriate proceeding in which the history of the transaction would
be . . . highly relevant.. 1. The Commission made it clear that the
Policy Statement price applicable in 1963 would not apply auto-
matically to such a contract.
(9) Opinion 390 In another recent case,31s the Commission ap-
proved, in addition to a 17-cent initial price,"' a contractual arrange-
31429 F.P.C. at 599, 17 0. & G.R. at 882.
a15 3 0 F.P.C. 613 (1963).
2'6 Id. at 616.
317 Id. at 615. (Emphasis added.)
"'SEl Paso Natural Gas Co., 29 F.P.C. 1175 (1963).
"
19 The initial price prescribed by the contracts was 21 cents. 29 F.P.C. at 1177-78.
Because the contracts had been executed prior to the Policy Statement, the price condition
was based on other contemporaneous sales rather than on the Policy Statement.
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ment under which producers selling gas rich in liquid hydrocarbons
from the Oklahoma Panhandle area would receive (in cash or in
kind), as compensation for relinquishing their right to extract these
liquids, one-fourth of any liquids extracted by the gas purchaser.
The Commission disapproved a provision that the producers should re-
ceive no less than 1 cent per Mcf for the liquid content of the gas. To
permit this minimum guarantee, said the Commission, would be tanta-
mount to a flat allowance of 18 cents per Mcf in an area in which the
"in-line" price was no more than 17 cents per Mcf. However, the
Commission ordered that for all gas not processed by the purchaser,
the producers were to receive additional compensation equal to one
hundredth of a cent per Mcf multiplied by the difference between
the average Btu content of processed gas and that of unprocessed gas
up to a maximum of .95 cents per Mcf. The apparent basis for this
order was that (1) the Commission had permitted upward price ad-
justments for high Btu gas32° to stand with respect to other sales in
the same area, (2) there were no such price adjustments in the con-
tracts in question, and (3) the producers would otherwise receive
no compensation for the liquids in gas which the purchaser elected
not to process.
Under this limited arrangement, the producers would not be
compensated for the Btu content of the processed gas in excess of
1,000, which the Commission conceded was normally attributable
to "pipeline quality gas." The Commission's explanation was that
nothing appeared in the record to show how the "extra values" re-
maining in the gas stream beyond the processing plant would be
utilized, while in other cases in which compensation had been allowed
for Btu content in excess of 1,000 it had been clear that such "extra
values" would be utilized to enrich lean gas in the purchaser's system.
The Commission stated that the "sine qua non" of its acceptance of
the Btu adjustment in those cases was a showing that such adjustment
would not adversely affect the customers of the gas purchaser-a
showing that had not been made here.
(10) Opinion 397 The first case to come before the Commission
in which the sales contracts had been executed after the Policy State-
ment involved sales from Ohio and Pennsylvania, areas for which
no price was prescribed in the Policy Statement.' As it had done
in cases involving contracts executed before the Policy Statement,
the Commission relied on evidence of certificated sales being made
20 In general, gas with a high heating value (which is measured in Btu's per cubic foot)
contains more extractable liquid hydrocarbons than gas with a lower heating value.
aas Medina Gathering Corp., 30 F.P.C. 227 (1963).
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in the area at the time the contracts were executed and found a 27-
cent "line," 3 cents below the initial price provided by the contracts.
It thus overruled the examiner who had attached a price condition of
27.45 cents based on the initial price prescribed by the Policy State-
ment for neighboring West Virginia. In this connection, the Com-
mission noted that the producers had expressly disclaimed any re-
liance on the Policy Statement price for West Virginia.
The contracts in this case had twenty-year terms and provided for
three fixed 1-cent escalations, in contrast with the prevailing area
practice of utilizing life-of-lease contracts with no escalation pro-
visions. The Commission concluded that the additional value which
this provision represented to the producers was roughly offset by the
value to the purchaser of another contract provision permitting the
purchaser to take all of the gas during the winter months. This de-
gree of flexibility was found to be unusual in the area and was re-
garded by the Commission as an "additional feature of the proposed
sale which is of objectively measurable value." ' No added value,
however, was attached to the purchaser's option to acquire storage
rights in the wells upon cessation of production because this option
was not unusual in gas contracts in the area.
(11) Placid Perhaps the most startling of the Commission's in-
novations during the post-Policy Statement period was the attach-
ment of conditions to producer certificates prohibiting for a speci-
fied period the filing of rate increases above a prescribed level. The
first case in which this device was employed involved a number of
south Louisiana certificate applications which were before the Com-
mission for a second time as a result of judicial remand.'s Following
its precedent in the remanded CATCO case,5 2 the Commission im-
posed a rate condition enforcing a "line" of 18.5 cents and permitted
a tax reimbursement of 1.5 cents with respect to sales made within
the taxing jurisdiction of the State of Louisiana."' In so doing, the
Commission affirmed the examiner's rejection of economic and fi-
3' Id. at 232.
323 Placid Oil Co., 30 F.P.C. 283 (1963), rehearing denied, 30 F.P.C. 682 (1963), rev'd
sub noam. Callery Properties, Inc. v. FPC, 335 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1964).
"
4 Continental Oil Co., 27 F.P.C. 96, 15 0. & G.R. 841 (1962), clarified and rehearing
denied, 27 F.P.C. 592 (1962), discussed in text accompanying notes 271-278 supra.
as As it had done in CATCO, the Commission required the producers to make refunds
of amounts collected in excess of 18.5 cents (plus 1.5 cents tax where applicable) since
first deliveries under the permanent certificates originally issued in 1959. However, with
respect to one sale commenced under a temporary certificate which contained no refund
condition, the Commission did not require the producer to refund amounts collected while
the temporary certificate was in effect. The allowance for take-or-pay provisions in the
producers' contracts was made subject to the outcome of a pending rule-making proceeding,
as was done in Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 27 F.P.C. 35, 0. & G.R. 877 (1962).
See text accompanying note 270 supra.
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nancial evidence as being "irrelevant to the determination of the
initial price question in independent producer certificate cases." ''
In addition to the condition concerning the initial rate, the Com-
mission imposed the further condition that the producers could file
no rate increase to a level in excess of 23.55 cents until the conclu-
sion of the south Louisiana area rate proceeding or until July 1, 1967,
whichever is earlier." ' It stated (1) that increases above 23.S5 cents
would have a widespread "triggering" effect in south Louisiana, (2)
that the public would not be protected completely by the producers'
obligation to refund, and (3) that the "line" would not be held
pending the determination of just and reasonable rates if the filing
of increases to levels above 23.55 cents were permitted."' In denying
rehearing,"' the Commission said that "it would not serve the public
convenience and necessity" to allow increases to above 23.55 cents
during the moratorium period which it had prescribed "even if such
rate were indicated on the basis of individual company cost of ser-
vice concepts."330
On appeal, the Commission was reversed by the Fifth Circuit."'
The court held that the Commission had erred (1) in rejecting cost
and financial evidence offered by the producers, (2) in imposing a
moratorium on rate increases, and (3) in requiring refunds of
amounts collected in excess of the initial rate determined by the
Commission to be required by public convenience and necessity. It
was held that the Commission's allowance of take-or-pay clauses
subject to future orders in a pending rule-making proceeding was
not a reviewable order.
In holding erroneous the exclusion of cost and financial evidence,
the court took a vigorous slap at the "new" Commission's basic ap-
proach in producer certificate cases. Producers were said to have
"positive rights" under section 7 (e) of the act,' 32 and it was held
that the Commission does not fulfill its statutory duty by a limited
inquiry into whether a proposed price is "in line." In this connection,
the court said:
2" 30 F.P.C. at 287.
327 30 F.P.C. at 298, 300. The south Louisiana area rate proceeding, which was insti-
tuted in 1961, was still in its initial stages at the time of this writing.
12 In another case issued the same day, the Commission imposed the same price increase
moratorium on certificates authorizing south Louisiana sales and based its action in part
upon a rate case settlement by each producer, which "leads us to believe that any rate
higher than the conditioned initial price herein determined could not be found just and
reasonable." United Gas Pipe Line Co., 30 F.P.C. 329, 334 (1963), appeal dismissed sub
nom. Gulf Oil Corp. v. FPC, 330 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1964).
32930 F.P.C. 682 (1963).
" Id. at 686. (Emphasis added.)
aaiCallery Properties, Inc. v. FPC, 335 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1964).
a32 5 6 Stat. 84 (1942), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (1958).
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In the concept of public convenience and necessity, price is, of course,
very important. But it is not the whole thing. And certainly under a
statutory scheme for a utility-type of regulation for the sale, not of a
service, but of a depletable commodity, where the Commission serves
primarily as a rate-reviewing, not a rate-fixing agency, and in which
the entry into the regulated market is the voluntary act of the gas pro-
ducer, it is perfectly evident that many factors other than price alone
bear upon public convenience and necessity and, in turn, upon price."5'
(Footnotes omitted.)
The question of the nature and extent of demand and the avail-
ability of supplies to meet it was regarded by the court as one of
the most critical factors bearing upon public convenience and neces-
sity. "[T]he decisive question," said the court, "then becomes what
price will it take to get the needed gas?""a The view was expressed
that "a price-only approach" could harm the public interest by keep-
ing needed gas off of the interstate market simply because the price
was "out of line."
The court concluded that the cost and financial evidence which
had been offered by the producers "bore upon" the question of pub-
lic convenience and necessity and should have been received by the
Commission. By footnote, however, the court commented that if
the Commission had received the evidence in question and had found
it to be wanting, "that might well have been the end of the matter."''
The moratorium on rate increases was held to be contrary to sec-
tion 4 of the act." The court found support for its position in the
distinction drawn by the Supreme Court between temporary and
permanent certification procedures in a recent case'37 upholding a
condition prohibiting the filing of rate increases during the pendency
of a temporary certificate. With respect to rate increases filed after
permanent certification, the court held that consumers were afforded
full protection by the suspension and refund procedures of section
4 (e). Any further triggering of price increases caused by such filings
was said to be the result of the act's unique scheme, which could be
changed by Congress but not by the Commission or the courts.
The court ruled that the Commission could require refunds, but
that "to meet the exigencies of this unique case" they should be based
on the difference between the price collected and the price ultimately
found in a proper proceeding to be just and reasonable, rather than
3335 F.2d at 1012-13.
3341d. at 1013.
"5 Id. at 1015 n. 30.
33 52 Stat. 822 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1958).
33 FPC v. Hunt, 376 U.S. 515 (1964), discussed in text accompanying notes 450-454
infra.
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the price determined on remand to be proper under section 7 stand-
ards. The "exigencies" referred to by the court were (1) the fact that
gas deliveries under the certificates in question had been made for over
five years and (2) the possibility that producers ultimately could re-
ceive less than a just and reasonable rate for gas delivered during this
period if (a) refunds were required down to the price determined to
be consistent with section 7 standards and if (b) the just and reason-
able rate determined for these sales were higher than the price deter-
mined to be required by the public convenience and necessity. In
this event, said the court, there would be no means by which the
excessive refund could be recouped by the producers because the
Commission has no power to require reparations.
(12) Hunt Late in the post-Policy Statement period, disenchant-
ment with the "suspect price" doctrine as it had been applied by the
Commission in Skelly.8 and subsequent cases became apparent among
some of the Commissioners. This was manifested in a recent decision'"
in which the Commission found and enforced a "line" of 15 cents in
Texas Railroad Districts No. 2 and No. 4, and 16 cents in District
No. 3. In arriving at the "line" for District No. 2, the Commission
gave no weight to one sale involving monthly volumes of 345,000
Mcf that had been permanently certificated at 17 cents.4 The reason
given for disregarding this sale was that it was made by a gathering
company, "and thus is not comparable to sales by producers."' A
permanently certificated producer sale at 17 cents involving 93,000
Mcf per month was accorded diminished weight because other sales in
the area at 15.5 cents and 17 cents were again before the Commission
for review on judicial remand. 4 Further, the Commission ignored sales
totaling nearly 225,000 Mcf per month under temporary certificates
at prices of 17 cents and above. Thus, the "line" imposed by the Com-
38 Skelly Oil Co., 28 F.P.C. 401, 16 0. & G.R. 865 (1962), modified, 28 F.P.C. 1065
(1962), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 329 F.2d 242 (D.C.
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 963 (1964), discussed in text accompanying notes 298-311
supra.
3' Hassie Hunt Trust, 30 F.P.C. 1438 (1963), rehearing denied, 31 F.P.C. 181 (1964).
Half of the applications in this case were before the Commission a second time on judicial
remand. See discussion of prior proceeding in text accompanying notes 186-192 supra.
On the same day this decision was issued, the Commission promulgated the Eight Amend-
ment to the Policy Statement, reducing the initial rate level applicable to Texas Railroad
District No. 2 from 18 cents to 16 cents. 28 Fed. Reg. 13547 (1963), 19 0. & G.R.
478 (1963).
4°The Commission also disregarded another sale of unspecified volume certificated
permanently at 17 cents because the contract was executed before 1958, the earliest year
that any of the contracts in question were executed, and was "therefore outside the scope
of our tabulation." 30 F.P.C. at 1444 n.e.
4 30 F.P.C. at 1444 n.e.
" These cases had been remanded not on the merits, but because the Commission had
denied intervention to the New York Public Service Commission. Public Serv. Comm'n v.
FPC, 295 F.2d 140 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 948 (1961).
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mission was 2 cents below the price at which some 663,000 Mcf of
gas was being sold monthly with Commission approval under con-
tracts executed contemporaneously with those in issue.
Commissioners O'Connor and Woodward objected to the ma-
jority's failure to give weight to four of these sales involving nearly
483,000 Mcf per month. To them the fact that two of these sales
were being made under temporary authority was of no moment
because unconditioned permanent certificates covering these sales
would have been issued "had they been requested at the time.1
3 43
Prices received by gathering companies were said to have probative
value in determining the "line" because area prices for Texas Rail-
road District No. 2 had been interpreted by the Commission to in-
clude the cost of gathering the gas and getting it to the transmission
company, making the "price of gathered gas for District No. 2 . .. a
legitimate consideration regardless of whether this gathering is done
by the producer or a separate entity."' The majority's application of
the "tainted" price doctrine was condemned in the following words:
This doctrine, originally very narrow in scope, has been expanded be-
yond all justifiable limits. It has come to stand for the proposition that
all contracts with rates higher than the ceiling which the majority seeks
to establish can be discarded as "tainted." The obvious result of such
an interpretation, as evidenced by this present proceeding, is to pro-
duce any desired result regardless of irrefutable facts.3
In the same case, the Commission, consistent with its action in
Skelly," severed applications involving contracts executed after the
Policy Statement to be heard with other applications involving con-
temporaneous contracts. It held that the record in the case before it
failed to reflect post-Policy Statement changes, including the effect,
if any, of the Policy Statement upon the "in line" price in the
area."' The Commission rejected the examiner's position that an ab-
sence of producer evidence showing changed circumstances resulting
from the promulgation of the Policy Statement was sufficient to
support the treatment of post-Policy Statement sales in the same
manner as pre-Policy Statement sales.
(13) Amerada In one of the last major certificate decisions at the
-'4 30 F.P.C. at 1449, 50.
3" Ibid.
345 Ibid.
'Skelly Oil Co., 28 F.P.C. 401, 16 0. & G.R. 865 (1962), modified, 28 F.P.C. 1065
(1962), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 329 F.2d 242 (D.C.
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 963 (1964), discussed in text accompanying notes 298-311
supra.
34 30 F.P.C. at 1442.
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time of this writing, 8 the Commission actually retreated somewhat
from the "suspect price" doctrine as it had applied it previously. This
decision concerned contracts covering gas in Texas Railroad District
No. 4. They were executed after the Policy Statement, which pre-
scribed an initial price of 18 cents for the area, but before the Fifth
Amendment thereto,"' which reduced the prescribed initial price to
16 cents. By a process of reasoning that was a startling departure
from that adopted in previous cases, the Commission refused to apply
perfunctorily the 15-cent "line" which it had found in Skelly35 for
pre-Policy Statement contracts in this area, and instead determined
that the "line" during the period in question was 16 cents.
The Commission confined its inquiry to contracts executed during
the period in issue. Because permanently certificated sales under con-
tracts entered into during this period accounted for only a very small
proportion of the total volumes of gas moving in interstate com-
merce under all contracts executed during the period, the Commis-
sion determined the "in-line" price on the basis of the contract prices
at which substantial volumes were sold during this period under
temporary or permanent certificates. It thus overruled the examiner's
holding that temporary certificates and permanent certificates issued
in uncontested proceedings were entitled to little or no weight. The
fact that a permanent certificate was issued in a noncontested pro-
ceeding was held not to affect its value as a precedent. It was stated
that although prices under permanent certificates "are decidedly more
persuasive and relevant, '.. 1 prices under temporary certificates were
neither per se "suspect" nor inadmissible to establish an "in-line"
price. The Commission concluded that to exclude temporary cer-
tificates from consideration in this case would preclude meeting the
requirement that the "line" be based on substantial volumes of gas
moving in interstate commerce. Under this approach, therefore, the
"in-line" price applied to each of the sales in issue was based pri-
marily upon the prices at which the other sales in issue were being
made.
The Commission also addressed itself in this case to the question
that it had raised in Skelly; viz., what weight is to be given in a
certificate case to the initial rate set forth in the Policy Statement as
348Amerada Petroleum Corp., No. 422, FPC, March 23, 1964, rehearing denied, No.
422A, FPC, May 27, 1964.
349 28 F.P.C. 441, 16 0. & G.R. 962 (1962).
35°Skelly Oil Co., 28 F.P.C. 401, 16 0. & G.R. 865 (1962), modified, 28 F.P.C. 1065
(1962), rev'd on other grounds sub nomn. Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 329 F.2d 242 (D.C.
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 963 (1964), discussed in text accompanying notes
298-311 supra.
35 No. 422, FPC, March 23, 1964.
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of the time the contracts in question were executed? Here the Policy
Statement rate had been 18 cents at the time the contracts were
executed. It was observed by the Commission that the existence of
this "guide" had exerted considerable influence in the negotiation
of the contracts in question. The Commission concluded that such
price should be given "some measure of weight" but refused to ascribe
to it "an irrebutable conclusiveness." In this connection, the Com-
mission pointed out that from the outset it had been obvious that
the prices set forth in the Policy Statement were guides only and
would not affect substantive rights.
It is impossible to determine from the Commission's opinion exactly
what weight actually was given to the Policy Statement rate in effect
when the contracts were executed, but it would appear to be very
slight. Primary reliance was placed on the finding that 16 cents was
the "in line" price. Having reviewed both the field price evidence and
the import of the 18-cent Policy Statement standard, the Commis-
sion concluded:
In the final analysis our action in fixing the price at which these sales
should be certificated requires an exercise of our informed judgment and
utilization of the expertise developed in the handling of thousands of
producer certificate applications. Catco requires that we hold the line
pending the determination of just and reasonable rates. This line can-
not, however, always be ascertained with mathematical certainty."(Emphasis added.)
Consistent with its action in some other certificate cases, the Com-
mission in this case imposed a moratorium "on the filing of all price
increases in excess of 18 cents per Mcf, inclusive of tax reimburse-
ment, pending the issuance of a final decision in the area rate pro-
ceeding in Docket No. AR 64-2 or until January 1, 1968, whichever
is earlier.. 5
In its order on rehearing,'" the Commission addressed itself at some
length to one producer's contention that it should be permitted an
additional allowance because of transportation charges which it in-
curred in delivering the gas to the purchaser's main line. The Com-
mission observed that the incurrence of the transportation costs in
question was necessary in order to sell the gas because of the rela-
tively disadvantageous location of the producer's reserves. Because the
gas delivered by this producer was of no greater value than the gas
delivered by the other producers, the Commission concluded that
public convenience and necessity did not require that more be paid
352 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
' No. 422A, FPC, May 27, 1964.
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for it."' In the same order, the Commission also rejected an argument
that a producer's initial contract price was justified because of its
de minimis effect on ultimate consumers.
2. Summary of Existing Law
At the time of this writing, ten years after Phillips,"' the Com-
mission's approach to the initial rate issue in producer certificate cases
has become relatively stable. The journey to this position has been
lengthy, tortuous, and beset with concealed pitfalls. The Commission
has labored up many blind alleys only to be forced to retreat under
judicial fire. Although it is by no means certain that the Commission
has reached its ultimate position on the initial rate issue, in view of
the favorable reception that the current approach has received in the
appellate courts in recent cases,' s it seems unlikely that there will be
further changes of a fundamental nature. At this juncture, it is
appropriate to summarize the Commission's current position on the
initial rate question. Subsequently, the law that "is" will be analyzed
in the light of the law that, in the opinion of the writer, "ought to
be."
In general, the Commission's current approach to the initial rate
issue in certificate cases may be described as one of freezing initial
rates through the use of its conditioning power. In each case, this
price freeze is imposed at a level no higher than that at which other
gas is sold from the same area under contracts executed at about the
same time as those involved in the case. The areas within which
separate price levels are determined and maintained by the Com-
mission are those set forth in the Policy Statement as "convenient and
well known."At present these areas are defined arbitrarily, being
delineated for the most part by political boundary lines rather than
by geographical, geological, or economic considerations. A proceed-
ing initiated by the Commission to determine whether these areas
should be redefined and new areas established.. has been held in
abeyance pending further developments in the area rate proceed-
ings."
In determining the price to be maintained (i.e., the "line") in each
area, the Commission places primary reliance on initial prices collected
for gas sold under permanent Commission certificates; less weight is
s The Commission reached a similar conclusion in another recent case. Superior Oil
Co., No. 437, FPC, July 23, 1964.
". Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954). See text accompanying
note 23 supra.
".. But see Callery Properties, Inc. v. FPC, 335 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1964), discussed
in text accompanying notes 331-337 supra.
ass 2 7 Fed. Reg. 5714 (1962).
"'28 Fed. Reg. 12945 (1963).
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given prices collected pursuant to temporary certificates. No weight
is given to (1) prices collected under permanent certificates with
respect to which judicial or administrative appeals or further admin-
istrative reviews are pending (i.e., "suspect" prices), (2) prices col-
lected under permanent certificates at the same level as those subject
to judicial or administrative review and not shown to be free of the
same "infirmities" (i.e., "like suspect" prices), (3) prices collected
under permanent certificates for gas sold by gathering companies,
(4) prices collected under permanent certificates for gas sold to new
uncertificated pipelines, (5) prices collected under permanent cer-
tificates for gas sold under contracts executed substantially before
or after those in question, and (6) prices not subject to the Com-
mission's jurisdiction. Having thus restricted the scope of its inquiry,
the Commission applies its "informed judgment" and "expertise" to
the prices to which it gives weight and arrives at a "line."
Occasionally a price increment above the "line" as thus determined
is permitted with respect to a particular sale characterized by fea-
tures of "objectively measurable" value to the purchaser that are not
possessed by the sales relied upon by the Commission to establish the
"line." As yet the Commission has not defined the features in each
area for which additional compensation will be allowed or the value
that will be attributed to such features. These matters are pending
before the Commission in a rule-making proceeding.'
Considerations such as individual company or industry-wide cost
of service, relative drilling costs, cost trends, economics, geology,
revenue requirements, and revenue trends are given no weight
either in establishing the "line" or in supporting a price above
the "line." Indeed, it is the Commission's policy to reject evidence
concerning such matters as being irrelevant in certificate cases.
The significance of the initial rates set forth in the Policy State-
ment is still subject to some doubt. It seems clear that the Policy
Statement will not be applied to sales under contracts executed before
the Policy Statement. With respect to sales under contracts executed
after the Policy Statement, its import is not clear. The initial rates
prescribed by the Policy Statement have been variously characterized
by the "new" Commission as "an administrative judgment of the
initial price line," price "ceilings," and "guides" to future admin-
istrative action. In recent cases, the Commission has indicated that the
rates prescribed by the Policy Statement at the time a sales contract
360 26 Fed. Reg. 4614 (1961). A related proceeding has been instituted concerning the
"ultimate propriety" of Btu price adjustments. Sunray DX Oil Co., 29 F.P.C. 1079
(1963). The Commission has allowed such adjustments to be operative subject to the out-
come of the rule-making proceeding.
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is executed are to be given "some weight" but cannot be given con-
trolling effect. Nevertheless, it appears that temporary certificates will
be issued in almost all cases in which proposed initial rates are no
higher than the applicable Policy Statement rates; and if no protest
or petition to intervene is filed, permanent certificates will be issued
in shortened, noncontested proceedings with no rate-reducing con-
ditions attached."6'
In almost all of the certificate cases in which rate conditions have
been imposed, the Commission has required only that the rate initially
charged be reduced to a specified level and has not restricted im-
mediate filing of increases up to the level authorized by contract.
Indeed, in some cases the right to make such filings has been specifi-
cally recognized. In some very recent cases, however, the Commission
has imposed as a condition to certification a moratorium on price
increases above a specified "triggering" level, for the stated purpose
of forestalling a widespread upward movement of area price levels
above those currently being collected."'2
3. Analysis of Existing Law
Having reviewed the gist of the law that "is" (or purports to be)
with respect to the initial rate issue in producer certificate cases, this
law will be analyzed and measured against the law which, in this
writer's opinion, "ought to be." The starting place for such an inquiry
is the Natural Gas Act, from which the Commission derives its power
to regulate producer rates.
a. Reduction of Producer Rates in Certificate Proceedings
The basic standard prescribed by the act with respect to rates is
found in section 4(a) which provides that "all rates . . . received by
any natural gas company for.., the.., sale of natural gas subject to
the jurisdiction of the Commission . . . shall be just and reasonable,
and any such rate ... that is not just and reasonable is hereby declared
to be unlawful."'' Undue preferences and advantages and un-
reasonable differences in rates are proscribed by section 4 (b).'" Sec-
tion 4 (c)'.. requires every natural gas company to file schedules with
the Commission showing all rates for jurisdictional gas sales. "'
301 See, e.g., Davidor & Davidor, Inc., No. G-7768, F.P.C., May 18, 1964.
302 One court has recently held that the Commission is without authority to impose
such a condition. Callery Properties, Inc. v. FPC, 335 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1964), discussed
in text accompanying notes 331-337 supra.
36352 Stat. 822 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717c(a) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
w452 Stat. 822 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717c(b) (1958).
6'52 Stat. 822 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717c(c) (1958).
00 With respect to independent producers, the Commission by regulation has defined
"rate schedule" as "the basic contract and all supplements or agreements amendatory thereof
. . . showing the rates . . . applicable to the . . . sale of natural gas in interstate commerce
for resale." 18 C.F.R. § 154.93 (1961).
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Sections 4 (d).. and 4(e)... deal with rate changes initiated by
natural gas companies. These sections provide that a natural gas com-
pany may not change any of its filed rates except after giving thirty
days' notice by filing new schedules showing the changes to be made.
Upon the filing of the new schedules, the Commission is authorized
to initiate a hearing concerning the lawfulness of the new rate and,
pending such hearing, to suspend the use of the new rate for a period
not longer than five months after it otherwise would go into effect.
Thereafter, if the hearing is not completed, the new rate may be put
into effect subject to the authority of the Commission to require
refunds of any portion found to be unjustified. The only specific
provision authorizing the Commission to modify rates filed by natural
gas companies, other than upon the initiation of rate changes by
such companies, is found in section 5 (a)."' Under this section the
Commission may initiate a hearing concerning any rate charged by
a natural gas company. If, after the hearing, the Commission finds
the rate in question to be "unjust, unreasonable, unduly discrimina-
tory, or preferential," section 5 (a) provides that the Commission
tshall determine the just and reasonable rate . . . to be thereafter
observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order."
In a case... antedating CATCO71 by just three years, the Supreme
Court held that the Commission's authority under the act with re-
spect to rates was limited to reviewing, pursuant to sections 4 (d),
4 (e), and 5 (a), the rates initially established by the regulated natural
gas companies, and that the Commission could reduce those initial
rates only after a hearing and a finding, pursuant to section 5 (a) of
the act, that such rates were "unjust, unreasonable, unduly discrimi-
natory, or preferential.""" Speaking of sections 4 (d), 4 (e), and 5 (a)
of the act, the Supreme Court said: "These sections are simply parts
of a single statutory scheme under which all rates are established
initially by the natural gas companies, by contract or otherwise, and
all rates are subject to being modified by the Commission upon a
finding that they are unlawful." 7 '
31 52 Stat. 822 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717c(d) (1958).
368 52 Stat. 822 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (Supp. IV, 1962).
39 52 Stat. 823 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a) (1958).
3"United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956).
37' Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959), discussed in text
accompanying notes 34 and 99-139 supra.
372 In another case, decided the same day, the Court held that the Commission could
require an increase in a rate established by contract only upon a finding that such rate was
so low as to affect the public interest adversely by impairing the financial ability of the
regulated company involved, or that such rate was unduly discriminatory. FPC v. Sierra
Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 (1956).
3' United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 341 (1956).
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In the same case, the Supreme Court also said that the "basic
power" of the Commission under the act was that given it by section
5 (a) to set aside and modify any rate or contract which it deter-
mined, after hearing, to be "unjust, unreasonable, unduly discrimina-
tory, or preferential." The Court observed that this was neither a rate-
making nor a rate-changing procedure, but simply a procedure for
the exercise of the Commission's basic function of reviewing rates
made in the first instance by natural gas companies. In this connec-
tion, the Court had said that "the initial rate-making and rate-
changing powers of natural gas companies remain undefined and un-
affected by the act.""74
The view expressed in this case concerning the Commission's au-
thority with respect to rates accurately reflects the structure of the
act. Nothing in the act suggests that the Commission may tamper
with initial rates in certificate cases. Section 7 of the act, 7' which re-
quires Commission certification of new gas sales, is entirely silent
concerning rates. The fundamental prerequisite specified by section
7 for the issuance of Commission authority to initiate a new sale is
a finding that the proposed sale "is or will be required by public con-
venience and necessity" ;3 76 and the Commission's conditioning au-
thority is founded on the same standard, i.e., the Commission may
impose "such reasonable terms and conditions as the public con-




The phrase "public convenience and necessity," although broad and
variously defined in different factual contexts, does not suggest an in-
quiry concerning the proper rate for a proposed sale or service, but
connotes such issues as public need or demand for a proposed sale
or service and the ability of an applicant to fulfill adequately that
need or demand."7 The absence of any reference to rates in section
7, coupled with the specific provisions in sections 4 and 5 for Com-
mission review of rates and modification of rates found to be unlaw-
ful, strongly indicates that Congress did not intend that initial rate
170levels be modified by the Commission in certificate cases.
741 Id. at 343.
a7s 52 Stat. 824 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717f (1958).
37156 Stat. 84 (1942), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (1958).
377 Ibid.
37 See Johnson, Producer Rate Regulation in Natural Gas Certification Proceedings:
CATCO in Context, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 773, 777 (1962).
371 See Callery Properties, Inc. v. FPC, 335 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1964). Another com-
mentator on the initial rate issue has observed that the "complete divorce of the certification
and rate-regulation sections suggests that rates are to be given little consideration in certi-
fication," and that "a most cursory reading of sections 4, 5, and 7 leaves one with the
uneasy feeling" that the conversion of certificate proceedings into rate hearings and the
imposition of specific rate conditions upon certificates "is not at all what Congress had in
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Prior to 1942, the Commission's certificate authority was prescribed
by section 7 (c) of the act... and was limited to situations in which
a natural gas company proposed (1) to construct, extend, acquire,
or operate facilities for the transportation of natural gas to a market
in which natural gas was being provided already by another natural
gas company; (2) to engage in transportation by means of such
facilities; or (3) to sell gas in such market. The following provision
of section 7(c) specifically made rates an issue in certificate cases:
In passing on applications for certificates of convenience and necessity,
the Commission shall give due consideration to the applicant's ability
to render and maintain adequate service at rates lower than those pre-
vailing in the territory to be served, it being the intention of Congress
that natural gas shall be sold in interstate commerce for resale for utili-
mate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any
other use at the lowest possible reasonable rate consistent with the
maintenance of adequate service in the public interest."'a
In 1942, section 7 of the act was amended; 2 the Commission's
certificate jurisdiction was broadened, authority to condition certifi-
cates was added, and the provision concerning rates was deleted.
Although the deletion of this provision in the 1942 amendments
normally would be strong evidence of Congressional intent that rates
not be a factor in certificate cases, the legislative history of the 1942
amendments indicates that rates were to continue to be a factor in
certificate cases in the same limited sense as under the original act;
3 83
i.e., consideration was to be given to the ability of a company pro-
posing service in an area already being served by another company
to render such service at lower rates than those of the other com-
pany. This was said to have been "specifically reserved"8 " in section
7(g) of the act which provides: "Nothing contained in this section
shall be construed as a limitation upon the power of the Commission
to grant certificates of public convenience and necessity for service
of an area already being served by another natural-gas company. '
mind in 1938." Johnson, supra note 378, at 775, 777. However, this commentator charac-
terizes the act as "unilluminating," and observes that "the cold language of 1938 offers no
guidance in resolving the pressing administrative problems that arose after 1954." Id. at 775.388Ch. 556, § 7(c), 52 Stat. 825 (1938).
388 Ibid.
ass 5 6 Stat. 83 (1942), 15 U.S.C. 5 717f(c)-(g) (1958). The 1942 amendments were
"based substantially" on the certification section of the Motor Carrier Act, 49 Stat. 551
(1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 305, 306 (1958). Hearings on H.R. 5249 Before the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1941). The
Supreme Court has indicated that the question of "illegal tariffs" is not properly an issue
in certificate proceedings under the Motor Carrier Act. American Trucking Ass'n v. United
States, 326 U.S. 77, 86-87 (1945).
3 Hearings on H.R. 5249, supra note 382, at 18-19.3
84 Id. at 18.
3" 56 Star. 84 (1942), 15 U.S.C. S 717f(g) (1958).
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Further, there is a suggestion in the legislative history of the 1942
amendments that, with respect to all applications, such amendments
would permit the Commission to "scrutinize," inter alia, "the char-
acteristics of the rate structure at a time when such vital matters can
be revised and modified as the public interest demands..... This lan-
guage, however, suggests an inquiry concerning the form in which
proposed rates are cast by the applicant rather than the lawfulness
of the amount of the proposed rates. Certainly such nebulous lan-
guage in the legislative history of the 1942 amendments to section 7
cannot be effective to negate the apparent plan of the act that rate
levels are to be modified only in section 4 or 5 proceedings." '
The logical conclusion to be drawn with respect to the amount of
proposed rates as an issue in certificate cases under section 7 as amend-
ed in 1942 is that when confronted with the question of whether a
pipeline applicant should be permitted to render new service in an
area within "an area already being served by another natural gas com-
pany," one factor which must be considered is the ability of the appli-
cant to render the service at rates lower than those of the other gas
company. This limited inquiry has a relevance peculiar to pipelines..8
and seems wholly inapplicable to producers.88
The first judicial approval of a Commission-imposed condition
requiring a reduction in the initial rate proposed by a natural gas
company was the Signal decision.' In Signal, the court relied on
386 Hearings on H.R. 5249, supra note 382, at 6. (Emphasis added.) The other "vital
matters" listed were (1) "financial set-up," (2) adequacy of gas reserves, and (3) feasibility
of proposed services.
387 The same comment is applicable to another passing reference to "conditions affecting
rates" found in the legislative history of the 1942 amendments. Id. at 24. See, e.g., High-
land Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 327 F.2d 725, 730 (8th Cir. 1964).
..8 That all parts of the act are not equally applicable to producers and pipelines has
been judicially recognized in a case holding that the portion of § 7(c) relating to temporary
certificates (also introduced by the 1942 amendments) "has a special relationship to pipe-
lines." Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 327 F.2d 893, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
388 As originally enacted, S 7(c) of the act (the rate provisions of which were said to
be "reserved" in § 7(g) of the act) was intended to "prevent wasteful competition
of natural gas companies." Hearings on H.R. 5249, supra note 382, at 4. This can have no
application to producers, among whom strong competition exists prior to the time Com-
mission certification is requested. The gas sale proposed is a product of that competition.
It also should be noted that pipelines, not producers, are assigned "service areas" under5 7(f).7 (Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC, 238 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
923 (1957), discussed in text accompanying notes 42-50 supra. In an earlier case, judicial
approval was given to a certificate condition imposed by the Commission prior to the 1942
amendments requiring that the rate which a pipeline proposed to charge, on the basis of
which authority to construct new facilities was granted, actually be charged by the pipeline
throughout the term of the certificate. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. FPC, 113 F.2d 281
(5th Cir. 1940), affirming 2 F.P.C. 546 (1939). In another case after the 1942 amend-
ments, a Commission certificate order prescribing a rate other than the proposed rate as
being "just, reasonable . .. and satisfactory to the Commission" was upheld because it was
held to be within the scope of a condition imposed on the certificate authorizing construc-
1964] FPC REGULATION OF PRODUCER GAS SALES 645
(1) administrative interpretation by the Commission that it was
authorized to impose "rate conditions" upon pipeline certificates; (2)
the reference to rates in the legislative history of the 1942 amend-
ments; and (3) a number of judicial decisions, none of which passed
upon the power of the Commission to reduce by certificate condition
the initial rate proposed by an applicant.391 It must be conceded that
there was Commission precedent in pipeline certificate cases for the
imposition of "rate conditions" which required that tariffs satisfac-
tory to the Commission be filed at some future date. or, in some
instances, which actually required that proposed rates be reduced. 93
In virtually all the cases in which proposed rates were reduced by
the Commission, however, the proposed rates were expressly or im-
plicitly found to be unjust, unreasonable, or discriminatory.9 " In
any event, this administrative precedent does not appear to have been
sufficiently persuasive to override the specific provisions of the act.
Although uniform administrative statutory interpretation is entitled
to weight,9 ' it cannot be effective to enlarge the statutory authority of
an administrative body in contravention of clear statutory language. 99
That consistent administrative interpretation is not always conclusive
is well illustrated by the Phillips case,9 7 in which the Supreme Court
brushed aside the Commission's consistent prior interpretation that the
tion of facilities that "a tariff satisfactory to the Commission" be submitted six months
before the beginning of operations; but the validity of the basic rate condition was conceded
by the litigants, and, hence, was not before the court. Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co.
v. FPC, 203 F.2d 494 (3d Cit. 1953), affirming 11 F.P.C. 75 (1952).
... The strongest authorities cited by the court in Signal for the result it reached were
the cases discussed supra, note 390.
39 See, e.g., Trunkline Gas Supply Co., 8 F.P.C. 250, 257 (1949); Alabama-Tennessee
Natural Gas Co., 7 F.P.C. 257 (1948), satisfactory tariff determined, 11 F.P.C. 75 (1952),
aff'd, 203 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1953); Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co., 7 F.P.C. 24, 39-40
(1948) (tariff "in a form" satisfactory to the Commission); East Tennessee Natural Gas
Co., 7 F.P.C. 5, 13 (1948); Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 6 F.P.C. 1, 20 (1947)
(schedule satisfactory "in form" to the Commission), aff'd on other grounds sub nona.
Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 169 F.2d 881 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 854 (1948).
... See, e.g., Erie Gas Serv. Co., 10 F.P.C. 22, 30, 34 (1951); Transcontinental Gas Pipe
Line Corp., 9 F.P.C. 32, 52, 63 (1950); San Juan Pipe Line Co., 9 F.P.C. 170, 185, 196
(1950); Tennessee Gas & Transmission Co., 4 F.P.C. 293, 301 (1945). But cf. Common-
wealth Natural Gas Corp., 9 F.P.C. 70, 82 (1950).
" Erie Gas Serv. Co., note 393 supra; Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., note 393
supra; San Juan Pipe Line Co., note 393 supra; Tennessee Gas & Transmission Co., note 393
supra. In this connection, it should be noted that unlike in producer certificate cases, cost
estimates are an essential part of the applicant's case in pipeline proceedings. Hence, informa-
tion for determining the probable lawfulness of rates proposed for the service to be rendered
through the new facilities is readily available to the Commission.
.. E.g., Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137, 154 (1960); Panhandle
Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 232 F.2d 467, 471 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 891
(1956).
. E.g., Social Security Bd. v. Nierotka, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946); Pacific Power &
Light Co. v. FPC, 184 F.2d 272, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1950); United States v. Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co., 171 F.2d 103, 110 (6th Cir. 1948).
91 Phillips Petroleum Corp. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
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act was not applicable to producers with the comment that "even
consistent error is still error." '
In CATCO,'" the Supreme Court did not cite Signal or other
judicial authority, and did not rely on the language of the act, its
legislative history, or its interpretation by the Commission; instead, the
Court relied on the "purpose" of the act in holding that producers
must show their initial rates to be required by public convenience
and necessity. The Court read this requirement into the act because
it believed (1) that the purpose of the act was "to underwrite just
and reasonable rates to the consumers of natural gas" ° and "to afford
consumers a complete, permanent and effective bond of protection
from excessive rates and charges,.. and (2) that this purpose would
be frustrated unless initial rates were shown to be required by public
convenience and necessity. Although it conceded that initial rates
need not be shown to be just and reasonable in certificate proceed-
ings, nevertheless the Court imposed a new and additional test of the
lawfulness of initial rates which must be met in such proceedings, a
test nowhere expressed in the act.
The Court attempted to square CATCO with its prior interpreta-
tion of the Commission's authority with respect to rates:400 "In grant-
ing such conditional certificates, the Commission does not determine
initial prices nor does it overturn those agreed upon by the parties.
Rather, it so conditions the certificate that the consuming public may
be protected while the justness and reasonableness of the price fixed
by the parties is being determined under other sections of the act."""
These words, however, are unconvincing to a gas producer who has
been precluded by a Commission condition from collecting the initial
price prescribed by his contract. It seems specious to contend that
the Commission does not "determine" the initial price of a sale if
it requires as a condition to certification that the initial price not
exceed a level several cents below that prescribed by the contract
rate schedule.
Nor is this contention strengthened by the fact that a producer
may immediately file a rate increase up to the initial contract price,
subject to the limitations of section 4.40" A producer filing such an
increase is faced with the possibility that the Commission will sus-
-"lid. at 678 n. 5.
"" Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959), discussed in text
accompanying notes 34 and 99-139 supra.
40 0id. at 388.
401 Ibid.
12 See text accompanying notes 370-374 supra.
403 360 U.S. at 392.
40452 Stat. 822 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1958).
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pend the effectiveness of the increase for a time up to five months
and, hence, that contractually authorized revenues will be irretrieva-
bly lost." 5 Furthermore, this mechanism effectively destroys the pre-
sumption of validity with which the act appears to endow rates
initially established by regulated companies and filed with the Com-
mission because the burden of proof in a section 4 (e) proceeding is
upon the producer. " A fortiori, there is no validity in the position
that the Commission does not "determine" initial rates in those cases
in which it attaches a rate-reducing condition coupled with a mora-
torium on rate increases.
The upshot of the Supreme Court's reading of the act in CATCO457
is that initial rates filed by gas producers may be subject to two tests
of lawfulness instead of the one specifically prescribed by the act
and that, when initial rates are subjected to these tests, the burden is
upon the producer to show that the initial rates proposed meet each
test. And, contrary to the Supreme Court's observation, the initial
rate, i.e., the rate charged for first deliveries of gas, is not determined
by the producers, but by the Commission."' Under the CATCO
gloss the only efficacy of the initial rate prescribed by contract is as
a ceiling which the initial rate cannot exceed.""
The two-step procedure sanctioned by the Supreme Court in
CATCO destroys the difference between initial rates and changed
rates contemplated by the structure of the act. The Court told the
Commission that it could use its section 7 conditioning power to
compel producers to subject a portion of their initial rates to the pro-
visions of sections 4 (d) and 4 (e) (or forever lose such portion) not-
withstanding the fact that the language of the act makes it clear that
sections 4(d) and 4 (e) were intended to apply not to initial rates
but to changes in previously filed rates. The Court suggested this
40' Revenues which a natural gas company is prohibited from collecting by a Commission
suspension order cannot thereafter be recouped even though the increased rate is ultimately
determined to be just and reasonable. FPC v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 371 U.S. 145
(1962); Hope Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 196 F.2d 803 (4th Cir. 1952).
' The burden of proving in a § 5 (a) proceeding that an existing rate is unlawful
is upon the one urging such unlawfulness. See Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364
U.S. 137, 144 (1960); Bel Oil Corp. v. FPC, 255 F.2d 548, 554 (5th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 804 (1958).
"'Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959).
401 See Munn, The Lesson of the Independent Gas Producer Regulatory Experiment, ABA
Proceedings, Section of Mineral & Natural Resource Law 17, 27 (1961).401See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1955). One
writer has suggested that this limitation on rates be eliminated by permitting producers to
file tariffs. Steves, FPC Gas Tariff-Solution to the Rate Change Dilemma of the Independent
Producer?, 15 Sw. L.J. 46 (1961). In this connection, another writer has observed that if
producers are to be subjected to "the burdens of regulation, . . . the benefits should also be
available." Tarver, The Natural Gas Regulatory Problem-A Middle Way, ABA Proceedings,
Section of Mineral & Natural Resource Law 15, 17 (1961).
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violation of the act's apparent intent in order to devise a hybrid pro-
cedure which it thought necessary to the proper administration of
the act.
It is submitted that if standards or procedures not provided for
in the act became necessary after 1954, it was the function of Con-
gress, not the courts or the Commission, to supply them. Although
some degree of "interstitial" legislation by courts and administrative
bodies is inevitable, 1° administrative boards should not assume major
substantive authority not specifically provided in the applicable
statute, nor should the courts, whose function is to interpret statutes,
not amend them, attribute such authority to an administrative
board."" The Supreme Court has said that in ascertaining the func-
tions and authority of an administrative board, "the determinative
question is not what the Board thinks it should do but what Congress
has said it can do."' Concerning problems of administration, the
Court has said:
Legislation introducing a new system is at best empirical, and not in-
frequently administration reveals gaps or inadequacies of one sort or
another that may call for amendatory legislation. But it is no warrant
for extending a statute that experience may disclose that it should have
been more comprehensive. "The natural meaning of words cannot be
displaced by reference to difficulties in administration." . . For the
ultimate question is what has Congress commanded. 13
Administrative bodies, supported by the courts, should have and
410 That the Commission is disposed to exercise legislative power which is considerably
broader than "interstitial" was shown in striking fashion in a recent case in which the
Commission held subject to its jurisdiction sales to consumers in Louisiana of gas produced
in Louisiana. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 30 F.P.C. 560 (1963). Unable to find anything in
the language of the act or its legislative history supporting its jurisdiction over these sales,
the Commission said:
In the absence of a direct statement of what Congress intended, we must at-
tempt to determine what Congress would have said about this particular prob-
lem if it had been brought to its attention. We do not think it is sufficient
to ask simply whether the states could constitutionally have regulated the sales
at issue here. Rather we are compelled to ask whether a statutory scheme
which would include wholesale sales at one end of a pipeline but would
exclude the same sales, from a common stream, if made at the other end of
a pipeline, would make sense. We think it would not .... We conclude that
had Congress considered the sales here in question, it would have treated them
as "in interstate commerce." Id. at 567-68. (Emphasis added; footnotes
omitted.)
Regrettably, in recent years the Supreme Court has occasionally utilized similar reasoning
in construing legislation. E.g., NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58
(1964); Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
411 See, e.g., CAB v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316, 322 (1961); Addison v. Holly
Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 617-18 (1944); Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. FPC,
202 F.2d 899, 903 (3d Cir. 1953), appeal dismissed, 345 U.S. 988 (1953); Border Pipe
Line Co. v. FPC, 171 F.2d 149, 152-53 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
41CAB v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., supra note 411, at 322.
413 Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 617-18 (1944).
1964] FPC REGULATION OF PRODUCER GAS SALES 649
should exercise all incidental and subsidiary powers necessary to
implement the basic powers specifically conferred upon them. Their
authority should not, however, be extended by "implication" to in-
clude new basic substantive powers not specified in the relevant
statute. It is logically, as well as legally, unsound to argue that be-
cause expressly granted powers A and B can be said to manifest or
promote policy X, that all other powers which also can be said to
manifest or promote policy X have been impliedly granted. By this
line of "reasoning" almost anything could be read into any statute.
Predictability is not an outmoded attribute of the law. If statutory
authority is to be extended to cover everything promotive of the
broad policies found in a statute, one would do well to challenge all
proposed legislation.
The undesirability of the "broad legislative policy" approach to
statutory construction is demonstrated by the fact that several broad
policies, sometimes conflicting, often can be found in a single statute.
For example, the Supreme Court has stated that in addition to the
oft-recognized policy of protecting consumers, Congress was mani-
festing in the Natural Gas Act "its concern for the legitimate inter-
ests of natural gas companies in whose financial stability the gas-
consuming public has a vital stake.. 1. Certainly this particular legis-
lative policy is not promoted by permitting natural gas companies to
be deprived forever of contractually authorized revenues which have
not been shown to be unlawful so that consumer gas bills may be re-
duced. Under the approach in question, if such a conflict in policies
is presented, the result will depend on which policy the court or
administrative body thinks should take precedence. In our system
of government, such a decision is properly a function of Congress.
The virtue of deciding the matter upon the basis of what the statute
says seems apparent.
b. Application of CATCO
Notwithstanding the foregoing discussion, CATCO'" is a fait
accompli which must be dealt with as a significant amendment of
the act. Although characterized by one writer as "a guiding flare in
a field of otherwise utter darkness,"' " the description of the Com-
mission's efforts to apply this decision41 makes it apparent that the
light from this "flare" was not altogether unfailing, and was never
particularly bright. Having described the Commission's current ap-
4 4 United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S. 103, 113
(1958).
"" Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959).
416 Johnson, supra note 378, at 773.
417See text following note 139 and accompanying notes 140-196 supra.
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plication of CATCO and the evolution thereof,'18 it is appropriate
to access the Commission's approach in the light of the "guiding flare."
(1) The Out of Line Test Certainly the most celebrated and
legally significant aspect of the CATCO decision was the pronounce-
ment of the "out of line" test. 1" As has been shown previously,
judicial and Commission decisions have resolved the question of
whether an initial rate is lawful as measured by the test of public
convenience and necessity into a determination of whether such
price is above or below a precise and virtually frozen number
known as the "line." The language of the CATCO opinion, how-
ever, conveys the distinct impression that the Supreme Court did
not have this kind of rigidity in mind when it used the term
"out of line." 2  Rather, as Judge Brown observed, ' it would
seem that the term was merely a colloquial expression used by
the Court for purposes of convenience and was not intended as
the phrase of art it has become. The phrase "out of line" is in com-
mon use and has a generally accepted meaning. When applied to a
price, the phrase could mean either that it is too high or too low,
depending on the observer's viewpoint. 22 Read in the context of the
CATCO opinion, the "out of line" test would appear to involve only
the question of whether a price is too high from the viewpoint of
the buyer, considering all surrounding circumstances.
What is the proper test of whether a proposed price is "out of
line," i.e., too high, in the CATCO sense? As has been noted pre-
viously, the Supreme Court was not very helpful on this point.4es
Factors specifically mentioned by the Court as requiring more evi-
dence than was in the record were: (1) the price was higher than
any paid by the purchaser, (2) the price was seventy per cent higher
than the weighted average cost of gas to the purchaser, and (3) the
41"See text accompanying notes 356-362 supra.
419 360 U.S. at 391. The other two CATCO-prescribed indicia that a proposed price "is
not in keeping with the public interest," viz., its "triggering of general price rises" and its
causing "an increase in the applicant's existing rates by reason of 'favored nation' clauses
or otherwise," have not been significant factors in the law that has evolved. The only case
found in which controlling effect was given these tests is Western Natural Gas Co., 23
F.P.C. 332, 11 0. & G.R. 1074 (1960), discussed in text accompanying notes 170-172 supra.
See Johnson, supra note 378, at 811-13.
20 But cf. Johnson supra note 378, at 798.
421 United Gas Improvement Co. v. FPC, 290 F.2d 133, 138 (5th Cir. 1961), discussed
in text accompanying notes 236-244 supra.
422 In this connection, the use of the phrase "out of line" by American Airlines, in an
advertisement appearing on page 9 of the January 3, 1964, issue of the Wall Street Journal
is of interest. There, in announcing a voluntary reduction in first-class fares, American stated
that the cost of first-class accommodations had been so much higher than coach that
American "felt it was out of line." (Emphasis added.) Clearly, the meaning conveyed was
that, all factors considered, the first-class fares were too high.
4" See text accompanying notes 133-13 9 supra,
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price was "greatly in excess of" the price paid by the purchaser for
gas from any lease in southern Louisiana." 4 The Court indicated that
these factors made it necessary for the applicant to introduce evidence
showing a "reason why" the proposed prices were higher than those
with which they had been compared, and made it clear that infor-
mation which was "little more ... than was included in the printed
contracts" " ' was not sufficient for this purpose. The only evidence
which the Court specifically mentioned as appropriate for this pur-
pose was evidence of "relative costs of production.""' Another factor
which influenced the Court was the purchaser's construction of a
pipeline to the producers' wells and the free transportation of the
producers' distillates. The absence of support for these aspects of the
transaction in the form of "evidence of practice or custom '  or
other supporting data was stressed.
The vagueness of the Supreme Court's definition of the "out of
line" test left considerable latitude for administrative interpretation.
Nevertheless, some elements seem clear. The test calls initially for a
comparison of a proposed price with other prices. The comparison
must be made with prices at which comparable sales are made, or
allowance must be made for factors which are not comparable." 8 If
the price in question exceeds prices under sales with which compari-
son is made, taking into account aspects of noncomparability, a price
condition "may" be attached to the certificate issued unless evidence
is presented showing a "reason why" the excess price is required by
public convenience and necessity. No restriction was suggested by
the Court with respect to the kind of evidence which may be ad-
duced for this purpose.
As has been noted, the Commission's inquiry is generally restricted
to a comparison of the proposed price with other prices in an artifi-
cially delineated area. Although this subject cannot be explored at
length here, it is apparent that political boundary lines should be of
no moment in determining areas within which gas prices are to be
compared. " The areas of comparison should have some rational foun-
dation in the economics of the gas industry. It is as ridiculous for
gas produced from a single source of supply to be sold at different
prices because drawn from wells located on different sides of a county
4"4Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 392-93 (1959).
42 Id. at 392.426 Id. at 393.
427 Ibid.
428 See United Gas Improvement Co. v. FPC, 283 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 881 (1961).
429 See McGee, Independent Producers-After Six Years of FPC, ABA Proceedings,
Section of Mineral & Natural Resource Law 219, 233-234 (1960).
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line43 as it is to have multiple just and reasonable rates from a single
well.4"' It would appear that the areas of comparison currently used by
the Commission are generally too small. Conceivably, comparisons
could be made on a nation-wide basis, if appropriate account were
taken of factors peculiar to sales in each area.
Further, it would appear that the Commission is much too restric-
tive in selecting prices within a given area to which it will give
weight in determining whether a proposed price is "out of line." By
giving little or no weight to nonjurisdictional prices, prices received
by gathering companies, prices received by new pipelines, prices under
contracts executed substantially before or after the contracts in
issue, "suspect" prices, "like-suspect" prices, and prices under tem-
porarily certificated sales, the Commission has effectively deprived the
"out of line" test of any semblance of reality. Nothing in CATCO"
suggests that prices be measured in section 7433 proceedings by an
artificially contrived standard which can be tailored to support any
predetermined result. On the contrary, the gist of the "out of line"
test to be gathered from CATCO is that an initial price above the
prevailing market price should not be permitted by the Commission
absent a legally compelling explanation therefor. It follows that all
prices at which gas is sold in the area of comparison should be con-
sidered in determining whether a price is "out of line."
At most, CATCO indicates that the status quo should be main-
tained against unjustified price increases; there is no hint that cer-
tificate procedures should be utilized to effect a price freeze or a price
rollback. The cutoff point for determining the existing market level
against which a proposed price is to be measured should be the time
of closing the record in the certificate proceeding in which the price
is being tested. There is no valid reason for limiting consideration to
prices under contracts executed contemporaneously with those in
issue. The touchstone of public convenience and necessity should be
an objective one to the greatest extent possible, and whether or not
the negotiators of a price were influenced by a particular contract
should not determine whether the initial price prescribed by such
contract should be considered in appraising the lawfulness of a price
in question. The relevant inquiry in a certificate proceeding ought
to be what is the status quo, not what was the status quo at some
time in the past, or what would it have been if regulatory actions
' See Michigan-Wisconsin Pipeline Co., 27 F.P.C. 449 (1962), discussed in text accom-
panying notes 285-288 supra.
431 See Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.P.C. 537, 544, 13 0. & G.R. 343, 350 (1960).
"
5 Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959).
43352 Stat. 824 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. S 717f (1958).
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which were not taken had been taken.434 If this approach presents a
possibility of "unjust enrichment" to sellers as a result of procedural
delays in a period of rising market prices, it also presents the possi-
bility of a price penalty in a period of declining market prices.
In addition to the weight they should be given as manifestations
of the current market price, prices for gas sold in intrastate com-
merce" and in other nonjurisdictional markets are entitled to con-
sideration in section 7 proceedings for another reason. The "public"
whose "convenience and necessity" is of concern to the Commission
is, of course, that segment of the population using gas sold in inter-
state commerce. But this "public" is affected by the price paid for
nonjurisdictional gas to the extent such price attracts, or presents
the possibility of attracting, gas supplies away from the interstate
market." It is not suggested that controlling significance be given
nonjurisdictional prices, but it seems apparent that the "convenience
and necessity" of the interstate "public" requires that interstate gas
prices be allowed to remain high enough to keep needed gas supplies
from being diverted to intrastate or other nonjurisdictional sales.'
There appears to be no valid basis for the Commission's refusal to
give weight to prices paid by pipelines to gathering companies.
Whether the gathering is done by the producer or by an intervening
entity should not be legally significant. The ultimate question is the
price paid by the pipeline measured against the value received there-
for. If a proposed price is applicable to gas delivered by a producer
at the wellhead, a sale by a gathering company can be used for com-
parative purposes if an appropriate adjustment is made for the value
of the gathering function.
(2) Suspect Prices One of the most objectionable aspects of the
Commission's current approach to the initial rate issue is the exclusion
of so-called "suspect prices" and "like-suspect" prices in determining
whether a price is "out of line." ' The "suspect price" rule runs afoul
of the long-established and well-founded rule of law that orders of
the Federal Power Commission and other administrative agencies are
4 3
'See Callery Properties, Inc. v. FPC, 335 F.2d 1004, 1013 n. 24 (5th Cir. 1964).
"' Intrastate prices have on occasion been given weight by the Commission. See, e.g.,
Phillips Petroleum Co., 22 F.P.C. 528, 529 (1959), discussed in text accompanying and
following notes 160-162 supra.
' In one case, gas producers refused price-conditioned certificates, took their gas off
the interstate market, and sold it intrastate at a price above that which the Commission had
imposed. Gulf Oil Corp., 23 F.P.C. 664 (1960), rescinded, 23 F.P.C. 926 (1960), discussed
in text accompanying notes 179-185 supra.
43 See Johnson, supra note 378, at 801.
" For a detailed analysis of this subject, see Morris, Recent Independent Producer Certi-
ficate Cases: The "Suspect Order" Rule, 32 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 489 (1964).
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presumptively valid. ' As the Supreme Court observed in one leading
case,"' an order of the Commission is "the product of expert judg-
ment" and "rdoes not become suspect by reason of the fact that it is
challenged.""' The Ninth Circuit, however, in first announcing the
"suspect price" rule,"' completely ignored this presumption of validity.
The "suspect price" rule not only fails to accord certificate orders
the presumption of validity to which they are entitled under settled
law, it also has potential consequences far more "anomalous" than
those which the Ninth Circuit said it feared would flow from reliance
on prices under review (and "like" prices) when determining whether
a particular price was "out of line." The application of this rule
necessarily prevents the price "line" against which a proposed price is
to be measured from representing current conditions in the industry
as the Ninth Circuit itself said it should."' Unwarranted power is
placed in the hands of those who oppose a particular price level
because they may effectively freeze the price "line" at old levels
simply by challenging every Commission order certificating sales at
higher prices.'
Carried to its logical end, the "suspect" price rule is administra-
tively unworkable. If all prices under judicial or Commission review
(and all "like" prices) were discarded as irrelevant for the purpose
of testing initial prices, there soon would be no jurisdictional prices
with which comparison could be made. This is so because as area rate
proceedings are instituted with respect to the various gas producing
areas of the country, all such prices will be subject to Commission
review, and therefore "suspect.""' The effect would be to destroy
completely the "out of line" concept. A result more at odds with
CATCO"' hardly can be imagined.
(3) Exclusion of Evidence Equally as objectionable as the "sus-
pect" price rule is the Commission's present policy of excluding all
FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591 (1944); Panhandle Eastern Pipeline
Co. v. FPC, 179 F.2d 896 (8th Cir. 1950); Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 142 F.2d
943 (10th Cir. 1944).
440 FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra note 439.
41 Id. at 602. (Emphasis added.)
41 United Gas Improvement Co. v. FPC, 283 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 881 (1961), discussed in text accompanying notes 217-227 supra.
4'In receding somewhat from this rule recently, the Commission recognized that rigid
application of the rule would "result in a complete stagnation of prices at . . . a level
based on prices being paid for gas under contracts drawn up long before these contracts
were executed." Amerada Petroleum Corp., No. 422, FPC, March 23, 1964, rehearing denied,
No. 422A, FPC, May 27, 1964 (Emphasis added.), discussed in text accompanying notes
348-355 supra.
'This weakness in the rule has been conceded by the Commission. Texaco Seaboard,
Inc., 29 F.P.C. 593, 598, 17 0. & G.R. 874, 881 (1963), discussed in text accompanying
notes 312-317 supra.
"'See Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FPC, 316 F.2d 677, 680 n. 12 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
'Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959).
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cost, economic, and related evidence. The exclusion of this evidence
in combination with the application of the "suspect" order rule has
sapped certificate proceedings of all vitality and meaning. Virtually
nothing can be adduced by a producer in a certificate proceeding that
will support a price above the highest price in the area not subject
to review proceedings. The Commission's exclusion of evidence re-
lating to costs, economics, geology, and related matters is entirely con-
trary to CATCO because it effectively eliminates the possibility of
showing a "reason why" in support of a proposed price, the absence
of which was fatal to the prices proposed in CATCO." That CATCO
specifically refers to relative costs of production as evidence that
might have been presented as a "reason why" apparently has been
forgotten."
The requirement of CATCO that prices above current levels be
supported by a showing of a "reason why,""' combined with the
Commission's exclusion of all evidence which can be presented to
make such a showing, puts producers in an intolerable position and
leads to an absolute price freeze which cannot be thawed.4"" The fact
that the evidence also may be relevant in determining just and rea-
sonable rates does not necessarily establish that such evidence is not
relevant in determining whether a proposed price is required by pub-
lic convenience and necessity. It is true, of course, that the public
convenience and necessity standard as applied to prices implies an
appraisal based primarily on the worth of a particular gas sale to the
consuming public. Consequently, the emphasis in certificate cases is
properly on the aspects of a sale which make it more valuable, or
less valuable, to the purchaser and to the consuming public."' If
the prevailing price in a particular area for gas delivered at the
wellhead is 20 cents per Mcf, there having been no prior sales in the
area of gas delivered to the purchaser's main line, the primary inquiry
in testing a 20.5 cent price for gathered gas should be how much is
the pipeline advantaged by the gathering service performed by the
44 Ibid. Since the burden of supporting initial prices above current levels with a "reason
why" has been imposed on producers, it seems axiomatic that the Commission is without
authority to exclude all evidence which can be presented for that purpose. See American
Trucking Ass'n v. United States, 326 U.S. 77, 83-86 (1944).
4' 360 U.S. at 392-93.
449 360 U.S. at 393.
' When applied in combination with the "suspect" price rule, the Commission's ex-
clusion of evidence actually results in a price rollback to old levels rather than in a freeze at
current levels.
" In two recent cases, the Commission has articulated this concept in refusing to allow
price increments to producers as reimbursement for the cost of transporting their gas to
the purchasers' pipelines. Superior Oil Co., No. 437, FPC, July 23, 1964; Amerada Petroleum
Corp., No. 422, FPC, March 23, 1964, rehearing denied, No. 422A, FPC, May 27, 1964.
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seller, not how much does the service cost the seller."' The logical
measure of the value of this particular service would be the amount it
would cost the purchaser to perform the service. No matter how
relevant the seller's cost of this service might be in determining
whether the price he receives is just and reasonable, it is of little sig-
nificance in determining whether a price differential based on such
service is necessary and convenient to the public.
But this primary emphasis on value does not rule out cost and
economic factors. The convenience and necessity to the public is not
dependent entirely on whether a particular price is above other prices,
taking into account the factors which affect the value of the sales
being compared; it also is relevant to inquire whether the price in
question is sufficiently high to spur the development of needed future
supplies in the area."" In this connection it should be noted that
the statutory standard is "the present or future.4 public convenience
and necessity. The public is not benefitted, except in the very short
run, by low prices which will not bring forth supplies needed for the
future. For this purpose, the cost and economic evidence currently
being rejected by the Commission is not only appropriate in certifi-
cate cases; it is well nigh essential. Such evidence should not be pre-
sented to show that the price in question is or is not just and reason-
able, but to show that it is required to provide needed supplies, i.e.,
to show that the price is required by present or future public con-
venience and necessity.
In a recent case,45 the Fifth Circuit reversed a Commission order
issuing rate-conditioned certificates because the Commission rejected
cost and financial evidence presented by the producers. The court's
opinion on this point was in substantial agreement with the views
expressed above.
(4) Function of Policy Statement As previously noted," ' the
Commission has recognized in recent cases that the Policy State-
ment5 7 cannot be determinative of the substantive rights of any
certificate applicant. This would seem to rule out the use of Policy
Statement rates in contested cases as "ceilings" or as "administrative
412 But cf. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 27 F.P.C. 35, 45, 15 0. & G.R. 877, 891
(1962), discussed in text accompanying notes 263-270 supra.
411 Mr. Justice Jackson once observed that "if . .. the price is not a sufficient incentive
to exploit [the supply of gas] . .. and fails to bring forth the quantity needed, the price
is unwisely low .... .. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581, 612 (1944)
(concurring opinion).
454 56 Stat. 84 (1942), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (1958).
.. Callery Properties, Inc. v. FPC, 335 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1964), discussed in text
accompanying and following notes 331-337 supra.
"0 See text preceding and accompanying note 361 suPra.
.. Statement of General Policy No. 61-1, 24 F.P.C. 818, 12 0. & G.R. 1227 (1960).
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determinations of the 'line.'" The Policy Statement, however, could
be treated as establishing an administrative presumption (not "de-
termination") that the initial prices which it specifies are required
by public convenience and necessity. 5' All prices below these levels
would be presumed lawful as measured by the criterion of public
convenience and necessity, and, in the absence of objections by inter-
veners, would be approved in shortened proceedings. Objecting inter-
veners in such a case would have the burden of proving that the
price was not required by public convenience and necessity."5' Pro-
posed prices exceeding the Policy Statement price would be presumed
to be inconsistent with public convenience and necessity to the extent
of the excess, and the burden of proving the contrary would be upon
the applicants.
For such a scheme to work accurately and fairly, Policy State-
ment prices should be realistic and up-to-date, and should take ac-
count of all factors which may vary from sale to sale and which may
affect the value of a particular sale to a particular buyer. These prices
should be based on information presented in contested certificate pro-
ceedings and on other information on file with the Commission. They
should change as circumstances change or as information becomes
more complete and accurate. The attributes of the sales upon which
the Policy Statement prices are founded should be set forth in detail,
and both penalties and premiums should be prescribed for specified
factors affecting the value of a sale, subject to the right of any party
to show in an individual proceeding that different values should be
attributed to such factors.
The function of Policy Statement prices discussed above is precisely
the function which the Commission in the Policy Statement said such
prices would serve. However, as has been shown, the Commission on
occasion has applied those prices as determinations of the "line" or as
impenetrable "ceilings." The Commission's tendency of late to treat
Policy Statement prices as mere "guides" to future administrative
action appears to be more in accord with the stated intent of the
Policy Statement. It would appear that this is the only use to which
such prices lawfully can be put.
(5) Moratorium on Rate Increases The Commission's use of its
conditioning power in recent cases to require a moratorium on the
filing of rate increases over a specified level for gas sold under perma-
nent certificates seems clearly at odds with the act. As has been men-
"SSee Hillyer, A Primer on Producer Price Regulation, Oil and Gas Operations: Legal
Considerations in the Tidelands and on Land 345, 363 (Slovenko ed. 1963).
"" See Stone, Federal Power Commission Developments of Significance to Independent
Producers of Natural Gas, 13 Ann. Inst. on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 1, 10-11 (1962).
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tioned, section 4 (c) .. of the act requires that natural gas companies
file with the Commission schedules showing all rates and charges for
sales subject to its jurisdiction. Under section 4 (d), 6 a change in a
filed rate may be made only upon thirty days' notice to the Commis-
sion and the public, to be given by the filing of a new schedule setting
forth the new rate and the date it is to become effective. At any time
during the thirty-day notice period, under section 4(e)41 the Com-
mission may (1) enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness of
the new rate and (2) "pending such hearing," defer use of the new
rate for a period of five months.' after it otherwise would have gone
into effect. If the hearing has not been concluded at the end of the
suspension period, the new rate may be put into effect subject to the
Commission's power to require a refund of any portion found by the
Commission to be unjustified.
It seems clear that these provisions of section 4 are, as the Supreme
Court observed in United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv.
Corp.,"" only procedural limitations on the power of natural gas
companies to initiate rate changes. These limitations are necessary to
permit the Commission to perform its only function under the act
with respect to rates-that of reviewing the lawfulness of rates made
by the companies. Nothing in the act can be said to support restric-
tion of the freedom of natural gas companies to file any rate increase
permitted by their gas supply contracts. On the contrary, it would
appear, as the Supreme Court observed in United Gas Pipe Line Co. v.
Memphis Light, Gas &q Water Div.,"5 that section 4 contemplates "the
earliest effectuation of contractually authorized ... rate changes con-
sistent with appropriate Commission review. '
This view has been reflected in several cases... in which the Com-
mission was held to have no authority under the act summarily to
reject contractually authorized rate increases duly filed by natural
gas companies. In one of these cases,"' it was argued that the Com-
460 52 Stat. 822 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717c(c) (1958).
461 52 Stat. 822 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717c(d) (1958).
462 52 Stat. 822 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. S 717c(e) (Supp. IV, 1962).
" The Commission has unsuccessfully urged Congress to increase this period. 42 FPC
Ann. Rep. 16 (1962). The moratorium in question accomplishes this purpose indirectly by
deferring the use of rate increases for a period of several years.
4350 U.S. 332 (1956).
46'358 U.S. 103 (1958).
4 Id. at 114.
4"Willmut Gas & Oil Co. v. FPC, 294 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 975 (1962); Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. FPC, 202 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1953), appeal
dismissed, 345 U.S. 988 (1953). But cf. Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. FPC, 293 F.2d 572
(10th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 976 (1962); Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v.
FPC, 232 F.2d 467, 473 (3d Cir. 1956); Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. FPC,
203 F.2d 494, 497 (3d Cir. 1953).
468 Willmut Gas & Oil Co. v. FPC, supra note 467.
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mission should have prohibited the filing of rate increases pursuant
to its section 16 rule-making power, a power which is certainly as
broad as, if not broader than, the Commission's section 7(e) con-
ditioning power. In rejecting this argument, the court said:
[T]he broad power granted by this statutory language does not author-
ize an order, rule, or regulation which would nullify or restrict the right
of a natural gas company to change the rates under which it offers to
furnish service, subject only to the requirements of Section 4(d) of the
Act that it notify the Commission of the changes, so that it may pro-
ceed under Section 4(e) .... An order or regulation requiring the re-
jection of increased rates . . . would deny to United the right to change
rates at which it offers service, which the Mobile decision says is the
right of a natural gas company. Thus, it seems clear that such an order
or regulation would amount to a legislative change which is beyond the
authority of the Commission." ' (Emphasis added.)
This interpretation of the act seems sounder than the contrary ra-
tionale of the Supreme Court in a recent case involving the Com-
mission's rule-making power. 7 '
In each case in which a moratorium on price increases has been
imposed, the Commission has taken the position that such a condi-
tion was required by CATCO 7' because (1) any increase above the
specified limit would cause widespread "triggering" of price in-
creases resulting in a general increase of the "asking price" within
the area, and (2) the obligation of the producer to refund amounts
collected and later determined to be excessive does not adequately
protect the public. In support of the latter point, the Commission
has relied on a Supreme Court decision 7. upholding an interim rate
reduction order entered by the Commission in a section 4 (e) pro-
ceeding prior to determination of all of the issues therein. In support
of the Commission's order, the Court said:
To do otherwise would have permitted Tennessee Gas to collect the
illegal rate for an additional 18 months .... True, the exaction would
have been subject to refund, but experience has shown this to be some-
what illusory in view of the trickling down process necessary to be
followed, the incidental cost of which is often borne by the consumer,
and in view of the transient nature of our society which often prevents




9 d. at 250.
470FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964), discussed in text accompanying notes
528-531 infra.
""Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959).
472 FPC v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 371 U.S. 145 (1962).
413 d. at 154.
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Contrary to the Commission's position, the moratorium in question
is in direct conflict with the CATCO decision, which the Commission
says requires that such action be taken. In CATCO, the Court said:
The gas operator . . . is not without remedy to protect himself. He
may, unless otherwise bound by contract, . . . file new rate schedules
with the Commission. This rate becomes effective upon its filing, subject
to the S-month suspension provision of [section] 4 and the posting of a
bond, where required. This not only gives the natural gas company
opportunity to increase its rates where justified but likewise guarantees
that the consumer may recover refunds for moneys paid under excessive
increases."" (Emphasis added.)
In granting . . . conditional certificates, the Commission does not de-
termine initial prices nor does it overturn those agreed upon by the
parties. Rather, it so conditions the certificate that the consuming
public may be protected while the justness and reasonableness of the
price fixed by the parties is being determined under other sections of the
Act.4 ' (Emphasis added.)
These statements make it quite clear that in holding that the
Commission may attach appropriate rate conditions in certificate cases,
the Court assumed that gas producers would remain free to file rate
increases up to contractually authorized levels, even if initial rate
conditions were imposed. The Court was concerned by the fact that
section 5... cases were lengthy and did not provide the public with
interim refund protection. The adequacy of the refund device to
protect the public in section 4 (e) proceedings was implicitly recog-
nized. Recognition also was accorded the need to protect the interests
of gas producers. The Court seems to have had in mind a procedure
in certificate cases which would accommodate the interests of both
producers and consumers. The imposition by the Commission of a
condition requiring the reduction of an initial rate to a level found
by the Commission to be "in the public interest" may be said to be
consistent with this purpose if coupled with freedom on the part of
the producer to file increases to contractually authorized levels. How-
ever, the imposition of such a condition is contrary to this purpose
if coupled with a moratorium on the filing by producers of rate in-
creases because the combination deprives producers of any protection
without providing the public any substantial additional protection.
Of course, any other rate increases which are "triggered" by a pro-
ducer's collection of his full contract price are also subject to the
suspension and refund provisions of section 4 (e).
474 Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 389 (1959).
415 Id. at 392.
476 52 Stat. 823 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717d (1958).
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The producers' right to file increases to contractually prescribed
levels even though initial rate conditions have been attached has been
specifically recognized in several judicial decisions in which the mora-
torium was not in issue." ' In one case,478 the court upheld the Com-
mission's imposition of initial rate conditions, but in so doing stated:
"[W]e think it appropriate to say that we find no authority for
holding that a producer does not have the right immediately to file
a proposed rate increase of 20 cents per Mcf after complying with the
condition that it file a new schedule carrying an initial price of
17.7 cents in lieu of the 20-cent rate in the contract." 7' In another
case,48 the court suggested that "in setting an initial rate," the Com-
mission "should err on the low side because the Company, under sec-
tion 4, can immediately increase the rate, subject to disallowance by
the Commission after a full rate proceeding, the public being pro-
tected with reference to refunds in the interim.
'48 1
In any event, the argument that rate increases should be banned
because the obligation to refund does not adequately protect the public
is not convincing. Under the scheme of regulation established by the
act, not only refunds but also rate increases and decreases by pro-
ducers must "trickle down" to ultimate consumers; none of these
matters can affect consumers until both interstate pipelines and local
distributors have taken action on the basis thereof. Just as the exist-
ing rates of a pipeline or distributor in a particular case may be
sufficiently high to permit it to absorb an increase in the price it pays
for gas, so may such rates be sufficiently low that it may be justified
in retaining for itself, wholly or partially, the benefits of a decrease
in the cost of purchased gas or a refund of past overcharges. How-
ever, in the long run, under any system of rate regulation in which
regulated companies are permitted to recover their costs of service,
the consuming public at large inevitably must be affected by any
increase or decrease in such companies' costs. Any refund by a pro-
ducer not passed along by the pipeline or distributor for any reason
will offset a part of the cost of service of the pipeline or distributor
and will affect ultimate consumers at large82 in the form of either
(1) a reduction in rates, (2) a delay in a rate increase, or (3) a
reduction in the amount of a rate increase.
The most that any system of rate regulation can hope to achieve
4' Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FPC, 316 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1963); California Oil Co. v.
FPC, 315 F.2d 652 (10th Cir. 1963); Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 290 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1961).
478 Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, supra note 477.
4791d. at 156.
48' Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FPC, 316 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
481 Id. at 679. (Emphasis added.)
48 See FPC v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 336 U.S. 577, 581 (1948).
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is protection of the public at large, for it would be impossible
to insure absolute equity with respect to each individual consumer.
Further, because the regulation of local distributors is beyond the
jurisdiction of the Commission, "3 the problem of adjusting equities
between local distributors and individual consumers is not a proper
matter of concern to the Commission, but must be resolved by state
regulatory agencies.""
It may be conceded that the procedure of allowing increases to
be filed by producers and placed into effect subject to an obliga-
tion to refund does not afford perfect protection to the public. It
is also true, however, that this system does not perfectly protect
producers either because any increase, regardless of its merit, may
be suspended for five months. Certainly it is more reasonable to
adopt a procedure which affords substantial protection to both con-
sumer and producer than it is to follow one which gives complete
protection to the interests of the former, while giving none to those
of the latter. Furthermore, regardless of the merits of the procedure
in question, it is, after all, the procedure prescribed by law and should
not be repealed judically or administratively.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in the Hunt case, 8 which
upheld the validity of a condition prohibiting rate increases during
the pendency of a temporary certificate, does not support the validity
of the moratorium in question. On the contrary, the Court in Hunt
carefully limited the scope of its holding to temporary certificates
and gave weight in reaching its decision to the difference which it
perceived between temporary and permanent certification procedures.
It was indicated that because temporary certificates were issued ex
parte, the Commission should be given greater latitude in condition-
ing such certificates than in conditioning permanent certificates. 8
The Court concluded that the Commission's powers under section 4
of the act are not operative until after a sale has been authorized by
the Commission under a permanent or an unconditioned temporary
certificate. "Under the procedures of the act, it is at the point of
permanent or unconditional temporary certification that the pro-
visions of section 4 become applicable. The gas has been permanently
certificated into interstate commerce and the independent producer
is then free to pursue the rate filing procedure of that section.' 8'
4 SSection 1 of the act, 52 Stat. 821 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1958).
414 See FPC v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 336 U.S. 577, 593-95 (1948) (concurring
opinion).
4 8 5FPC v. Hunt, 376 U.S. 515 (1964), discussed in text accompanying notes 635-639in ira.
4S6ld. at 523.
417 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
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Although it must be admitted that some of the reasoning in Hunt
could be applied to permanent as well as to temporary certification
procedures, it is difficult to imagine how such an extension of the
Hunt rationale could be squared with CATCO. Indeed, in Hunt the
Court quoted with approval"' a part of CATCO s9 which supported
the continuing vitality of section 4 procedures after Commission im-
position of an initial rate condition.
In a recent case,490 the Fifth Circuit held that the Commission was
without authority to impose a moratorium on rate increases as a
condition to permanent certification. The court's opinion on this
point was in substantial agreement with the views set out above.
c. Effect of Area Rate Determinations
In 1960, the Commission abandoned the individual company ap-
proach to the determination of just and reasonable producer rates
and announced its intent to determine such rates on an area basis.49'
Since then it has instituted four area rate proceedings.49 Assuming
arguendo that the area approach is valid9. and that just and reasona-
ble rates will be validly determined in pending and future area pro-
ceedings, the effect of these determinations on the rate issue in cer-
tificate cases deserves consideration.
The Supreme Court made it clear in CATCO that the introduc-
tion of the rate issue in certificate cases was only an interim device to
be utilized to "hold the line" pending determination of the applicable
just and reasonable rate. '94 Thus, if a just and reasonable rate deter-
mined in an area proceeding were applicable to proposed new sales,
the rate issue apparently would drop out of certificate proceedings;
if it were not applicable, then it would seem that the rate issue and
the considerations raised by CATCO would continue to be an issue
in those proceedings. Will just and reasonable area rates automatically
govern new sales? The Commission suggested an affirmative reply in
the remanded CATCO case 9'5 when it expressed the view that "the
498 Id. at 524.
4SAtlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 391-92 (1959).
4
.Callery Properties, Inc. v. FPC, 335 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1964), discussed in text
accompanying and following notes 331-337 supra.
491 Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.P.C. 537, 13 0. & G.R. 343 (1960), aff'd sub nom.
Wisconsin v. FPC, 303 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1961), aff'd, 373 U.S. 294 (1963).
492 See note 256 supra.
" Consideration of the validity of, and the regulatory problems inherent in, the area
rate approach is beyond the scope of this Article. For treatment of these matters, see Orn,
FPC Excursion into New Regulatory Fields, 14 Ann. Inst. on Oil and Gas Law and Taxa-
tion 71 (1963); Ross, The Area Rate Proceedings: An Unsettled Experiment in Public
Control of Natural Gas Prices, 18 Sw. L.J. 165 (1964); Comment, Legality of FPC
Regulation of Independent Gas Producers by Area Price Fixing, 50 Geo. L.J. 250 (1961).
4. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 392 (1959).4
1
9 Continental Oil Co., 27 F.P.C. 96, 15 0. & G.R. 841 (1962), discussed in text
accompanying notes 271-278 supra.
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price problem" in certificate cases would be eliminated by the con-
clusion of area rate proceedings.'
It does not appear, however, that initial rates will be any less of a
problem in certificate cases initiated after the determination of just
and reasonable area rates than at present. The pending area rate pro-
ceedings are basically section 5 (a) cases directed at all rates within
each of the affected areas. Consolidated with the section 5 (a) case
in each proceeding are a number of pending section 4 (e) rate in-
crease cases. In the Permian Basin case,"" pending certificate applica-
tions also have been consolidated. The section 4 and section 7 pro-
ceedings may be ignored for purposes of this discussion because they
are limited to specific sales. The basic question, therefore, concerns
the scope of the determination in the pending area section 5 (a)
proceedings.
Desirable though it might seem to the Commission from the stand-
point of administrative expedience, there simply is no basis in the
act for applying a Commission determination of a just and reason-
able area rate to any sale of gas not subject to the Commission's
jurisdiction before the close of the hearing upon which such deter-
mination is based. Section 5 (a) provides in pertinent part as follows:
Whenever the Commission, after a hearing, . . . shall find that any rate
... charged ... by any natural gas company in connection with any
... sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission,
... is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential, the
Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate . . .to be there-
after observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order . . . .
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, it seems clear from the language of the act that a rate estab-
lished by contract for a specific sale can be changed by the Com-
mission pursuant to section 5 (a) only upon a finding by the Com-
mission following a hearing that the rate in question is unlawful.""
In this connection, the Supreme Court has said. of the Commis-
sion's authority under section 206 (a) of the Federal Power Act,"'
in all material respects identical to section 5 (a) of the Natural Gas
41 Id. at 100, 15 0. & G.R. at 845.
417 24 F.P.C. 1121 (1960).
49s52 Stat. 823 (1938), 15 U.S.C. S 717d(a) (1958).
49 See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956);
FPC v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 (1956); FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of
America, 315 U.S. 575, 584-85 (1942); Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n,
260 U.S. 48 (1922); Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 226
F.2d 60 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 987 (1956); Colorado Interstate Gas Co.
v. FPC, 142 F.2d 943, 954 (10th Cir. 1944).
50 FPC v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., subra note 499.
50'49 Stat. 852 (1920), 16 U.S.C. § 824e (1958).
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Act, that "the condition precedent to the Commission's exercise of
its power ... is a finding that the existing rate is 'unjust, unreason-
able, unduly discriminatory, or preferential.' ,...
The requirement that a hearing be held and a finding be made by
the Commission with respect to a specific rate and sale compels the
conclusion that a determination of a just and reasonable rate in a
section 5 (a) case cannot be applicable to any sale which becomes
subject to the Commission's jurisdiction after the close of the hearing
in such case."' Because the mere execution of a gas sales contract and
the application for a certificate to make sales pursuant thereto does
not bring a sale within the ambit of the Commission's regulatory
authority, ' it would appear that a sale of gas for resale in interstate
commerce must actually have been made (i.e., deliveries must have
begun) pursuant to Commission authority, prior to the completion
of a section 5 (a) hearing, if the resultant order is to be applicable
thereto.
Of course, the scope of a Commission order in a section 5 (a) case
may be narrower than the maximum permitted by the act. Within
statutory limits, the scope of the order emanating from the pending
area proceedings will depend upon which sales have been made subject
to the proceeding by the Commission upon appropriate procedural
steps. In the Permian Basin... and south Louisiana' proceedings, the
orders initiating the proceedings seem to contemplate that only sales
being made at the time the orders were issued are covered. However,
the order instituting the latest two proceedings is couched in broader
terms.5ee
seaFPC v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 353 (1956). (Emphasis added.)
0' Even with respect to those sales to which a Commission determination of just and
reasonable rates is applicable, the rates so determined are not binding for all time. Upon the
determination and effectuation of just and reasonable rates, any producer making a sale
affected thereby will be free, under § 4 of the act, to file a rate increase to the level permit-
ted by contract for such sale. Upon making such a filing, a producer must be given an oppor-
tunity to support the justness and reasonableness of the changed rate-i.e., the Commission's
area determinations will not provide a basis for summary disallowance of future rate increases
above the just and reasonable area rate so determined. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v.
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S. 103 (1958); Pennsylvania Water & Power
Co. v. FPC, 343 U.S. 414, 423-24 (1952); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591,
615 (1944); Willmut Gas & Oil Co. v. FPC, 294 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 975 (1962); Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. FPC, 202 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1953),
appeal dismissed, 345 U.S. 988 (1953); Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 143 F.2d
488, 498 (8th Cir. 1944); United Carbon Co., 19 F.P.C. 242, 249 (1958); Colorado In-
terstate Gas Co., 19 F.P.C. 1012, 1016 (1958). But cf. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co.
v. FPC, 236 F.2d 606 (3d Cir. 1956); Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 232 F.2d
467 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 891 (1956); State Corp. Comm'n v. FPC, 206
F.2d 690, 716 (8th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 922 (1954).
°4Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 387 (1959); Pioneer
Gathering Sys., Inc., 23 F.P.C. 260 (1960).
'
5
°Area Rate Proceeding, 24 F.P.C. 1121 (1960).
'0 Area Rate Proceeding, 25 F.P.C. 942 (1961).
10 7 Area Rate Proceeding, 30 F.P.C. 1354 (1963).
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Thus, contrary to the Commission's apparent hopes, there is no
reason to assume that the problem of initial rates will be solved by
the completion of area rate proceedings. The same circumstances
which moved the Supreme Court to introduce the rate issue into cer-
tificate cases in the first place still will be present. There will be no
just and reasonable rate determination applicable to new sales and
no way of making such a determination except through a new sec-
tion 5 (a) proceeding.
d. A Proposal
The initial rate issue was introduced into producer certificate
proceedings because the fundamental issue in the regulation of
producer gas sales-the method of determining just and reason-
able rates-had not been resolved. Currently, ten years after the
inception of producer regulation, the issue still is unresolved. The
introduction of the rate issue into producer certificate cases was the
Supreme Court's innovation, devised to fortify a weakness which the
Court detected in the "bond" of consumer protection which it
thought the act was designed to provide. Essentially, this weakness
was the lack of consumer protection against possibly excessive rates
during "nigh interminable" section 5 (a) proceedings. It is reason-
able to assume that if producer section 5 (a) proceedings were expedi-
tious instead of "nigh interminable," there would be no further rea-
son for tampering with producer rates in certificate proceedings.
It now seems apparent, however, that Congressional action will
be required to develop an expeditious method of determining just and
reasonable producer rates.' Having discarded in 1960 "the tradi-
tional original cost, prudent investment rate base method" in pro-
ducer rates cases, s°9 the Commission's much-heralded area price ap-
proach to the problem now seems hopelessly bogged down after only
four years. 1 The rate requirements of the act have defied rational
application to producers. It should now be apparent to everyone-pro-
ducers, consumers, pipelines, and Commissioners-that remedial legis-
lation is essential. Such legislation either should exempt producer
rates from regulation under the act or, alternatively, should provide
5"'There can be little doubt that the present Natural Gas Act no longer is an efficient
regulatory instrument." Tarver, The Natural Gas Regulatory Problem-A Middle Way,
ABA Proceedings, Section of Mineral & Natural Resource Law 15, 16 (1961).
5'"Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.P.C. 537, 13 0. & G.R. 343 (1960), aff'd sub nom.
Wisconsin v. FPC, 303 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1961), aff'd, 373 U.S. 294 (1963).
51 In the Permian Basin proceeding, the first area hearing instituted by the Commission,
the examiner's decision was issued on September 17, 1964, three years and nine months
after the proceeding was initiated. Commission and judicial review remain. In this connec-
tion, one court commented that "despite ... the importation of resourceful new plans, .. .
the fact is that progress is slow, so slow indeed that it is hardly progress." Hunt v. FPC,
306 F.2d 334, 343 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 515 (1964).
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a rational and expeditious mode of determining just and reasonable
producer rates.
It would appear that the public interest would be served at least
as well by exemption of producers as by enactment of a modified
system of producer regulation. 1 ' If this alternative were adopted,
producer gas prices could be effectively regulated by critically scruti-
nizing the prices paid by interstate pipelines for gas supplies before
allowing that cost to be included in their cost of service recoverable
through rates to distributors and consumers. Notwithstanding the
1954 Phillips decision,"'5 it is conceded by nearly everyone familiar
with the subject that the Natural Gas Act was written to apply not
to producers, but to interstate pipelines, s"' which, being public utili-
ties in the traditional sense, were appropriate subjects of regulation.
As a general rule, direct control of the rates of those furnishing goods
or services to public utilities has not been deemed essential to effective
regulation of utility rates; but such rates have been controlled indi-
rectly by permitting utilities to pass on to their customers only those
costs incurred which are reasonable, thus placing the burden of un-
reasonable expenditures upon utility stockholders."4
If strict proof were required from pipelines with respect to their
gas purchase costs, and they were compelled to absorb any unjusti-
fied costs, it seems certain that the price paid for gas by pipelines
would never exceed its worth. In fairness, the consuming public can
ask for no more protection than this. Even if it be conceded that the
primary purpose of the act was to protect consumers from "exploita-
tion" at the hands of natural gas companies, there is nothing in the
act or its legislative history which suggests that natural gas producers
were to be "exploited" for the benefit of consumers. The word "ex-
... In this connection, it should be noted that in its Phillips opinion the Commission
stated that cost figures adduced in the many cases before it "show that natural gas has
been, in almost all instances, substantially underpriced." Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.P.C.
537, 546, 13 0. & G.R. 343, 353 (1960), aff'd sub nom. Wisconsin v. FPC, 303 F.2d 380
(D.C. Cir. 1961), aff'd, 373 U.S. 294 (1963). For a compelling argument in support of
abolishing federal control of the price of gas at the wellhead, see Munn, The Lesson of the
Independent Gas Producer Regulatory Experiment, ABA Proceedings, Section of Mineral &
Natural Resource Law 17 (1961).
"'Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
513 As recently as 1961, the then general counsel of the Commission said: "Unquestion-
ably, the Natural Gas Act was tailored to fit the pipelines, not the producers." Mason,
Problems in Regulation under Natural Gas Act of Interstate Operations of Producers, ABA
Proceedings, Section of Mineral & Natural Resource Law 30, 31 (1961). See also Orn, FPC
Excursion into New Regulatory Fields, 14 Ann. Inst. on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation
71-72 (1963).
514See, e.g., Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. FPC, 252 F.2d 619, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 904 (1957); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 34
Cal. 2d 822, 215 P.2d 441 (1950); Ohio Mining Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 106 Ohio
138, 140 N.E. 143 (1922); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 133 Tex. 330,
128 S.W.2d 9 (1939). See also Welch, Public Utility Regulation 431-33 (1961). But cf.
Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. FPC, 163 F.2d 433, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
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ploit" as used by the courts means "to take advantage of," which
suggests (1) inequality of bargaining positions and (2) unfair action
predicated thereon. Of course, producers of gas for the interstate
market do not negotiate directly with consumers, so neither can
directly "exploit" the other. If there were direct negotiation, pro-
ducers and consumers would find themselves in roughly equal bar-
gaining positions; the consumers' investment in gas burning equip-
ment and need for energy to operate it would be balanced by the pro-
ducers' investment in wells and leases and the need to sell gas in order
to avoid (1) possible loss of their leases, (2) drainage, (3) waste
through flaring gas produced in association with oil, and (4) liability
for shut-in payments to their lessors. In other words, the price at the
point of production that would result from direct negotiation would
be the fair market value of the gas, and neither party could be said to
have been "exploited." The effect of the suggested procedure would
be to put consumers in the same position (to the extent of the Com-
mission's power to do so) under the indirect relationship which exists
between consumers and producers as they would be in if they dealt
directly with producers; i.e., they would be assured a rate based upon
the fair market value of the gas at the point of production.
Consumers are no more entitled to rates which reflect an under-the-
market price for purchased gas than they are to rates which reflect less
than the market price for pipe, for pipe laying, or for any of the other
commodities and services included in a pipeline's cost of service. Why
then are not the suppliers and layers of pipe for use in an interstate
pipeline subject to federal rate regulation? Certainly such regulation
can no longer be thought inhibited by constitutional restrictions. Such
regulation does not exist simply because it would not make any sense.
Prices for supplying or laying pipe are effectively kept near cost (or
sometimes below) by that sure and stringent regulator, competition.
Further, such prices are indirectly regulated by the Federal Power
Commission through the test of reasonableness discussed above.
When one views the ponderous administrative machinery and the
formidable array of law which have evolved in the effort, unsuc-
cessful to date, to regulate directly the price of gas sold to interstate
pipelines, it seems inconceivable that direct regulation was really what
Congress had in mind when it passed the Natural Gas Act. If indirect
regulation were utilized, the Commission once again would have only
a few regulated entities"' with which to cope rather than the sev-
a' The Commission has reported that at the end of 1962 there were only 40 "natural
gas pipeline companies" in operation, "natural gas pipeline companies" being defined as
"companies having transmission line mileage in excess of 250 miles and sales for resale in
excess of 50 percent of total sales." FPC, Statistics of Natural Gas Companies 1962, at VII.
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eral thousand... with which it now must deal. Its regulatory burden
thus lightened, the Commission could regulate more effectively pipe-
line rates which, after all, have a more direct and immediate impact on
the consuming public than do producer rates. Inherent in improved
pipeline regulation would be effective indirect regulation of pro-
ducer prices through the method previously described.
However, if direct regulation of producers is to be retained, the
act should be amended to provide specifically that the just and rea-
sonable rate for gas at the point of production shall be its fair market
value.51 ' The adoption of such a standard would provide consumers
with all the protection they reasonably can expect; it would not be,
as others have suggested, s" s tantamount to no regulation. Consumers
would be assured that the rates they paid for gas would not include
an artificially inflated price at the point of production resulting from
collusion of lack of arm's-length bargaining. In other words, the act
as so amended would protect consumers from "exploitation" at the
hands of producers.
B. Condition Precedent To Certificate Application
In 1962, the Commission amended51' its regulations to provide that
certificate applications filed by producers would be rejected if the
sales contracts submitted in support of the applications contained
any price-changing provisions other than those defined by the Com-
mission as permissible.52 Price-changing provisions defined as "per-
missible" by the Commission are: (1) provisions for reimbursement
of state production taxes by the buyer to the seller; (2) provisions
for a price change to a specific amount on a definite date; and (3)
provisions that once in five-year periods of the contract during which
no specific change is provided, the price shall be redetermined on the
516 During 1962, domestically produced gas was supplied by some 1,300 producers having
annual sales of 100,000 Mcf or more each, and by an estimated 3,200 additional producers
with smaller sales. FPC, Sales by Producers of Natural Gas to Natural Gas Pipeline Com-
panies 1962, at V.
517 One pipeline attorney has publicly advocated that the just and reasonable rate for
gas at the point of production be defined by statute as "the reasonable market price of the
gas." Tarver, The Natural Gas Regulatory Problem-A Middle Way, ABA Proceedings,
Section of Mineral & Natural Resource Law 15, 16 (1961). For a persuasive argument
supporting "the fair market value" of gas as a proper measure of just and reasonable
producer rates, see Smith, The Operator Who Has Discovered a Gas Pool-What Next?,
7 Rocky Mt. Min. Law Inst. 79, 98 (1962). Under the act as now written, just and reason-
able producer rates cannot be determined solely by reference to field prices. Bel Oil Corp.
v. FPC, 255 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 804 (1958).
518 See, e.g., Johnson, Producer Rate Regulation in Natural Gas Certification Proceed-
ings: CATCO in Context, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 773, 800 (1962).
s1927 Fed. Reg. 1356 (1962).
52 18 C.F.R. § 157.25 (1961). For a detailed discussion of this amendment and related
amendments, see Fitzgerald, Adoption of Federal Power Commission Price-Changing Rules
Without Evidentiary Hearing: Statutory Collision, 18 Sw. L.J. 236 (1964).
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basis of (and not higher than) rates subject to Commission jurisdic-
tion which are not in issue in suspension or certificate proceedings,
and which are in the area of the price in question."' Eliminated as
not "permissible" were "favored nation" provisions, providing that
a producer shall receive a price as high as any other price paid by his
purchaser ("first party favored nation") or any price paid by any
other purchaser ("second party favored nation") to any producer
within a specified area, and "spiral escalation" provisions, providing
that a producer shall be permitted to collect a higher price when his
purchaser is permitted to collect a higher price. The reasons given
by the Commission for outlawing these provisions were: (1) they are
"by their nature and in their effects inherently unreasonable" be-
cause there "need be no economic or other substantial justification"
for an increase pursuant thereto; (2) such provisions have a wide-
spread impact; and (3) the administrative burden of processing in-
creases filed pursuant to such provisions would be eliminated."'
This Commission-imposed condition precedent to the filing of cer-
tificate applications by producers has received judicial attention in
several recent cases. Rejection of a certificate application for failure
to meet this condition was held invalid by the Tenth Circuit."' The
Commission's action was referred to as a "bootstrap operation" which
had the practical effect of circumventing the basic question of the
propriety of indefinite pricing clauses. The Commission's rule-making
authority was held not to encompass the power to promulgate the
regulation relied on. The critical deficiency which the court found in
the Commission's action was its failure to conduct an adversary hear-
ing to determine whether these contract provisions were unlawful
before prohibiting them by regulation. In this connection the
court said: "Sections 4 and 5 . . . give the Commission power to
modify contracts-not to make contracts. The power to modify can
only be exercised after hearing. The controlling standard is what is
just and reasonable..". "No claim of administrative need or of frus-
tration in the performance of its duties can make up for the lack of
statutory authority." '' Although the court specifically invalidated
only the order of rejection before it, it expressed the opinion that
the basic order promulgating the condition to certification was void.
The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, in holding that the Com-
mission's rejection of a producer application upon the basis of the
21 18 C.F.R. § 154.93 (1961).
122Pure Oil Co., 25 F.P.C. 383, 388-91, 15 0. & G.R. 369, 376-80 (1961), aff'd, 299
F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1962).
"23 Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 317 F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 377 U.S. 33 (1964).
24 Id. at 805.
"I Id. at 807.
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condition was proper, stated that promulgation of the regulation was
a valid exercise of the Commission's rule-making power.' 6 The court
held that the challenged rule was not adjudicatory in nature and,
therefore, that no hearing was required prior to its issuance. Further,
the court placed some reliance on the fact that, pursuant to a general
regulation of the Commission,"' any producer filing an application
based on a contract containing any of the proscribed provisions could
obtain a hearing by requesting a waiver of the rule.
The Supreme Court decided the issue in the same manner as had
the Ninth Circuit.2 ' The Court held that the requirement in section
729 that a hearing be held did not "preclude the Commission from
particularizing statutory standards through the rule-making process
and barring at the threshold those who neither measure up to them
nor show reasons why in the public interest the rule should be
waived.""' The Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that the Com-
mission's action in this case was not an "adjudication" and, hence,
that an adversary hearing was not required precedent thereto. The
Counission's rule was said not to pass on the merits of any rate
structure or of a certificate of public convenience and necessity, but
to prescribe "qualifications for applicants." Further, the Court saw
no purpose in prolonging and crippling the processes of regulation
by requiring the Commission to implement its policy against indefinite
pricing clauses on a case-by-case basis. Also mentioned was the right
to apply for a waiver of the rule in individual cases. Although the
merits of the provisions which the Commission had outlawed were
not before it, nevertheless the Court referred to the provisions as "a
built-in device for ready manipulation of rates upward."'' .
The Supreme Court's affirmance of the regulation in question is one
of the latest in a series of decisions by the Court giving the Commis-
sion virtually free rein with respect to gas producers. Without reite-
rating them here, it is enough to observe that the criticisms previously
made with respect to the moratorium on rate increases imposed by
the Commission". are equally applicable to the regulation under dis-
cussion. The question of whether Commission policies may be ap-
plied through rule-making processes or must be applied on a case-by-
case basis, to which the Supreme Court gave great attention, seems
58 Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 922
(1964).
27 18 C.F.R. § 1.7(b) (Supp. 1964).
...FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964).
'29 52 Stat. 824 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717f (1958).
5"0 377 U.S. at 39.
531 Id. at 42.
... Discussed in text accompanying notes 460-490 supra.
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
entirely beside the point. The relevant point is that the outlawing
of contract provisions permitting increased gas prices is not a proper
function of the Commission in any kind of proceeding.
As the Supreme Court has recognized," there is an obvious and
long-observed distinction between "the service in which the producer
engages" and "the contract which regulates his relationship with the
transmission company in performing the service."" The Commis-
sion's authority properly relates to the "service" performed by a
producer rather than to the relationship established by contract be-
tween the producer and the pipeline. The Commission's regulatory
concern begins only when the parties to a gas sales contract seek to
make its provisions operative. At this point, the Commission must
measure the contractually prescribed action against the standards of
the act, and may take such measures as the act authorizes. Thus, when
a producer files a rate increase authorized by the contract between
the producer and the pipeline, the Commission may review the law-
fulness of the new rate," but not the lawfulness of the provision
which authorized the increase. The Commission's only concern with
respect to the contract is to determine the "threshold question" of
whether the increased rate actually is authorized by the sales con-
tract.'
The Court's observation that the regulation in question does not
pass on the merits of any rate structure or certificate application""
suggests the very reason why it is invalid. It is precisely the function
of the Commission to pass on the merits of new rates and certificate
applications filed, not to prohibit the filing of such matters for reasons
having no relationship to their merits. To define the elements of a
showing that a specific rate is just and reasonable may be said to be
the "particularization" of statutory standards,' but to bar pro-
ducers from even making sales because the basic contract contains
certain provisions for increasing prices is more akin to amendment
of the act than to "particularization" of its standards.
The Commission's statement that the prohibited pricing clauses are
"by their nature and their effects inherently unreasonable" seems
untenable.' That, as between the parties, there need be no "economic
'
33 Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137 (1960).
34 1d. at 153.
53' United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S. 103 (1958).
s'6 See Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 363 U.S. 263 (1960); Pure Oil
Co. v. FPC, 299 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1962).
6
3 7 FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 42 (1964).
"' The Commission has recently been judicially rebuffed for failing to so "particularize"
the "just and reasonable" standard as applied to producer rates. Hill v. FPC, 335 F.2d 355
(5th Cir. 1964).
"'.Pure Oil Co., 25 F.P.C. 383, 389 (1961).
[Vol. 18
1964] FPC REGULATION OF PRODUCER GAS SALES 673
or other substantial justification" for a price increase under the clauses
in question does not distinguish these provisions from the definite
pricing clauses which the Commission recognizes as effective. With
respect to the requirements of the act, all rate increases must be justi-
fied regardless of the nature of the contract provisions authorizing
them. But under the act, rate increases are to be justified after they
are filed, not before. At the time of certificate application, the factors
which may justify a rate increase during the term of a contract are
unknown. It is exactly this uncertainty that gave birth to the in-
definite pricing provisions in question which are triggered by future
events suggesting that a price increase is in order and may be justifia-
ble before the Commission. To ban such provisions at the outset of a
proposed sale seems in itself an act which is "inherently unreasonable."
C. Duration Of Permanent Certificates
Contrary to the impression conveyed by the word, a "certificate"
of public convenience and necessity is not a specific, identifiable docu-
ment that can be mounted and framed or filed away. Instead, it is
a part of the order of the Commission finding that a gas sale is re-
quired by public convenience and necessity and authorizing deliveries
to commence, or to continue if already commenced. In general, the
certificate is effective on the date of the order issuing it or upon the
satisfaction of any conditions imposed by the Commission. A pro-
ducer who applies for and receives a certificate, conditioned or un-
conditioned, has no obligation under the act to accept the certifi-
cate,"' although the obligations imposed by his gas sales contract may
inhibit rejection of a certificate issued exactly as applied for."' Nor
does acceptance of a proffered certificate impose any obligations under
the act upon the accepting producer."4' It is only when gas deliveries
are actually initiated by a producer pursuant to certificate authority
that the producer incurs obligaions under the act."3 One important
obligation incurred is the duty to continue the deliveries so initi-
ated." Because this obligation has always been considered to endure
for the same period of time as the certificate under which deliveries
'40Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FPC, 360 U.S. 378, 387-88 (1959); Sunray Mid-Continent Oil
Co., 20 F.P.C. 730, 732 (1958).
"'See Gulf Oil Corp. v. American Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 282 F.2d 401 (6th Cir.
1960).
'
2 Pioneer Gathering Sys., Inc., 23 F.P.C. 260 (1960). See also FPC v. Panhandle
Eastern Pipeline Co., 337 U.S. 498 (1949).
14'Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 387 (1959); Sunray DX
Oil Co., 29 F.P.C. 1295 (1963); Pioneer Gathering Sys., Inc., supra note 542, at 263.
4Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, supra note 543, at 389; Harper Oil
Co. v. FPC, 284 F.2d 137, 139 (10th Cir. 1960). Cf. J. M. Huber Corp. v. FPC, 236 F.2d
550 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 971 (1957).
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were initiated,4 ' the duration of certificates became an issue early in
the history of Commission regulation of producers. Producers took
the position that they were entitled to certificates limited in duration
to the term of their gas sales contracts, and that certificates issued
without a term limitation were, ipso facto, coterminous with the
related gas sales contracts.
Initially, the Commission took the position that it was without
authority to issue limited term certificates.54 The Tenth Circuit, how-
ever, held the Commission's position to be erroneous. 7 The court
held that the Commission was authorized, under its section 7 (e) con-
ditioning power, to grant certificates of public convenience and
necessity of limited duration, and that section 7 (b),"' requiring
Commission approval prior to abandonment of service, did not re-
strict the Commission's authority to issue limited term certificates.
On the other hand, the court ruled that the Commission was not
required to issue limited term certificates when requested. The Tenth
Circuit's ruling on this point, after some procedural circularity, was
confirmed by a divided Supreme Court in Sunray Mid-Continent Oil
Co. v. FPC.M'
The majority of the Court adopted what can only be called a
strained reading of sections 7(c) and 7(e) of the act in order to
reach a result which it obviously deemed desirable. It stated that a
contrary holding would permit gas producers, upon the expiration
of their gas sales contracts, (1) to terminate deliveries of gas with-
out obtaining authority from the Commission pursuant to section
7 (b) of the act, (2) to enter into new contracts at higher rates with-
out being subject to the rate-changing provisions of sections 4 (d) and
"' See discussion with respect to temporary certificates in text accompanying notes
658-685 infra. This view was judicially expressed as early as 1956. Sunray Mid-Continent
Oil Co. v. FPC, 239 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 353 U.S. 944
(1957). See Atkinson, Federal Regulation of Natural Gas-The Independent Producers'
Status, 13 Sw. L.J. 425, 457 (1959).
" Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., Nos. 8826, 8907, and 9403, FPC, July 25, 1955, and
January 4, 1956.
"'Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., 239 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1956), rev'd on other
grounds, 353 U.S. 944 (1957).
548 52 Stat. 824 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1958). Section 7(b) pro-
vides as follows:
No natural-gas company shall abandon all or any portion of its facilities sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or any service rendered by means
of such facilities, without the permission and approval of the Commission first
had and obtained, after due hearing, and a finding by the Commission that
the available supply of natural gas is depleted to the extent that the continu-
ance of service is unwarranted, or that the present or future public conven-
ience and necessity permit such abandonment.
This provision has been held applicable to producer sales. E.g., Hunt v. FPC, 334 F.2d 474
(5th Cir. 1964); J. M. Huber Corp. v. FPC, 236 F.2d 550 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 971 (1957).
'49 364 U.S. 137 (1960).
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4 (e) of the act, and (3) to obtain new certificates covering such con-
tracts. In the latter circumstance, the majority observed that "the
only power the Commission would have, under the Act, with respect
to those rates, would be to bear the burden of proof in an investiga-
tion under section 5 of the Act, that the rates are unjust and un-
reasonable. . . .""' The majority feared that the power to change
rates coupled with the "leverage" of the power to abandon deliveries
without Commission approval would seriously affect the "regulatory
scheme," the "primary aim" of which was consumer protection."
Having explained the practical reasons for its decision, the ma-
jority came to grips with the language of the act. Section 7 (e) of
the act provides that if the requisite findings are made, a certificate
shall be issued to the applicant "authorizing the whole or any part
of the operation, sale, service, construction, extension, or acquisition
covered by the application."5 "2 One of the requisite findings is "that
the applicant is able and willing properly to do the acts and to per-
form the service proposed." ' Relying upon this language, the pro-
ducer contended that the Commission had no power to authorize
more than what the applicant proposed, e.g., to tender a certificate
unlimited in time to an applicant proposing a sale of gas for twenty
years only.
The majority found this contention "unpersuasive," because it
depended on "freighting" the phrase "the whole or any part" with
a "load" of unwarranted negative meaning."4 The majority argued
that the phrase could be interpreted to mean only that the certificate
granted must be sufficient to authorize the specific sale proposed,
and that an unlimited certificate would meet this requirement.
Further, the majority took the position that a producer proposing
a sale is also proposing a "service"-namely, the movement of gas
in interstate commerce-which was said to be commenced by
the initial sale. The majority concluded that because section 7(e)
permits the Commission to authorize services as well as sales,
it was not restricted to authorizing the specific sale proposed, but
could go further and authorize the "service" which the proposed
sale represented. The requisite "willingness" to perform the "service
proposed" was found by the majority to be inferable from the
55°Id. at 144. Although the majority often referred to the CATCO opinion, written
just a year earlier, it ignored the basic holding of that case, as shown in this quotation, that
the Commission may exercise its conditioning power in certificate cases to reduce prices.
s51 Id. at 143, 147. In explaining the potential impact of the producer's contentions on
the "regulatory scheme," the majority noted that such contentions would be equally applic-
able to pipelines. Id. at 143.
'5 56 Stat. 84 (1942), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
33 Ibid.
.. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137, 148-49 (1960).
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applicant's willingness to execute a long-term sales contract,5s5 a
"specific manifestation" of such service. The majority noted and gave
weight to the Commission's past practice of distinguishing between
contracts and "underlying service. '
The majority rejected the contention that if the public interest
requires unlimited term certificates, this end should be achieved by
Commission rejection of all requests for limited term certificates or
by the use of the Commission's conditioning power."5 The majority
saw no purpose in resorting to such indirect methods and expressed
fear that if the Commission's direct approach were invalidated, the
indirect procedure likewise would be overturned on appeal. Also
rejected by the majority was a contention that its decision would
violate the integrity of private contracts. In this connection, it was
noted that both parties to the gas sales contract would continue to
be bound by it during its term and that the producer's obligation to
continue deliveries after expiration of the contract would flow not
from the contract but from the act.
Similarly dismissed was the producer's contention that it would
be in a position of inequality after the expiration of the contract
because it would continue to be obliged to deliver gas but the pur-
chaser no longer would be obliged to take it. Deftly sidestepping the
question whether an obligation to continue taking natural gas, cor-
responding to a producer's obligation to continue delivering, was im-
posed by the act upon a purchaser after expiration of the contract,"'
the majority noted that the purchaser would continue to have obliga-
tions under the act to local distributors and that its need for a con-
tinuing gas supply to meet these obligations might enhance the pro-
ducer's post-contract "bargaining strength." ''5 In other words, re-
gardless of whether the purchaser was compelled by law to continue
taking, it would be forced to do so by necessity.
In the companion case, Sun Oil Co. v. FPC,s65 decided by the same
majority, it was held that a certificate issued by the Commission with-
out specific time limitations was of unlimited duration despite (1)
the fact that the producer had applied for a certificate "authorizing
551 Id. at 151.
1 Id. at 15 2.
" In this connection, the majority also sustained the Commission's imposition of the
burden of proof on the producer to support a limited term certificate instead of taking
upon itself the burden of justifying the issuance of a certificate unlimited in term. Id. at
1 57.157 The Commission has since decided that such an obligation is imposed upon gas pur-
chasers under the act. Continental Oil Co., No. 426, FPC, May 5, 1964, rehearing denied,
No. 426A, July 2, 1964, appeal docketed, No. 21693, 5th Cir., July 6, 1964.
.. Sunray Mid-Contient Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137, 155 (1960).
'6°364 U.S. 170 (1960).
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the sale of natural gas in the circumstances . .. described," having
described these "circumstances" by incorporating the gas sales con-
tract by reference,"' and (2) the fact that the Commission had issued
the certificate "authorizing the sale of natural gas . . .as more fully
described in the application. . . ."' Upon the expiration of the
original contract, the producer and pipeline had executed a new one
providing for a considerably higher price, and the producer had ap-
plied for certificate authority covering the new sale. The Commis-
sion had rejected this application as duplicative of existing authority,
and upon the filing of the new contract under protest as a rate
increase, it suspended the operation of the new rate. The majority
based its holding affirming the Commission upon the absence of any
explicit time limitation in either the application for the original cer-
tificate or in the order issuing it. The majority also placed reliance
upon the fact that at the time the original certificate was issued, the
Commission was asserting the view, albeit erroneous, that it pos-
sessed no authority to issue limited term certificates.
Expressing what seems the better view, the four dissenters in Sun-
ray Mid-Continent "" and Sun'" took the position that the Com-
mission is powerless summarily to authorize more than is proposed
by a producer."" The majority was said to have ignored the "basic
distinction between an interstate pipeline and an independent pro-
ducer of natural gas,".. 6 namely, that a pipeline performs traditional
public-utility "service," whereas an "independent producer is uni-
que among the objects of public-utility regulation because it is not
engaged in rendering a service to the public in the conventional sense
of that concept, but rather simply in selling a commodity which it
owns.
The majority's "notion" that producers render a continuing serv-
ice to the public in the same sense as pipelines or other conventional
utilities was said to be its basic error. The dissenters concluded that
the sole act which Phillips... held subjected producers to Commission
regulation was the sale of natural gas and that, as to independent
producers, only a limited scheme of regulation was contemplated by
the statute, viz., control over the prices and the other terms of sale
of their natural gas.' The word "sale," it was said, "signifiies a
' Id. at 171.
'12Id. at 172 n. 2.
"'364 U.S. 137 (1960).
'" 364 U.S. 170 (1960).
... Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137, 159 (1960).
5" Id. at 160.
567 Ibid.
56Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137, 161 (1960).
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transaction limited in duration and amount."' '- From the fact that
a producer is not required to "dedicate" his gas supply to the inter-
state market in the first instance, the dissenters reasoned that a pro-
ducer should be free to propose the amount of gas he will so "dedi-
cate.
5 7 1
The Commission was said to lack authority to require, under threat
of outright denial of the application, acceptance of a certificate au-
thorizing the sale of more gas than proposed without meeting the
requirements of section 7 (e) for the imposition of conditions on
certificates. It was in the Commission's section 7(e) conditioning
power that the dissenters found the answer to the practical difficulties
which the majority feared would flow from denying the Commis-
sion the authority which it had asserted in this case. If a limited term
certificate were deemed contrary to public interest by the Commis-
sion in a given case, the dissenters argued, a perpetual certificate could
be issued under the Commission's section 7 (e) conditioning power,
but in such a case the Commission would have to bear the burden
of showing that public convenience and necessity requires such
a condition. The dissenters found nothing in the act equating a
"sale" with a "service." On the contrary, the terms were found to
be used disjunctively in the act at all times."'
Pursuing this line of reasoning, the dissenters concluded that the
certificate in question in the Sun case.7 . should be held to be one of
limited term. They interpreted the Commission's order issuing this
certificate as authorizing the sale proposed, thereby limiting the term
of the certificate to that of the sale. Further, they were of the opinion
that the producer could not be bound by the Commission's erroneous
views concerning the scope of its authority and that, absent a specific
condition to the contrary, the Commission was authorized to issue
only a limited term certificate. The majority was said to have strained
the provisions of the Natural Gas Act beyond permissible limits in
order to reach a result which it deemed more appropriate to effective
regulation, and to have "taken impermissible liberties with statutory
language in order to remedy what it considers an undesirable de-
ficiency in the way Congress has written the statute." "
In the last analysis, however, the only essential difference between
the majority and minority views in these two cases concerned the
method by which the issuance of unlimited term certificates upon
'
7 0 Id. at 162.
571 Id. at 163.
512 Id. at 165.
'" Sun Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 170 (1960).
17 Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 360 U.S. 137, 169 (1960).
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application for limited term certificates was to be achieved. Both
agreed that the Commission could accomplish this result. The ma-
jority allowed it to be done summarily, without supporting findings;
the minority would require such action to be supported by findings
relating it to public convenience and necessity. The minority's ap-
proach seems preferable. In no other area of its jurisdiction is the
Commission permitted to regulate arbitrarily. The reduction of a
proposed initial rate "must be supported by soundly based findings
in the record before the Commission..... There appears to be no
reason why Commission alteration of the proposed term of a sale
should not be subject to the same requirements.
Therefore, under the holding in the Sunray Mid-Continent case,
the duration of a certificate and the corresponding duty to continue
deliveries initiated thereunder are not necessarily limited to the dura-
tion of the underlying sales contract; unless a limited term cer-
tificate is issued, both the certificate and the duty to deliver re-
main in force until Commission authority under section 7 (b) of the
act to abandon the sale is obtained. Under the Sun decision, a cer-
tificate will be deemed to be of limited duration only if the Com-
mission specifically so provides; that a certificate is issued as applied
for is not sufficient for this purpose. The burden is on a producer
seeking a limited term certificate to prove that public convenience
and necessity requires the issuance of the certificate. Because the bur-
den of obtaining a limited term certificate is now virtually the same as
that of obtaining abandonment authority, limited term certificates
seldom are requested by producers.
D. Successors In Interest
Although there is no such provision in the act or in Commission
regulations, each certificate issued by the Commission provides that
it shall not be transferable and that it shall be effective only so long as
the named producer continues the acts authorized in accordance with
the provisions of the act." '7 These certificate provisions have made it
necessary to obtain Commission approval not only upon the initiation
of a sale, but also upon its continuation by one to whom the certifi-
cate holder has assigned his interest in the gas-producing property.
Authority for the successor in interest to continue the sale may be
obtained through one of two procedures: (1) the original seller may
seek authority to abandon the sale and the successor may apply for a
new certificate, or (2) the successor in interest may request that the
575 Pure Oil Co. v. FPC, 292 F.2d 350, 352 (7th Cir. 1961).
5S E.g., Texaco, Inc., No. 4616,-FPC, May 6, 1964; Texaco Seaboard, Inc., 29 F.P.C.
593, 600, 17 0. & G.R. 874, 884 (1963).
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Commission substitute it as holder of the certificate originally issued.
The latter method is more commonly employed, and seems con-
ceptually correct. When producing property is assigned, there is no
abandonment of a sale and initiation of a new one; the original sale
is continued without any change other than the identity of the seller.
In a recent case " in which a successor in interest sought to be sub-
stituted as holder of the original certificate, it was contended that the
initial rate issue should be reopened. The Commission rejected this
contention by a divided vote and ruled that a successor in interest
stood in the shoes of his predecessor. Hence, the successor was per-
mitted to collect the last rate not subject to refund collected by his
predecessor.
Noting that the only change between initial certification of a sale
and application by a successor to be substituted as holder of the cer-
tificate is the identity of the seller, the Commission stated that the
purpose of making certificates nontransferable was a narrow one,
viz., to permit the Commission to "focus on the successor himself,
to ensure that he is not, for some particular reason, unqualified to
hold a certificate..... This position was said to be supported by sub-
stantial public interest considerations and to be required by justice
and equity. A contrary ruling, the Commission observed, would re-
quire a new inquiry into rates every time a producer holding a cer-
tificate died; might permit successors to charge as initial rates not
subject to refund the same rates collected by their predecessors sub-
ject to refund; and would introduce additional rate uncertainty, in-
hibiting transfers of interests, "thus interfering with the normal
functioning of the industry..5.. The salutary effect upon consumer
prices that might be accomplished by this disruptive practice was
said to be minimal. Conceding that some of the sales in issue were
originally certificated at prices higher than those currently being
allowed, the Commission stated that it would not allow the prices
permitted by the certificates issued successors in interest to be used
to show the proper "price line" at any time. Succession proceedings
were classified by the Commission as unique.Y
5 7 7Graridge Corp., 30 F.P.C. 1156 (1963).
.. Id. at 1162.579 Id. at 1163.
" The Commission has refused to apply the rationale which it has adopted in succession
cases to situations in which new acreage is substituted for that from which gas was pre-
viously sold pursuant to Commission certification; such substitution is treated as a new
sale. Superior Oil Co., No. 437, FPC, July 23, 1964.
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III. TEMPORARY CERTIFICATES
A. Why Needed
In almost all cases, gas producers seeking certificates of public con-
venience and necessity hold oil and gas leases on the acreage from
which the proposed gas sales are to be made. The terms of the leases
often make gas production at the earliest possible date a matter of
the utmost importance. A producer's entire investment may be at
stake because his lease may expire absent actual gas production by a
given date, or the absence of production on a given date may require
the payment of substantial "shut-in gas royalties" to preserve the
lease."' Because of the fugacious nature of gas in the reservoir, a pro-
ducer and his lessor may suffer substantial and irreparable loss to
lessees and owners of adjoining acreage each day the producer's wells
are shut in due to lack of certificate authority. If the gas in question
is produced in association with oil, it may be necessary to flare it
pending issuance of a certificate by the Commission. Some urgency
for the isusance of certificate authority also may be caused by the
provisions in the gas sales contract making the issuance of acceptable
certificate authority by a stated time a condition precedent to the
effectiveness of the sale."'
Under any of these circumstances, procedures for obtaining per-
manent certificates may be too slow. A hearing is required by the act
before a permanent certificate may be issued, even if the application is
not contested. At best, the issuance of a permanent certificate may take
several months; at worst, it may take several years. To cope with this
situation, the Commission issues temporary certificates. " 3
B. Commission Authority To Issue Temporary Certificates
The only provision in the act specifically authorizing the Commis-
sion to issue temporary certificates is found in section 7(c): "The
Commission may issue a temporary certificate in cases of emergency, to
assure maintenance of adequate service or to serve particular custom-
ers . .. pending the determination of an application for a certifi-
cate .... "'" Temporary certification procedures applicable to produc-
ers are prescribed in detail by Commission regulation."8 ' Subject to
'81 See generally Maxwell, Oil and Gas Lessee's Rights on Failure to Obtain Production
During the Primary Term or to Maintain Production Thereafter, 3 Rocky Mt. Min. Law
Inst. 133, 184-93 (1957).
85 See generally Richardson, Producer Contracts for Sale of Natural Gas in Interstate
Commerce, 11 Ann. Inst. on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 201, 215-16 (1960); Howell,
Natural Gas Purchase Contracts, 5 Rocky Mt. Min. Law Inst. 221, 227-30 (1959).
883During the Commission's fiscal year 1963, it issued 1516 temporary certificates to
gas producers. 43 FPC Ann. Rep. 129 (1963).
58456 Stat. 84 (1942), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1958).
5's18 C.F.R. 5 157.28 (1961).
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specified limitations and requirements, the regulation permits a pro-
ducer who has filed an application for a certificate and a related rate
schedule to "initiate" the sale "in the event of an emergency that does
not involve immediate danger to life or property, .... and to continue
such sale pending final Commission action on the certificate applica-
tion. The most important requirement specified is the filing of a state-
ment by the producer of its intention to invoke the regulation, "setting
forth the facts constituting the emergency requiring such action,
which may include, inter alia, drainage, threatened loss of lease,
flaring, economic hardship resulting from payment of shut-in royal-
ties, or similar situations." ' 7
Although the Commission has been issuing temporary certificates
to gas producers pursuant to this regulation for several years, its
validity was judicially tested for the first time only recently."' s The
regulation was sustained by the court on the basis of section 16 of
the act, " ' which grants the Commission authority to make rules and
regulations, rather than on the basis of the above-quoted provision of
section 7 (c), " which, the court held, "has a special relationship to
pipelines....1 The court relied on the fact that the issuance of such
certificates to independent producers had been tacitly accepted as
valid in a number of prior cases. In these prior cases, although the
point was not directly in issue, the Commission's authority to issue
temporary certificates had been assumed to flow from section 7 (c)."',
Further, in two cases subsequent to Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC,
593
the courts have treated section 7 (c) as the source of the Commission's
authority to issue temporary certificates.'"
C. Commission's Authority To Impose Conditions On
Temporary Certificates
Despite the absence of any specific authority in the act to impose
conditions upon temporary certificates, it has been held uniformly
that such authority is implicit in the Commission's authority to
588 Ibid.
587 Ibid.
58" Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 327 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
'952 Stat. 830 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1958).
5" Quoted in text accompanying note 584 supra.
5" Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 327 F.2d 893, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
59 Hunt v. FPC, 306 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 515
(1964); American Liberty Oil Co. v. FPC, 301 F.2d 15 (5th Cir. 1962); J. M. Huber
Corp. v. FPC, 294 F.2d 568 (3d Cir. 1961); Pure Oil Co. v. FPC, 292 F.2d 350 (7th
Cir. 1961); Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 270 F.2d 404 (10th Cir. 1959). This
also had been the Commission's view. E.g., Amerada Petroleum Corp., 29 F.P.C. 218 (1963);
J. Ray McDermott & Co., 28 F.P.C. 1300 (1962); 43 F.P.C. Ann. Rep. 128 (1963).
'93 327 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1964).5 94FPC v. Hunt, 376 U.S. 515 (1964); Hunt v. FPC, 334 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1964).
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grant or deny them."9' Because of the summary nature of proceedings
for the issuance of temporary certificates, it has been suggested that
the Commission has somewhat greater discretion in granting, denying,
and conditioning temporary certificates than permanent certificates." '
The courts, however, have made it clear that the Commission does
not have absolute discretion in conditioning temporary certificates.'""
The conditions attached must be "in accord with the provisions of
the act and must meet the test of constitutional due process..'... The
Commission may attach only reasonable terms and conditions to
temporary certificates; it may not act arbitrarily, whimsically, or
in a manner that amounts to a clear abuse of its discretion. 6 The
Commission's authority to require reduction of initial rates to the
applicable Policy Statement level as a condition to temporary cer-
tification has been upheld,6 ' as has its authority to impose a mora-
torium on rate increases during the term of the temporary certifi-
cate. 0 ' The Commission, however, has been judicially rebuffed in
efforts to require "floorless" refunds6 or the elimination of Btu
price adjustment clauses... as conditions to temporary certification.
Although the propriety of conditions which would require producers
to waive their right to judicial review of conditions attached to
temporary certificates have not been subjected to direct review by
the courts, they have been the topic of critical judicial remarks in
604
one case.
59 Hunt v. FPC, 306 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1962), orev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 515
(1964); American Liberty Oil Co. v. FPC, 301 F.2d 15 (5th Cir. 1962); Sohio Petroleum
Co. v. FPC, 298 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1961); J. M. Huber Corp. v. FPC, 294 F.2d 568
(3d Cir. 1961); Pure Oil Co. v. FPC, 292 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1961); Sunray Mid-Continent
Oil Co. v. FPC, 270 F.2d 404 (10th Cir. 1959).
06 Hunt v. FPC, supra note 595, at 341.
59 Hunt v. FPC, 306 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 515
(1964); American Liberty Oil Co. v. FPC, 301 F.2d 15 (5th Cir. 1962); Sohio Petro-
leum Co. v. FPC, 298 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1961); J. M. Huber Corp. v. FPC, 294 F.2d
568 (3d Cir. 1961); Pure Oil Co. v. FPC, 292 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1961); Sunray Mid-
Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 270 F.2d 404 (10th Cir. 1959).
... Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, supra note 597, at 409; accord, Pure Oil Co.
v. FPC, supra note 597.
'"American Liberty Oil Co. v. FPC, 301 F.2d 15, 18 (5th Cir. 1962).6 06Hunt v. FPC, 306 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 515
(1964); American Liberty Oil Co. v. FPC, supra note 599.
Go'FPC v. Hunt, 376 U.S. 515 (1964).
°'°Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 270 F.2d 404 (10th Cir. 1959). But cf.
Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 329 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1964); J. M. Huber Corp. v.
FPC, 294 F.2d 568 (3d Cir. 1961); Pure Oil Co. v. FPC, 292 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1961).
See also Sohio Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 298 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1959).
603 Sohio Petroleum Co. v. FPC, supra note 602; Pure Oil Co. v. FPC, supra note 602.
But cf. J. M. Huber Corp. v. FPC, supra note 602.
"' Hunt v. FPC, 306 F.2d 334, 344 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 376
U.S. 515 (1964). However, the decision of the Supreme Court held that the Commission
has very broad authority in attaching rate conditions to temporary certificates and, hence,
diminishes the practical value of the right to judicial review of such conditions.
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The decisions dealing with the Commission's conditioning power
in issuing temporary certificates are not consistent, in either ra-
tionale or result. In Sunray, °5  the first case testing the Commis-
sion's authority to condition temporary certificates, the Tenth Cir-
cuit invalidated a "floorless" refund condition, i.e., a condition re-
quiring the applicant to refund the difference between revenues re-
ceived at the initial contract price and those that would have been
received at the price ultimately found by the Commission to be
required by public convenience and necessity.0" The court reasoned
that because of the uncertainty of the condition, the applicant was
effectively deprived of his statutory choice of accepting or rejecting
the certificate and, more importantly, of dedicating or not dedi-
cating his gas to public service. The court observed that an appli-
cant's statutory choice cannot be exercised if the Commission tells
him: "Sell your gas; collect your proposed initial price; we will later
tell you if you can keep your collections; if we decide you cannot,
you must assure refund by bond."" ' The Sunray case..8 is also note-
worthy for its holding that a condition to a temporary certificate
barring the discontinuance of service initiated thereunder without
Commission approval was not ripe for review because further admin-
istrative action was required to adversely affect the applicant.
In Pure Oil Co. v. FPC,'° the Seventh Circuit, in reversing the
Commission's attachment of conditions to temporary certificates
requiring elimination of upward Btu price adjustment provisions,
appeared to be inviting precisely the kind of condition which Sunray
held invalid: "Temporary certification of the sale of gas at the
initial contract price upon condition that petitioner refund any
amount received in excess of that ultimately found proper in the
public interest would have protected all interests pending determina-
tion after hearing." 10
The court's disapproval of the condition imposed was based on its
finding that "the record before the Commission does not furnish a
sufficient basis to warrant imposition of a condition reducing the
initial price of natural gas proposed by petitioner..... Noting that
605 Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 270 F.2d 404 (10th Cir. 1959).
606 Because such a condition immediately aggrieves the recipient of a temporary certificate
to which it is attached, judicial review of a "floorless" refund condition may be obtained
only by filing an appeal immediately; an appeal from such a condition at the time of appeal
from the order issuing a permanent certificate is not "timely." Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 290
F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1961).6
°Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 270 F.2d 404, 409 (10th Cir. 1959).
606 Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, supra note 607.
69292 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1961).
'"Id. at 353-54. (Emphasis added.)
65 Id. at 353.
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the exercise of the Commission's authority to attach conditions to
permanent certificates "must be supported by soundly-based findings
in the record before the Commission, '... the court ruled that limita-
tions on the Commission's authority to impose conditions were not
affected by the nature of the proceedings underlying the order. The
promulgation of the Policy Statement"3 was held not to be a sufficient
basis in itself for reducing the proposed initial price. The court ob-
served that the proposed price was not patently against the public
interest and that enforcement of the condition imposed by the Com-
mission would result in irremediable financial prejudice to the pro-
ducer. The court concluded that the application of the Commission's
Policy Statement prior to the completion of proceedings providing
a proper legal foundation for a reduction of prices must be accom-
plished in a manner which protects the producer against prejudice.
It was to this end that the court suggested the attachment of a refund
condition, as set out above.
In striking contrast to the rationale of the Pure case was the deci-
sion of the Third Circuit in 1. M. Huber Corp v. FPC 1" Although
it quoted with apparent approval the portion of the Pure opinion just
discussed, and acceded to a Commission request that the matter be
remanded for further proceedings "in the light of" the Pure opinion,
the court in Huber took an approach to the Commission's authority
to condition temporary certificates that was diametrically opposed to
that adopted in Pure. The court rejected the producer's contention,
based on his reading of Sunray,61 that the Commission's authority to
attach conditions to temporary certificates was circumscribed by all
the standards prescribed in the act. 1' The court observed that the
issuance of a temporary certificate is "a summary matter"-"an
emergency provision"-and that, unlike other sections of the act,
no specific standard was prescribed for the Commission to follow in
"fixing rates" upon temporary certification.617 Viewed in this legal
milieu, the court felt that the announcement of the Commission's
Policy Statement between the time the producer applied for a tem-
porary certificate and the time it was issued constituted a sufficient
legal basis for imposing the rate condition complained of: "Prima
facie it provides an adequate foundation for the price condition
imposed. 61
1 Id. at 3 52.
613 Statement of General Policy No. 61-1, 24 F.P.C. 818, 12 0. & G.R. 1227 (1960).
"'
4 J. M. Huber Corp. v. FPC, 294 F.2d 568 (3d Cir. 1961).
611 Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 270 F.2d 404 (ioth Cir. 1959).
614 294 F.2d at 569.
617 Ibid.
61 Id. at 570.
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In Sohio Petroleum Corp. v. FPC," the Tenth Circuit again con-
strued the Commission's authority to condition temporary certifi-
cates, this time with Pure and Huber before it. In this case, as in
Pure and Huber, the condition in question required the elimination
of an upward Btu price adjustment from the gas sales contract.
After noting the divergent views expressed in the Pure and Huber
cases with respect to the efficacy of the Policy Statement as a basis
for price-conditioning temporary certificates, the court expressed
agreement with the views of the court in Huber. It stated that the
Commission was authorized to "initiate" a change in the "in-line"
price summarily by a Policy Statement "properly premised upon
accepted standards. ' 2 0 However, the court ruled that because such
action on the part of the Commission was ultimately subject to re-
view, the Commission "has the duty to so safeguard the rights of
interested parties as to minimize the possibility of discrimination in
its summary action. 0 2' Here this duty was held not to have been
discharged by the Commission because no safeguard was provided
the producer against the possibility that the initial contract price
ultimately would be determined reasonable, leaving no remedy where-
by revenues lost by the producer could be recouped. For this reason,
the court held the condition to be arbitrary and discriminatory, and
remanded the matter to the Commission. In so doing, however, it
commented on the refund condition approved in Pure and Huber.
In those cases, the court observed, the producers apparently did not
object to the refund condition, while in the case before it the pro-
ducer had resisted a Commission offer to substitute such a condition
for the one in issue on the basis of the Tenth Circuit's Sunray
opinion... holding "floorless" refund conditions to be invalid. Sup-
porting the producer's position, the court strongly suggested that a
refund condition would not be lawful absent a "floor" at the area
level prescribed in the Policy Statement.
In two decisions subsequent to Sohio, the Fifth Circuit appears to
have adopted the rationale of Huber" that the Policy Statement is
a proper premise for initial price reduction on temporary certifica-
tion. In American Liberty Oil Co. v. FPC,"0 the court upheld the
imposition of a condition requiring price reduction from the 18 cents
proposed to the 16-cent Policy Statement price. The court relied on
6'9298 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1961).
e20 Id. at 467.
621 Ibid.
e
2 2Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 270 F.2d 404 (10th Cir. 1959).
1
2
1j. M. Huber Corp. v. FPC, 294 F.2d 568 (3d Cir. 1961).
624301 F.2d 15 (5th Cir. 1962).
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its characterization of a temporary certificate as "an emergency relief
for the benefit of the producer,"'" and upon the express language
of the act permitting such a certificate to be issued without notice
or hearing. It concluded that the Commission's authority to grant
a temporary certificate upon the request of a producer, "to alleviate
what would otherwise injure him," "may be validly exercised much
as a discretionary act," although the court did indicate that the Com-
mission was not free to act "arbitrarily" or "whimsically" or to
clearly abuse its discretion."'
Unlike the Pure, Huber, and Sohio cases, the American Liberty
decision did not discuss the issue of financial prejudice to the producer
during the effectiveness of the temporary certificate. Implicit in the
decision was the view that the producer would suffer substantial
financial harm absent temporary certification, and that a producer
who, by the beneficent exercise of the Commission's discretion, had
been granted a temporary certificate which would "alleviate" his
financial harm should not be heard to complain because he was not
initially permitted to collect his full contract price, because any
financial prejudice the producer may ultimately suffer would be less
than his loss would have been had the Commission denied a certificate.
This view of the Commission's authority to impose price conditions
was further supported in the decision by the Fifth Circuit in Hunt v.
FPC."' The court again upheld a condition requiring reduction of
the initial rate to the Policy Statement level. Noting the absence of
a "formalized record," the court concluded that no "tools" were
available to construct a thesis showing that it was "completely arbi-
trary" for the Commission to have required an effective rate reduc-
tion. '28 The court refused to hold that it was error for the Commis-
sion to impose a rate-reducing condition instead of allowing collec-
tion of the full contract price and imposing a refund condition. In
this connection, the court said:
There are a whole host of problems, legal and administrative, wrapped
up in this choice. In the Commission's limited facility for study of the
probable ultimate merits of a sale when considering an application for
temporary authority, the circumstances would . . . have to be quite
unusual to warrant a Court differing with this conclusion inevitably
calling for the nicest of expert judgments. 2 "
The court, however, ruled that the Commission had overstepped
e25 Id. at 18.
020 Ibid.
627 306 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 515 (1964).
' lid. at 339-40.
29 Id. at 340.
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the bounds of its discretion in attaching a condition prohibiting the
filing of a rate increase up to the contract level during the effective-
ness of the temporary certificate. The court denied that its statement
in an earlier case.3 that the Commission's power to condition a cer-
tificate "is co-extensive with its power to reject or deny a certifi-
cate" ' was intended as a declaration that the Commission had
authority to impose any conditions short of denial, no matter how
harsh. Implicit in its statement, the court said, was a concept of
reasonable Commission action. The Commission's effective oblitera-
tion of a specific section of the act permitting the filing of rate
increases constituted a step beyond the line of reasonableness. To
permit such a prohibition of rate increases would be "a complete
abandonment of the approach deliberately selected by Congress and
which, all must agree, was a radical break with traditional utility-
type regulation." '
Although it conceded that the filing of rate increases to contrac-
tually authorized levels would make the maintenance of the "in-line"
price something less than completely effective, the court regarded
this as an unavoidable consequence of a unique regulatory scheme.
It noted the probability of a substantial time lapse before the pro-
ducer's lawful rate was determined and observed that, under the
condition in question, time was irreplaceable to the producer. Fear
was expressed that if the Commission could nullify one section of
the act, "then there is no end to the legislative tampering which the
Commission may undertake." '' As an example of such a potential
Commission abuse, the court mentioned conditions denying judicial
review of Commission orders. By footnote, the court took cognizance
of the fact that in recent orders the Commission actually had im-
posed conditions upon temporary certificates which would preclude
the applicant from seeking judicial review of the order issuing the
certificate."4
The Fifth Circuit's ruling on this point recently has been reversed
by the Supreme Court."' Because temporary certificates may be
granted ex parte, the Supreme Court held, "the Commission must
have the authority to condition a temporary certificate so as to avoid
irreparable injury to affected parties"" during the pendency of the
"'
0Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 290 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1961).63 Id. at 1 6.
3' Hunt v. FPC, 306 F.2d 334, 342 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 515 (1964).
631 Id. at 344.6 3 4 Id. at 344 n. 19.6 3 FPC v. Hunt, 376 U.S. 515 (1964).
O Id. at 523.
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application for a permanent certificate. The Court said it did not
believe that Congress intended to permit rate conditions imposed
upon temporary certificates for the purpose of preventing injury to
be "nullified" by the filing of rate increases during the term of such
certificates. The provisions of section 4 were declared to be inap-
plicable to a sale until a permanent or unconditioned temporary cer-
tificate covering the sale was issued by the Commission. The Com-
mission's section 4 (e) suspension power was regarded as affording
insufficient protection to the public against excessive prices which
might be collected pending the issuance of a permanent certificate.
Accordingly, the Court concluded: "The existence of broad dis-
cretionary power in the Commission to condition temporary cer-
tificates appears to us to be vital to its ability to hold the line in
pricing.")37
The Court observed that, whereas delays attendant to section 5 (a)
rate proceedings operated against the consumer, delays in section 7
certificate proceedings would, under the Court's holding, operate
against producers. It stated that "administrative devices" were be-
ing employed by the Commission to reduce delays in certificate
cases. Nevertheless, unfavorable comment was directed against "the
accumulation of a large backlog of cases with its accompanying
irreparable injury to the parties." ' Such a situation, the Court
warned, might adversely affect consumers "through the reluctance
of producers to enter interstate markets because of the long delay
incident to permanent certification." '3 The Court suggested that a
Commission study of National Labor Relations Board exemption
practices might be helpful in formulating a method to clear up the
Commission's docket congestion and to maintain a clear current
docket.
In evaluating the Commission's authority to condition temporary
certificates, consideration should be given to a recent decision of the
District of Columbia Circuit 40 involving an appeal from the Com-
mission's Skelly decision." 1 The court ruled that the absence of refund
conditions in temporary certificates accepted by producers and under
which deliveries were initiated did not preclude the Commission from
637 Id. at 526.
113 id. at 527.
639 Ibid.
040 Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 329 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
963 (1964).
6' Skelly Oil Co., 28 F.P.C. 401, 16 0. & G.R. 865 (1962), modified, 28 F.P.C. 1065
(1962), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 329 F.2d 242 (D.C.
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 963 (1964), discussed in text accompanying notes 298-311
supra.
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requiring as a condition to permanent certification that refunds be
made of amounts collected since first deliveries in excess of the price
ultimately determined to be "in line." In this connection, the court
said:
The basic purpose of the Natural Gas Act is consumer protection from
unreasonable prices, and refund of excessive utility rates is a well recog-
nized remedy. It would need to be quite clear from the Act that the
Commission lacked the power to use such a remedy for the courts to
deny it. We find no such clarity. The power does not depend upon an
explicit refund provision in a temporary certificate. Should the occasion
be appropriate for its exercise the power resides in the Commission when
it grants a permanent certificate. 4 (Emphasis added.)
Further, the Commission's authority to require refunds retroactive
to first deliveries as a condition to permanent certification was found
to be supported by certain "boilerplate" language in the temporary
certificates to the effect that acceptance of the producers' rate sched-
ules did not constitute approval of any rate and that such acceptance
and the issuance of temporary authority was "without prejudice to
such final disposition of the certificate application as the record may
require."" The court agreed that the exercise of the power to impose
such refund conditions was not mandatory, but was governed by
"equitable considerations." However, it disagreed with the Commis-
sion's conclusion that the absence of refund conditions in the tempo-
rary certificates was the decisive equitable consideration. Accordingly,
the case was remanded to the Commission for "a broader and more
penetrating analysis and consideration of the factors pro and con
a refund."'44
The court's ruling in this case on the refund issue is squarely in
conflict with the decision of the Tenth Circuit in Sunray"' invali-
dating a "floorless" refund condition, for its effect is to build a
"floorless" refund condition into every temporary certificate which
the Commission issues. This conflict was tacitly recognized by the
court in a footnote, and disagreement with Sunray was expressed "to
the extent that our decision may be inconsistent" therewith. 4 ' The
court expressed the view, however, that "as a practical matter" the
producers had been "relatively assured" of a refund floor of 14.6
cents, the price initially urged by the interveners as the "in-line"
price.
42 Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, supra note 641, at 249.
43 Ibid.
141Id. at 250.
"'Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 270 F.2d 404 (10th Cir. 1959).
40Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 329 F.2d 242, 250 n. 8 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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The Commission's current policy with respect to initial rates on
temporary certification seems to be patterned generally along the lines
suggested by the Tenth Circuit in the Sohio case;... i.e., contract prices
are allowed to be collected subject to an obligation to refund any
amounts collected in excess of those which would have been collected
at the rate ultimately determined by the Commission to be required
by public convenience and necessity, limited by a floor equal to the
area price prescribed by the Policy Statement. " 8 In addition, the
Commission prohibits the filing of rate increases during the effective-
ness of the temporary certificate.
The Commission's policy of permitting full contract prices to be
collected under temporary certificates seems sound. Contrary to the
view expressed by some of the courts, there appears to be no basis in
law for reducing a contractually authorized price until a record has
been made which supports a determination that the price is not
required by public convenience and necessity. The Policy Statement is
not, could not, and was not intended to take the place of the record
in individual certificate cases. This point is made quite clear by the
language of the Policy Statement itself.
To deprive gas sellers of contractually authorized revenues-
revenues which cannot be recouped-solely on the basis of the Policy
Statement would give the Policy Statement an unwarranted substan-
tive effect. The Commission has recognized that the Policy State-
ment in itself cannot be determinative of whether a particular price
meets section 7 standards. As has been suggested, 49 the only function
which Policy Statement prices can serve is procedural, i.e., as price
levels which are presumptively valid, subject to being shown by evi-
dence to be too high or too low in a particular case. Allowing pro-
ducers to collect the full contract price protects them against unwar-
ranted financial harm in the event they are able to support the lawful-
ness of prices above the Policy Statement level; imposing refund
conditions protects purchasers against the possibility that producers
will fail wholly or partly to sustain the lawfulness of such prices.
It seems specious to argue that the granting of temporary cer-
tificates by the Commission is a matter of administrative largesse and
that, for this reason, producers have no basis to complain of being
deprived by the Commission of contractually authorized revenues
during the temporary term. This argument assumes that a producer
can have no right to a temporary certificate or, put another way,
.47 Sohio Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 298 F.2d 465 (loth Cir. 1959).
648 Statement of General Policy No. 61-1, 24 F.P.C. 818, 12 0. & G.R. 1227 (1960).
640See discussion in text accompanying and following notes 456-459 supra.
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that the Commission's discretion in issuing or not issuing temporary
certificates is absolute. But regardless of whether the Commission's
authority to issue temporary certificates to gas producers stems from
section 7 (c) "0 or from section 16..1 of the act, it would seem that in
circumstances such as those listed in the Commission's regulations'as
"emergencies," it would constitute an abuse of discretion on the part
of the Commission to refuse to issue a temporary certificate to a pro-
ducer seeking such a certificate. In order to protect the interests of
both gas consumers and gas producers, the Commission would seem
duty bound to authorize the temporary initiation of gas sales if
necessary to avoid the waste of gas or irreparable financial loss to
producers. Both circumstances would tend to increase costs that could
be reflected in higher rates and would be inimical to consumer need
for adequate gas supplies. "'
The test by which Commission action on applications for temporary
certificates should be measured is that of reasonableness, just as it is
with respect to applications for permanent certificates. It must be
conceded that because of the difference between the nature of pro-
ceedings for temporary certificates and those for permanent certifi-
cates, reasonable Commission action in the two kinds of cases must
necessarily differ. This difference in procedural characteristics, how-
ever, should result in less, not greater, breadth of Commission dis-
cretion. It does not necessarily follow from the fact that no hearings
are held upon applications for temporary certificates that the require-
ment accepted with respect to permanent certificates, i.e., that "sound-
ly based findings in the record" be made prior to reduction of contract
prices," 3 may be dispensed with. On the contrary, the more reasona-
ble conclusion is that the summary nature of temporary certificate
proceedings, by making the requisite findings impossible, precludes the
imposition of price-reducing conditions upon temporary certificates.
It is not suggested that the Commission should be held powerless
to condition temporary certificates. As has been previously stated, the
imposition of conditions on temporary certificates requiring refunds
of amounts collected in excess of the current initial price level pre-
scribed by the Policy Statement does not seem inappropriate. The
650 52 Star. 825 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. S 717f(c) (1958).
651 52 Stat. 830 (1938), 15 U.S.C. S 717o (1958).
eas In its most recent report to Congress, the Commission recognized that its authority
to issue temporary certificates "provides an important protection both to the consumer and
the industry." 43 FPC Ann. Rep. 128 (1963). In a recent order upholding the issuance
of temporary certificates to producers, the Commission conceded that such certificates, by
permitting producers to sell their gas prior to completion of the hearing on permanent
certificates, "preclude leasehold drainage, flaring or other loss to the producers' (and con-
sumers') detriment." J. Ray McDermott & Co., 28 F.P.C. 1300, 1303 (1962).
e"Pure Oil Co. v. FPC, 292 F.2d 350, 352-53 (7th Cir. 1961).
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continued use of refund "floors" is, however, imperative. The rationale
of the Sunray54 case seems preferable to that of the recent D. C.
Circuit decision 5 which effectively inserted a "floorless" refund con-
dition in every unconditioned temporary certificate issued by the
Commission. It seems needlessly unfair and impractical to expect pro-
ducers to commit their gas to interstate commerce for a period of
time at least equal to the duration of the temporary certificate...
without knowing at least the minimum price they may expect to re-
ceive therefor. As indicated in the Sohio case,"5 ' the only "floors" that
have any rational bases are the Policy Statement prices. The use of
any other "floors" would be a tacit admission by the Commission
that its current Policy Statement prices are no longer valid.
Whether the Commission's conditioning authority is to be mea-
sured by what is "equitable" or by the more traditional standard of
what is reasonable, the Commission should have no authority to re-
quire as a condition to permanent certification refunds of amounts
collected under a temporary certificate to which the Commission failed
to attach a refund condition. The Commission's inaction in this
respect should be held tantamount to an affirmative declaration of
no refund obligation. The rights conferred and duties imposed by a
temporary certificate should be determined prospectively by the order
issuing it, not retrospectively by the order which, in effect, termi-
nates it. By even stronger reasoning, the Commission should have no
authority to require as a condition to permanent certification refunds
of amounts collected pursuant to a temporary certificate below the
"floor" level prescribed in the temporary certificate.
D. Duration Of Obligations Under Temporary Certificates
In addition to what conditions the Commission may attach to
temporary certificates, consideration should be given to the legal
position of a producer who has been issued a temporary certificate
and has initiated deliveries pursuant thereto. What obligations does
he assume in exercising the right granted by a temporary certificate
to commence deliveries prior to the testing of the lawfulness of the
sale in a hearing? More specifically, does a producer by commencing
gas deliveries pursuant to a temporary certificate thereby obligate
himself to continue the deliveries indefinitely until permitted by the
Commission to abandon the sale pursuant to section 7(b) of the
:54Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 270 F.2d 404 (10th Cir. 1959).
"
55Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 329 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cerl. denied, 377
U.S. 963 (1964).
45" See discussion of the duration of the obligations of producers who initiate deliveries
pursuant to temporary certificates in text accompanying notes 658-685 infra.6 57Sohio Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 298 F.2d 465 (loth Cir. 1959).
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act, 58 or are his obligations as temporary as his rights under the cer-
tificate? Does a producer who has delivered gas under temporary cer-
tification retain the right to refuse an unacceptable permanent certifi-
cate and take his gas off the interstate market?
It is the Commission's position that the introduction of a producer's
gas into interstate commerce makes that producer a captive of the
interstate market with respect to the gas supply in question, and that
such producer can be freed from his bonds only by a Commission
order approving abandonment of deliveries. 59 This position is mani-
fested in conditions attached to all temporary certificates providing
that once service is commenced under such authorization it may not
be discontinued without permission issued pursuant to the act."' There
is some judicial support for the Commission's position,"s' but the
question of deliveries initiated pursuant to temporary certificates has
not been squarely litigated. The only judicial pronouncement con-
cerning the duty to continue deliveries commenced under temporary
authority is the following dictum in the Fifth Circuit's Hunt"'
opinion:
His rights may be temporary, but his duties are not, or at least on the
present holding they are not. Like the ancient covenant running with
the land, the duty to continue to deliver and sell flows with the gas from
the moment of the first delivery down to the exhaustion of the reserve,
or until the Commission on appropriate terms permits cessation of
service under Section 7 (b) .... 66a
It is submitted that the duration of the obligation to continue
deliveries commenced under a temporary certificate should be coter-
656 52 Stat. 824 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1958).
619E.g., Placid Oil Co., 30 F.P.C. 283, 293 (1963), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Callery Properties, Inc. v. FPC, 335 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1964); Sunray DX Oil Co., 29
F.P.C. 1295, 1297 (1963); Hunt Trust Estate, 16 F.P.C. 831, 832 (1956); Dixie Pipeline
Co., 14 F.P.C. 106, 112 (1955). However, if deliveries are commenced to eliminate im-
minent danger to life or property, no certificate is required and abandonment authority
need not be obtained; indeed such deliveries must be discontinued after a period of 60 days.
18 C.F.R. § 157.29 (1961).
66" Judicial review of such a condition has been denied on the ground that the recipient
of a certificate so conditioned was not "presently aggrieved." Sunray Mid-Continent Oil
Co. v. FPC, 270 F.2d 404, 407 (10th Cir. 1959).
"'Harper Oil Co. v. FPC, 284 F.2d 137, 139 (10th Cir. 1960); J. M. Huber Corp. v.
FPC, 236 F.2d 550 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 971 (1957); Atlantic Ref.
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 389 (1959) (dictum); Callery Properties, Inc.
v. FPC, 335 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1964) (dictum); Hunt v. FPC, 306 F.2d 334, 342 (5th
Cir. 1962) (dictum), rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 515 (1964). Only the Hunt case
involved a situation in which deliveries had commenced under temporary certification. The
Huber case involved a situation in which deliveries had commenced prior to producer reg-
ulation and, hence, without certification.
02 Hunt v. FPC, supra note 661.
66 Hunt v. FPC, 306 F.2d 334, 342 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S.
515 (1964).
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minus with the duration of the certificate. Upon being tendered a
permanent certificate, whether conditioned or unconditioned, a gas
producer then should be permitted under the act... to decide whether
to "dedicate" his gas on a permanent basis to the interstate market
on the terms prescribed in the permanent certificate.
The proposition that the obligation to continue gas deliveries en-
dures only for the term of the certificate under which such deliveries
were commenced finds strong support in the Supreme Court's Sunray
Mid-Continent decision 6 5 which upheld the Commission's authority
to issue a certificate, unlimited as to term, upon application by a pro-
ducer for a certificate limited in term to the duration of the basic
gas sales contract. This was one of the line of Supreme Court decisions
measuring the Commission's authority upon the basis of how the
results of affirming or denying the Commission's authority would
square with certain broad purposes of the act. One of the results
which the Court stated would flow from denying the Commission
authority to issue a certificate of unlimited duration upon applica-
tion for a certificate of limited duration was that a producer who
applied for and received a limited term certificate would be free to
terminate gas deliveries upon expiration of his certificate without re-
ceiving abandonment authority from the Commission under section
7(b) of the act. In this connection, the Court said:
The proposal of petitioner was for a certificate that would by its own
terms expire when the contract with United expired. Thus at the end
of the period, petitioner would become free to cease supplying gas to
the interstate market . . . without further leave of the Commission,
and without there having been made the findings that Congress deemed
necessary.
If Petitioner's contentions, as to the want of authority in the Com-
mission to grant a permanent certificate where one of limited duration
has been sought for, were to be sustained, the way would be clear for
every independent producer of natural gas to seek certification only for
the limited period of its contract with the transmission company, and
thus automatically be free at a future date, untrammeled by Commis-
sion regulation, to reassess whether it desired to continue serving the
interstate market."'6 (Emphasis added.)
At another point in the decision, the Court referred to a limited
664 Aside from the restrictions of the act, a gas producer may have contractual obliga-
tions which affect his freedom of choice. See Doggett, Marketing by Producer of Natural
Gas Through Means-Conventional and Unconventional, 1 Economics of the Gas Industry
193 (1962); Gregg, Negotiating and Drafting Gas Purchase Contracts on Behalf of the
Seller, 13 Ann. Inst. on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 87 (1962).
"'Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137 (1960), discussed in text ac-
companying and following notes 549-575 supra.
6 Id. at 142.
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term certificate as "an advance license for the abandonment of the
continued supply of gas."6 '
In the companion Sun case,"' the Court stated that if a limited
term certificate had been issued, the producer "would after the term
have been free to apply for a new certificate to authorize the sale
under the new contract...... Implicit in this reasoning is the principle
that the obligation to deliver gas is coterminus with the certificate
under which deliveries were initiated. Although the vote in both cases
was five to four, not even the dissenters questioned this basic prin-
ciple.
The Commission itself has given specific recognition to this prin-
ciple,670 inconsistent though it be with the Commission's oft-stated
position that once gas is turned on, it must remain on until authority
to abandon is obtained from the Commission. A recent Commission
order observed that the need for producers to obtain abandonment au-
thority remains "so long as there is an outstanding certificate."'" In
denying rehearing of an order issuing temporary certificates to pro-
ducers, the Commission rejected a request by interveners that the
term of the temporary certificates be limited to the duration of the
"temergency" occasioning their issuance." 2 The Commission stated
that such request was tantamount to a request "that we determine,
upon the issuance of temporary certificates, the time when it will
be in the public interest to permit the producer to abandon service
without compliance with section 7 (b) of the act." ' 3 The Commission
thus equated the duration of the duty to deliver gas with the term
of the temporary certificate under which deliveries were commenced.
Nevertheless, the Commission has not recognized this principle as
applicable upon the expiration of a temporary certificate as a result
of Commission action on the application for a permanent certificate."4
The principle in question appears to be sound. There can be no
rational basis for holding in the case of temporary certification that
the duration of a producer's duty to deliver gas is different from that
of his right to deliver gas, both right and duty being but different
views of the same whole. What is the source of a producer's public
duty to deliver gas? Is it the issuance of a certificate, temporary or
667 Id. at 147.
60. Sun Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 170 (1960).
66 Id. at 174.6OContinental Oil Co., No. 426A, FPC, July 2, 1964; J. Ray McDermott & Co., 28
F.P.C. 1300 (1962).
671 Continental Oil Co., supra note 670.
672 J. Ray McDermott & Co., 28 F.P.C. 1300 (1962).673 Id. at 1302-03.
674 Placid Oil Co., 30 F.P.C. 283 (1963), T'ev'd on other grounds sub nowt. Callery Prop-
erties, Inc. v. FPC, 335 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1964).
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permanent, authorizing the initiation of deliveries, or is it the pro-
*ducer's act of initiating deliveries? Although it appears to be the
view of the Commission and of some courts"' that it is the latter act
alone which imposes the duty to continue deliveries, it would seem
that both the issuance of a certificate and the actual commencement
of gas deliveries pursuant thereto should be necessary to impose the
duty to maintain deliveries, and both should be taken into account
in determining the scope of a producer's duty.
"Dedication" of gas to public service, which the Commission and
some courts have been wont to find implicit in the mere act of com-
mencing deliveries, has two elements, (1) intent and (2) an act im-
plementing such intent."" Heretofore, the emphasis has been on the
second element-the act of initiating deliveries. It is not suggested
that a producer's subjective intent upon beginning deliveries from
a gas reservoir be permitted to be determinative of the scope of
his obligation to continue such deliveries, nor is it suggested (and
this is the gist of the Sunray Mid-Continent decision'..) that the gas
sales contract, as an objective manifestation of producer intent, be
given controlling effect. It does seem reasonable, however, that the
duration of a producer's duty to deliver gas under temporary cer-
tification be measured by the term of the certificate pursuant to
which deliveries are commenced. In other words, the certificate pur-
suant to which deliveries are commenced is an appropriate objective
measure of the producer's intent to dedicate and, hence, of the scope
of the producer's duty to serve.
The certificate under which gas deliveries are made by a producer
has been recognized as limiting the area from which deliveries can
and must be made by him."'7 Deliveries may not be made by a pro-
ducer from areas adjacent to those covered by an existing certificate
and from which deliveries are being made, absent a new certificate
or an amendment of the existing certificate covering the adjacent
acreage. On the other hand, it has never been contended that a pro-
ducer whose wells on acreage covered by an existing certificate are
no longer capable of production must maintain production from
wells on other acreage not covered by such certificate. There would
seem to be no basis, in giving effect to the terms of a certificate, for
distinguishing between limitations in area and limitations in time.
A temporary certificate is by definition a limited term certificate,
and under the principle announced in the Sunray Mid-Continent de-
675 See cases cited supra note 661.
67"See Black, Law Dictionary 500-01 (4th ed. 1951).
:
7 7Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137 (1960).
071 See Superior Oil Co., No. 437, FPC, July 23, 1964.
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cision the obligation of a gas producer commencing deliveries under
a temporary certificate to continue such deliveries should also be of
limited term. This conclusion is not altered by the "boilerplate" con-
dition which the Commission customarily attaches to temporary
certificates providing that deliveries commenced under such certifi-
cates shall not be discontinued absent Commission approval. The
Supreme Court has made it clear that conditions attached to tempo-
rary certificates remain effective only during the pendency of the
related application for a permanent certificate. 79 Hence, the condi-
tion in question should expire when the Commission acts on the re-
lated application for permanent authority.
Further, to the extent the temporary certificate purports to im-
pose an obligation to maintain deliveries beyond the time the Commis-
sion acts on the application for permanent authority, the condition
in question seems invalid. The Commission should not be permitted,
through its conditioning power, to create a hybrid combining the
most onerous features of the certificates specifically provided for by
the act. There can be no justification under the act or under any
concept of fair play or equity for saddling a producer receiving
benefits that are temporary with burdens that are less than tempo-
rary.
If a producer's obligation under a temporary certificate is co-
terminus with his rights thereunder, it is pertinent to consider the
duration of a temporary certificate. Section 7 (c) of the act, which
until recently was assumed to be applicable to the issuance of tem-
porary certificates to producers, 8 0 clearly indicates that such certi-
ficates are to be operative "pending the determination of an applica-
tion for a [permanent] certificate." '' More to the point is section
157.28 of the Commission's regulations, which states that under
"temporary authorizations" issued pursuant thereto producers "may
initiate the sale . . . of natural gas in interstate commerce and con-
tinue such sale ...pending final Commission action under Sections
4 and 7 of the Natural Gas Act, and without prejudice to such rate
or other condition as may be attached to the issuance of the [per-
manent] certificate . *...s,8"" The Commission recently has ruled
that a temporary certificate ceases to be effective upon the issuance
of a permanent certificate applicable to the same sale."' On this
point, the Commission said:
679FPC v. Hunt, 376 U.S. 515 (1964).
680 See discussion in text accompanying notes 588-594 supra.
68 56 Stat. 83 (1942), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1958).
681218 C.F.R § 157.28 (1961).
68' Placid Oil Co., 30 F.P.C. 283 (1963), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Callery Prop-
erties, Inc. v. FPC, 335 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1964).
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In our opinion, once we granted . .. a permanent certificate . . . , the
temporary authorization ceased to have any prospective application and
was, in effect, automatically cancelled. Assuredly the two charters did
not coexist, providing duplicate authority for the same sale .... [A]ny
temporary authority can only be effective pendente lite."'
It is reasonable to conclude that a temporary certificate becomes
effective upon the commencement of deliveries pursuant thereto
and terminates upon (1) denial by the Commission of the applica-
tion for a permanent certificate or (2) issuance of a permanent cer-
tificate and the acceptance or rejection thereof by the applicant.
When the temporary certificate so terminates, the applicant should
be free to withdraw his gas from the interstate market without fur-
ther action by the Commission."'5
IV. CONCLUSION
Since 1954, the Federal Power Commission has been the target
of criticism for failure to promulgate regulatory standards govern-
ing producers. A reading of this paper at least should make one ap-
preciate the difficulty of the task which has faced the Commission.
That the task is difficult, however, does not obviate the necessity
for regulatory standards if direct regulation of producers is to be
continued. The development of these standards is an absolute ne-
cessity if producer regulation is to achieve any degree of rationality.
The Commission's current utilization of the "in-line" approach
to the rate issue in producer certificate cases, in combination with
the "suspect" price rule and the exclusion of all financial and eco-
nomic evidence to freeze or roll back prices, amounts to an aban-
donment of efforts to develop rational regulatory standards in cer-
tificate cases. Instead, the Commission has put all of its regulatory
eggs in one basket-the area rate proceedings-and pending the out-
come of those proceedings has arbitrarily utilized all weapons at its
disposal (and some which are not) to maintain the status quo with
respect to prices.
The Commission is in error, however, if it believes that the con-
clusion of area proceedings and the determination of just and reason-
able area rates (assuming their validity) will be a panacea for pro-
ducer regulatory problems. With respect to certificate cases involv-
ing sales made after the conclusion of hearings in the area proceed-
ings, the same issues will confront the Commission that face it to-
:84 Id. at 292.
"s See Atkinson, Federal Regulation of Natural Gas-The Independent Producers' Status
13 Sw. L.J. 425, 461 (1959).
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day. The determination of area rates will not be dispositive of these
issues.
If the standards of the act as interpreted by the courts are to be
applied to producers in certificate cases, then the task must be met
head-on; there is no easy way out. No magic formula which the wit
of the Commission can devise will do the job. It would appear that
appropriate regulatory standards in certificate cases can be worked
out only on an ad hoc basis, taking into account all evidence pre-
sented in each case. Essentially, this was what the Commission was
doing in the year which elapsed after CATCO, and before the pro-
nouncement of the Policy Statement. The process, however, was
atrophied following the Policy Statement by the policies of the
"new" Commission.
The Policy Statement is a potentially useful procedural tool for the
development of standards in certificate cases. It could be utilized as
a statement of prices presumed to meet section 7 standards and of
the adjustments in such prices presumed to be proper for various
factors which might not be comparable from sale to sale. It could
be amended on an ad hoc basis as the Commission's standards evolved
and would thereby provide the best possible guidance to producers
concerning regulatory standards as they existed at any given time.
Under this procedure, as the number of cases decided by the Com-
mission increased, the regulatory standards reflected in the Policy
Statement would tend to become more precise, more stable, and
more reliable. The basic standard in certificate cases with respect to
proposed initial prices should be the current market price.
The foregoing comments have assumed the continuation of direct
producer regulation. It would appear, however, that the Commis-
sion's struggles in the morass of producer regulation have been as
needless as they have been futile. Consumers could be given all the
protection to which they are entitled against excessive gas prices at
the point of production and the Commission's regulatory burden
could be virtually eliminated if gas producers were exempted from
direct regulation and were, instead, indirectly regulated through close
examination by the Commission of pipeline purchased gas costs.
Assuming arguendo that all the staggering problems of producer
regulation could finally be resolved, there would still be no justifica-
tion for continuing regulation for regulation's sake. Producer regula-
tion has been a costly experiment. Ten years after its inception, stand-
ards have not been developed and there is no promise that they will be
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